AN

HISTORICAL SURVEY

OF

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF

GREAT BRITAIN,

&c. &c. &c.

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WITH

A VIEW TO EXPLAIN THE CAUSES OF THE DISASTERS OF THE LATE AND PRESENT WARS.

BY GOULD FRANCIS LECKIE, ESQ.

Ισοριας γαρ αν αφελη τις, το δια τι, και πως, και τινος χαριν επραχθη, και το πραχθεν ποτερα ευλογον εσχε το τελος· το καλαλιπομενον αυτης αγωνισμα μεν, μαθημα δε γινεται· και παραυτικα μεν τερπει, προς δε το μελλον ουδεν ωφελει το παραπαν. POLYB. lib. 3, chap. 31.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

Many events mentioned in this book as probable, have actually taken place; it is natural for the reader to suspect the author of the vanity of being thought to foresee the future, if the reader is pleased to deny him a merit which he thinks too small to contend for, though the reasons of his conjectures are very simple, he will agree in one point, which is, that at least ministers ought to have had the pre-eminence of talent sufficient, to have not missed such obvious reasonings.

The author long accustomed to foreign idioms, is sensible of many deficiencies in point of style and accuracy of expression, but if the matter is approved of, his end is fully answered.

INTRODUCTION.

THE events of the war which we are now waging, have already proved that all attempts to preserve the balance of power on the continent must in the end be nugatory. Two great powers now divide nearly the whole of it, and whatever assistance we give to either of them, may probably tend to no permanent good; so that the safest policy seems to be to look to ourselves for that security which we have hitherto founded on a precarious balance, and which has cost us so much treasure to maintain. This doctrine is now pretty nearly established, and the present alliance with Russia will perhaps be the last essay on the

folly of coalitions!—Whether we pay subsidies to the Russians to attack France, or vice versa, the result must be equally useless; if either of them be too powerful for the other, it is not our money, nor the handful of men which we can furnish to either party, that will determine the contest. Should one of them over-run the whole, a state so formed must fall to pieces in a few years, and the favorite balance of power will be alternately erected and overthrown. But the empire of the sea will always balance that of the land, whether it be in one or more hands. And the example of the republic of Rhodes, which made so long a resistance to Rome at a time when navies were not what they are at the present day, ought to teach us that our views should be confined to islands, or transmarine possessions.

The following tracts have been written as the successive transactions suggested the matter, result from the writer's having been an attentive spectator of them during the whole war, from its commencement after the death of Louis XVIth to the present time. Events have crouded

so fast on each other, that their cause and spirit cannot at first sight be easily discovered; but this is evident to all, that the French have been successful in almost all their attempts, that they have totally changed the face of Europe, while the British government seems never to have been guided in its conduct by any general abstract principle, nor by any great and philosophic view of human events; but rather to have suffered its measures to be determined by some bias it received at the moment.

Had the ministers of the crown attentively read the history of those countries where their arms have been engaged, or to which their views have been turned, they could never have sent expeditions abroad, called forth by the reliance upon false hypotheses, and in no way adapted either to the circumstances of the country which was the object of them, nor tending to any one advantage, in the event of success.

Thus the conduct of our armies being cramped by the considerations quite foreign to the real state

of affairs, can produce no advantage, while the principle on which we carry on the war in general defeats its own object; and the diplomatic agents we employ abroad are either so confined by the orders transmitted to them, the nature of their powers, or, as more frequently happens, by their own want of abilities, that wherever we find the British government concerned, we see the want of energy and decision, and inconsistency and weakness in all our measures. This opinion is now so deeply rooted in the minds of foreigners, that no party have any confidence in us, and our national credit is daily suffering depreciation. While the French were consolidating a great empire in Europe, we have been afraid to pursue the war with vigour, least our success should excite the jealousy of our allies; and this sentiment, the offspring of timidity, has lowered us in the esteem of other nations, and become the subject of severe sarcasm, or contemptuous ridicule.

The tracts contained in this volume may serve to elucidate the foregoing assertions, and

at the same time satisfy us, that we have not only the means of commanding the respect, but also of gaining the confidence of other nations; that the present war, were it conducted with a different spirit and more enlarged views, would produce not only the security which we declare to be its object, but also lay the foundation of a grandeur and duration far exceeding that of any empire which ever yet existed. To the attainment of that end the present system, or that followed during the administration of the immortal Pitt,* cannot be subservient. We must be led to it by principles resulting from the evidence of facts, and confirmed by the repeated testimony of the most authentic historical records.

But even though all the points which it was intended to establish in the course of the following

* Pochi anni sono congiurò contra la Francia tutto il mondo nondimeno avanti che si vedesse il fine della guerra, Spagna si ribellò dai confederati, e fece accordo seco in modo che gli altri confederati furono costretti ad accordarsi ancora essi.—

MACCHIAVELLI discorsi sopra Livio, lib. 3. chap. 11.

Mr. Pitt might have found his experiment had been tried, and recorded by a writer in the 15th century.

tracts, should not have been made out equally to the satisfaction of the reader, it is hoped they will have received illustration, and that the truth, to whatever side it may incline, will be found corroborated by some new arguments, or more competent evidence.

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TRACT I.

Syracuse, Jan. 1806.

HISTORY in its origin consisted of nothing more than the traditionary songs of bards, who celebrated the warlike actions of their heroes or tribes; as mankind improved in civilization, it became a chronicle of events, and a repository of laws and institutions: the lapse of ages, and the revolutions of human affairs, swelled the volumes, and encreased their number, while it rendered necessary the subdivision of their contents. History became a study, and the examples it contained were diligently examined, while the events of past times were applied to the present. History, thus methodised, became the basis of the science of politics, and so well is this theory now established, that it would be difficult to adduce an event which has not its corresponding example in the records of ages past.

A statesman, who is not fortified by this science, as it is here defined, must reason and draw his conclusions, not from any general principles, but from the impression made by the incidents of the moment, regarded only within a very limited

circumference, of which he himself is the centre; his reasonings, under such circumstances, must be fallacious, in proportion as the medium of his vision is deceptive. It is generally deemed unfair to estimate the conduct of individuals by their success or disappointment; but in affairs of state, when we find that a plan undertaken has failed, and that the failure was occasioned not by the fortune of war, but by inattention to circumstances highly necessary to be considered, we naturally are led to appreciate the political abilities of the ministers under whom it originated; and it thence becomes a duty to dissipate the mists of falsehood with which adulation delights to envelope the historic page.

To scrutinize the conduct of the British cabinet since the year 1793, to dispel the mists of disputes in which the sentiments of parties have had too much share, to endeavour to discover on what system their conduct has been regulated, to make ourselves sure that they ever had a system, and if so, to satisfy ourselves whether or not it was founded on really existing circumstances, or on imaginary notions, hastily taken up, obstinately persisted in, and then suddenly abandoned, is our present purpose. The contradictory propositions uttered in the course of a few years by the same mouths, might, if recorded, present a curious amusement to idle readers; but words uttered in the heat of debate it were ungenerous to collect and compare. The inconsistency of actions with themselves, with the state of the countries where they were performed, and with the end that was proposed to be attained, must certainly, before the tribunal of posterity, be the criterion by which they will be judged.

The public conduct of every nation, in its wars and alliances, will always have an influence on the character of the people; a timid and embarrassed conduct will teach the public to lose its confidence in its own strength, while active and enterprising men at the head of affairs, will give an energy to the state, which it ought never to lose.

If we look back to the national character at the close of Lord Chatham's war, we shall see that the English nation are now less sanguine in their hopes than at that period, and more disposed to reflect on the injuries they may receive from other nations, than on the means they possess of being terrible to their enemies, and of improving the advantages which they possess above every other nation. If we consider the insulated position of Great Britain between the old and new world, the discipline of her armies, her riches, her public faith, the security of individuals, her empire of the seas, her commerce and colonies, we are surprised to find that all her wealth and power in thirteen years have not gained greater advantages, and that her system of war is a system of mere defence; that to the blockade of harbours almost all her operations have been confined—that to watch and prevent the enterprises of the enemy, is the utmost effort she can make; following with servile steps the route of the conqueror, without adopting one great and general plan for the advancement of her glory and power; and instead of establishing her pretensions on her own internal strength, expending her treasures in subsidizing mercenaries. The following outline of our lukewarm system of warfare seems to comprehend all that we dare hope to complete.

We know that France has totally destroyed the balance of power in Europe, and under pretence of alliance has reduced every country, except Russia, to a dependence on herself. We know that she is bent on the destruction of the British power, and that neither treaties, nor the suggestion of her own national interest, can ever divert her from the object of her pursuit. If we look forward to war, and consider the implacability of our enemy, we must prepare for a perpetual state of defence; if we flatter ourselves with the prospect of peace, we have equally to dread the cabals, which, under the cover of friendship, will be excited at home. If the French make peace, they only change the weapons of war, and every insidious stratagem tending to our destruction, will be imagined

and put in practice. Both these points are, perhaps, allowed by all, and those who reason no further, must naturally present to themselves a very gloomy prospect: the choice must be bad if we have no alternative but endless war, or a peace, for the duration of which there is no security, and by which we are not relieved from the evils and the expence of war.

To aggravate this circumstance, we find that as the French power spreads over the European continent, one after the other, its ports are shut against us, and an absolute prohibition enforced against the vent of our produce. Thus as the war continues our commerce daily decreases, and the means of supporting our expences are diminished in proportion to the encreased necessity of that expenditure; but whether this view of the subject be deemed correct, or otherwise, it will hardly be denied that the defensive system of warfare, must meet with the highest approbation from our rival, since the motives alledged for abstaining from conquest, lead us into a line of conduct at once as expensive as the most active aggression, while it must essentially prove devoid of all the ordinary advantages of hostility. To suppose that the greatest efforts on our part to maintain a footing in different parts of the world, according to our present system, can ever bring our enemy to terms, is to overlook both what we know of his character, and what we must internally feel regarding the state of our own affairs. The French cabinet exults in our fruitless exertions, and laughs at a nominal disinterestedness, at once ruinous to ourselves, and useless to the countries we occupy. They rejoice to see that every new acquisition is to us a sink of expence, and a fresh motive for the people of England to demand peace on any terms. Nothing can be so agreeable to them, as to see us in this humour; we thereby co-operate much more effectually with the enemy, than we have ever done with our allies.

Every advantage so gained extenuates our force, while the continuance of the war gives them full leisure to pursue their projects, and our fear of being thought usurpers, or of resemb-

ling our rivals, deprives us of the advantages resulting even from the success of our arms; this overweaming delicacy also generates distrust in these who are friendly to us; for while we abstain from acting as masters in the country we occupy, they fear, and perhaps not always without reason, that they are destined in future to be the objects of barter. While the French are consolidating a great part of Europe into one vast empire, they appropriate the revenues of the countries they overrun, and apply them to convert the youth of each into efficient combatants in their cause; we follow a very opposite system.

We strain every nerve in forming a large army, we man our fleet, we protect our trade and our colonies, we watch the continent, and we are ever ready to promote the division of the French empire. But hitherto all endeavours to diminish have only tended to encrease it, and to such a magnitude has it now arrived, that any idea of reviving the independance of Germany must be very precarious, and almost chimerical; should we even see a prospect of success, let us ask ourselves if the exertions we must make to obtain it would not so far exhaust our strength before it could be accomplished, as to render us unable to enjoy the advantages it would give us, or to maintain by the remnant of our power an acquisition so fatal to our resources? In the manner in which we carry on war, all is expence, and few are the real advantages. If any such accrue, they, for the most part, belong to our allies, while we are ever obliged to act the heroic, the disinterested part! Let us recollect that this war is a contest not only for our national grandeur, but for our independence as a people, that the war is the barrier which at present prevents our destruction; but at the same time that it offers to us the prospect of power, of riches, and of greatness; if we reduce our share of it to a fatiguing exertion confined to defence alone, we must not blame the war for any sinister result, but attribute it to our own neglect of the advantages it offered. We must

therefore sometimes conquer, and if we are excluded for a time from the continent of Europe, form for ourselves an insular empire, complete in its parts, and sufficient to itself.

TRACT II.

Syracuse, Jan. 1806.

In the various changes and vicissitudes of human events, the invasion and destruction of civilized states, by the barbarians of the north, make one of the most prominent features. A repetition of similar calamities becomes every day more improbable; the conquests and colonies of Russia in Siberia, have streightened the limits of the pastoral life; their military posts and garrisons have caused the cultivation and inclosure of lands; the objects of luxury are exchanged for the produce of the chace, and the supremacy of the Russian sceptre is acknowledged by the barbarian tribes, in the payment of an annual tribute. The probability of barbarian invasion is, therefore, diminished and continues to decrease; but if the spirit of conquest is evaporated in Tartary, it is revived in Europe. In the midst of this quarter of the globe, a system of democracy arose, which at length subsided into a military despotism, animated by the principle of universal conquest. The firm basis of European policy has no doubt checked its progress, but the kingdoms of the continent are shaken to their centre, and universal aggression is as active as ever. The law of nations and the sanctity of treaties are every where violated with impunity, and without shame. A defensive system alone can never resist such a power, and the spirit of conquest must be opposed by the spirit of conquest. The British empire is at this moment combating this relentless system! In the course of her military measures, and political negociations, let us ask if the genius, foresight, and courage of

the ministry, were adequate to this enterprize, and if in the miscarriage of every project they have undertaken, it has not become evident that they have been most grossly deceived by their estimate of resources, their hopes, their fears, and their flatterers. The fall of the French monarchy, and the dissolution of the ancient government, excited all Europe to a crusade against that kingdom. Under the pretence of re-establishing the monarchy, a treaty of partition had been settled, the emigrants found themselves the instruments and the dupes of the allies, and the fortresses which were taken, displayed the standard of Austria, and not that of Bourbon. The jealousy of Russia was awakened, and the private understanding between that court and the French shew how the British minister had been deceived and betrayed.

The inhabitants of Holland and the Netherlands, who had only a few years before exhibited a republican spirit, notwithstanding that the internal factions had with difficulty been quelled, became through their rulers the allies of a party they were predetermined to betray. The corruption and degeneracy of the Austrian cabinet, the weakness of the government, the cabals of the court, the insincerity of her military officers, were alike overlooked in the formation of this motley system.—A mass of such discordant materials was mistaken for a combination of all the regular governments against anarchy; thrice was the experiment tried, and thrice it failed; and though the evidence of experience shows how imprudent it was to go to war with these disadvantages on the side of the allies, yet we are not yet cured of coalitions.

Our whole conduct during this war has been marked by indecision and weakness of measures. From the time that Pichegru invaded Holland, and drove the British from the continent, hostilities on our side was never conducted on any regular plan, founded on a general view of the state of the world. The dereliction of the cause by our allies created a thousand idle fears; and when Bonaparte threatened the invasion of

England, the people acknowledged the supposed superiority of the French, and called out for peace. Even a humiliating peace was acceptable to the trembling nation!—The treaty of Amiens, by opening the eyes of the nation, has excited their indignation, and inspired them with new courage.

But the generous energy of our countrymen has been diverted into channels, which had they produced success it could not have been adequate to the exertions they required, nor would the intended end be attained. The plan of occupying the whole of the West Indies was one of these, and was well worthy of the monopolising spirit which suggested it to the minister, who instead of turning his attention to the progress and the decline of empires, and viewing the vicissitudes of human affairs with the eye of a philosopher and a politician, allowed himself to be ruled by a party of interested merchants, and while he vainly attempted to gain a footing on the coast of Holland, insured the victory of the French at Marengo!

When it began to be understood from the evidence of facts and experience, that the French, however absurd were their tenets, and however fantastic their views, met with a success even beyond their expectations, all well disposed persons were alarmed at a spirit so destructive of those principles which had hitherto been received as unquestionable. The obvious means of opposing this torrent of innovation, were by defending every thing that was established, whether good or bad; and the defenders of established government held it equally dangerous to deride the absurdity and tyranny of an Asiatic despotism, as to question or cavil at the perfections of the British constitution. In order to render the universal aggression still more odious, it was thought expedient to disclaim any intention of extending the limits of our empire, or encreasing our dependencies; nay, we went still farther, we were taught to believe that every inch of territory, which we possessed beyond our own shore, was a political robbery, and a violation of the rights of mankind; and as one absurdity

draws on another, there have not been wanting men who asserted that we are bound in justice to evacuate all our foreign possessions. Those who were in opposition insidiously caught at these ideas, and called the government ambitious and unjust; it signified little to them how captious and embarrassing this theory would be to themselves, should they get into power in future, nor how detrimental it would be to the state; every consideration was sacrificed to private ambition. This flight into the opposite extreme, involved the supporters of established systems in a palpable absurdity; and by acting on this principle in every enterprise of the war, they precluded themselves from obtaining any advantages or attempting any conquest, which might strengthen our relative position, increase our influence and power, or be serviceable either to our commerce or revenues. By this system, instead of being the supporters of our own empire, we are reduced to become the knight errants of every weak, degenerate, and despotic state in Europe, Asia, and Africa. On this principle of good faith and virtue, we abandoned the people of Egypt to the lawless tyranny of the Turks and Mamelukes; on this principle also we hope to prolong the existence of the Sicilian government, a state which exhibits all the weakness and degeneracy of the Byzantine empire, in its last stage of degradation; though, as will appear in the sequel of these papers, not only at the expence of our own interests, but also those of the king and people.

TRACT III.

Syracuse, Feb. 1806.

At a period when a rival power on the continent of Europe has subdued the most populous and civilized regions, and united the whole into one band; when a nation of soldiers is

openly intent on universal aggression and conquest; when the British empire is the only opponent, the only impediment to this immense force, it were well to estimate our own strength, our own superiority, our own defects. In what consists the means of opposing the enemy? Where we are firm and immoveable, where we are vulnerable. What are the means best calculated to preserve the power we have, to prevent decay in the machinery of the whole, and to simplify and assimilate its parts as much as possible, so as to give it a greater consistency and stability? The British Isles contain, according to the most probable calculations, about fifteen millions of souls; but the people are singularly ingenious and docile, persevering and brave. The nature of the government, by the support it gives to good faith in all transactions, has afforded to the freedom of commerce, the valuable aid of public credit. In this empire every thing is activity and enterprise, and the moral sentiments of the people give it a splendid superiority over the profligate nations of the continent. These are, probably, the intellectual springs from which the British energy originates; and with such materials in their hands, there is no enterprise too great for a wise administration to undertake. With these very materials, however, we have laboured in vain for fourteen years to support the balance of power, and we have been disappointed in all our projects. A great and uniform empire has arisen, which exerts its whole strength to effect our annihilation. It is our duty, however, to transmit to posterity that independence which we have inherited; and as this cannot be done without encreasing our power, in order, by ourselves, to find that counterpoise which we have in vain sought on the continent, let us consider what system we should adopt, and what spirit we should call forth, in order to extend, as well as to perpetuate our empire. After we have so long forborn to conquer for ourselves, with the hope of convincing the world of the integrity and honor of our political sentiments, and of the respect we feel for the inde-

pendence of other nations; necessity obliges us to make fresh exertions not to be obliterated from the political map of the world. Before we proceed further, let us draw a parallel between the present state of the British, and that of the French empire.

The British Isles are the head and centre of our power, and as we have no frontier, our domestic empire can never be extended.

France, on the contrary, is in the centre of the principal states of Europe, and touching on all, she has profited by the means of extension on all sides; the system of federative dependence of all the surrounding states on the central power, is the tye which unites the whole mass. France is a continental, Britain a maritime power; the contest between these, is a repetition of the struggles between Rome and Carthage; but it does not follow that the result must be the same; the nature of naval power is different, and its effects are greater than at that epocha; the elements of colonization and commerce are better understood, and if we represent Carthage, we must not suppose that a fatal omen is contained in the name.

The principal point of analogy which appears between the French and Roman empires, is in their military system, and the subserviency of their respective friends and allies, which are, in fact, no more than parts of themselves, but the difference in other respects is considerable.

Wherever the Roman conquered, he inhabited, he colonized, he tilled the land; wherever the Frenchman penetrates, he neither does the one or the other; he lives on the conquered, and he imposes the tye of hard necessity and terror; but as he raises a great revenue from all parts, he pays his troops, and enrolls the youth of his allies, with what he has extorted from their own country. Military power is the great chain which binds the whole together; and the French, probably, will never become incorporated with the conquered into an homogeneous mass.

The nature of the British power is widely different from

either of these; our empire extends over many and distant provinces, situated in climates very distinct from each other. When one part is attacked, another cannot easily give it aid; a circumstance contrasting it with the compact empire of France. Our force therefore can never be concentrated except by sea; but that dominion is a band of union to the whole empire.

The British system is founded on commerce as well as territorial revenue, the prosperity and riches of the nations she commands are therefore more important considerations with her than they are to France; and it is or ought to be her policy to interest these in her cause, and to make their individual prosperity depend on that of the empire at large.

As the countries under the dominion of Britain are widely separated, and as many of them are in tropical regions, she is obliged to employ a great part of her population in the military service necessary for their defence and government. It is therefore a consideration of the highest importance, whether she can spare so much of her population from manufactures and agriculture as may be required for those objects. The hardy nations of Europe and of Tartary, have ever been the instruments of conquest and permanent power: these are at present divided between the empires of France and Russia. The population of Britain may not be found sufficient to supply the whole of our demand for men: it is therefore necessary that the conquest or adoption of European nations, should keep pace with the extension of our American and Indian empires, but on this subject in its proper place; at present let it suffice to point out the importance of the above reflection.

It has always been reckoned good policy to leave to a people the laws to which they have been accustomed, and nothing can be so contrary, even to political justice, as to overturn all the institutions to which a people have been from their origin habituated, the principle is good, and indispensably necessary to the tranquil possession of any foreign settlement, but if it be carried too far, the evil consequences are infinite.

It is evident that most of our foreign possessions have fallen into our hands from their want of interior energy and vigour, that the indifference of the people to the duration of their government, marks either a spirit of dissention in the one, or an abuse of authority in the other, or perhaps it implies both. The British empire in India drew its origin from the imbecility and discord of the Moguls and Hindoos. Our recent power in Paraguay, and the facility with which it was established, shew how little reason the people had to be content with their rulers.* Our object is to see where a line may be drawn between the opposite errors of too great or too little innovation: for while sound policy requires that the laws and religious opinions prevailing in an acquired dominion, should remain inviolate, it is an indispensable duty to prevent the abuse of their institutions to the detriment of the nation at large.

In order to illustrate this theory, let us consider the present state of landed property in India; we find the country divided into large estates, some of them equal in extent to the county of Yorkshire. All landed property belongs to the government, which lets the district to a great renter, or Zemindar. This tenant divides his estate into shares, which again are let to inferior renters, or Talookdars, and these again to Pottahdars, &c. &c. through several gradations, so that before the land is given to the peasant it goes through several hands; some small spots are possessed in perpetuity by persons holding by a tenure something analogous to our perpetual fee-farm rents in Europe. Thus we see that in Asia there is no class of men which answers to our landed interest. The Zemindars, as they first hold one district and then another, may be rather considered as traders in produce, and usurers to the cultivator, and thus may be more properly deemed a part of the moneyed interest; of course they have no local attachment, nor any regard for the peasantry.—This system may well accord with

* This sentence was inserted after the news of that event was known in Sicily.

the despotic governments of Asia, but cannot be at all necessary to the support of an European power established in a country, whose genius dictates milder institutions.

If these immense tracts were divided into smaller estates, forming a gradation down to the peasant, who possesses a few acres of land, the result would be a greater security of property, and superior encouragement to industry:—an increase of people, and the clearing immense tracts of waste land, which now cover the half desolated country of Bengal.

As our European system of landed tenure is unknown in Asia, and inasmuch as it is highly favorable to the prosperity of the people, so it would be opposite to the principle of public revenue in India*. When once mankind had felt the good effect of this policy, it would be to their interest that it should be durable; hence would arise a dread of again being under the dominion of a native power. To say that it would make them independent enough to enable them to raise the hand of rebellion against us, would testify ignorance of the temper and genius of the people. It would also imply that the servants of the company would not know how to govern the whole community by balancing the different orders of society against each other. The increase of confidence towards the government which such a measure would cause, must render the accumulation of wealth, and the establishment of a funded property more easy, and create a fresh tye on the fidelity of the subject: It must animate him, by every motive of interest, in the defence of a government on which his prosperity and happiness depended. To this system it is that Great Britain owes its stability in the midst of the revolutions which have convulsed all Europe. Man is in many respects the same under every climate; and the motive of personal interest is certainly the surest pledges of his fidelity.

In a country where the great body of the people are poor husbandmen and artificers, and where the rich have no fixed

* Because the revenue is there the rent of land.

or landed interest, little support can be expected from them; particularly when they are under the dominion of strangers, in whose preservation they can have no personal interest. Thus we see that it is in our power to prolong the duration of our Indian empire to a very distant period, if we have but wisdom and firmness to see things as they really are, and acquire clear and distinct ideas on them; and at last when our existence as a great and powerful people shall be traced only in the page of history, posterity will attribute to us the glory of having wrought a change highly important to the prosperity of mankind, and to the foundation of civil government, in a region where degrading despotism had oppressed the natives, and arrested all improvement in society.

This digression was necessary to shew, that beneficial innovations should not be confounded with a capricious violation of the laws and institutions of mankind, and that to seize the just medium, is of indispensable consequence, if we would preserve any part of our various and motley domain.

In municipal laws, and such as relate to the dispensation of justice, most nations are attached to their old forms; but where the mode of procedure either impedes the discovery of truth, or the decision of right, it would be adviseable to introduce a clearer method, and this reflection is of the highest importance. The neglect of a strict administration of justice is one of the most common defects of government; but it is this defect which, of all others, is most intimately felt by every citizen; any innovation therefore which would strengthen the criterion of truth with respect to the matter of fact, is a necessary and salutary one, it would especially tend to attach the people, and make them happy.

The people of Malta are enriched by our protection; we have never infringed either on the practice or even the abuse of their laws; it is still as difficult to obtain justice, or to punish a crime by the regular course of law, as it was under the Order of St. John; this mistaken delicacy of ours, so

vainly intended to gratify the people, is, together with the corn laws, the chief cause of complaint, and their dislike of the British power.

If the British government impart to its subjects a greater security of person and property; if our laws are so framed, and the action of the constituted powers so directed, as to produce a more strict and prompt execution; if under its influence the people can enjoy the fruit of increased activity and industry, it follows that there will exist a greater spirit of union, and attachment to their laws and institutions. If on the contrary, the want of these advantages under other governments, have produced an indifference to the public weal, and if thence be derived that weakness and want of energy, which is constantly displayed in every department of their administration;—if the general oppression of the people, the venality of officers and magistrates, and the consequent perversion of justice, the violation of public faith;—if a part, if not all these evils were and are still conspicuous in every country which has either been subjugated or protected by our arms;—if that part of the inhabitants of these countries, which was friendly to us, cherished a hope that the establishment of our power would superinduce such changes as would almost certainly conduce to the general advantage: then, to permit the continuance of those very evils to which the national weakness must principally be attributed, and which thus served as stepping stones to our possessions, is surely providing for our successor more generously than for ourselves, and abridging instead of perpetuating our own power!

But this is not all—our empire abroad is in no way an imitation of the mother country; there is no uniform spirit that pervades our distant provinces, and stamps them as much as circumstances will permit with an homogeneous character; we are too indifferent to the natives of these possessions, and we neither seek to remedy the defects in their system, nor do we endeavour to give them notions agreeable to our own.

There are, no doubt, among all nations habits of thinking distinct and immutable, which it would be impolitic and even dangerous to violate; but there are also some in which the consent of mankind is nearly universal. Where public regulations proceed from the difference of these habits it would be bad policy to make any change in them; but where the modes of thinking agree, and the regulations are contrasted from other causes, to alter them would be to remedy the grievances of the people.

The logical test of truth is the same in every part of the world; under the terms protection of commerce, is every where understood a free traffic in raw product. The tenures by which landed property is held are various; an indispensable ingredient in all of them, is security to the possessor; where this is deficient, a prudent change, or modification of existing institutions, can never disgust the people in whose favor it is made. From all these reflections it may be easily deduced in what cases a change should be operated, and where the attempt would be dangerous. We have been too often forgetful of this principle, and where we have interfered, we have not adhered enough to the maxim above laid down; we have either adopted the laws we found, and confirmed their defects and abuses; or we have endeavoured to innovate, where the nature of things would not admit of innovating; we have left the work unfinished in both instances, and where we have not been contented with the state of things which we found, we have rashly endeavoured to introduce our laws*, without considering that it was the spirit of them only, that was wanting to operate the intended improvement. More stress has been laid

* A striking example of this superficial policy was exhibited in Corsica, where we attempted to establish the British constitution among a people not prepared for it, either by the progress that they had made in civilization, by the division of property, by the habits of industry, or the love of order; this was perhaps one of the most notorious examples of imbecility in legislation ever seen in the annals of history; and the result it met with proves the truth of the remark.

on this subject, because in all our foreign possessions the general complaint of the natives has been, that though they were benefited and enriched by our commerce, yet they did not find that the government had ever been much meliorated by the British: on the contrary, that new abuses had often crept in which rendered their state in that respect worse. It is for these reasons that we see little improvement even in the people who have been long under our power, and that their advances towards prosperity are so much slower than they otherwise would be. We are perhaps good masters, but we never aspire to be legislators; and, as if we were jealous of our inestimable institutions, we seem unwilling to impart their essential advantages to others. Yet no tie can be so strong, nor any allurement so tempting to the people, as to let them freely participate of advantages enjoyed by ourselves.

These considerations would be of the greatest effect in giving solidity to our foreign possessions; while the prosperity that would accrue to our foreign dominions from adopting such a policy, would shew, that if we professed ourselves to be conquerors, any seeming injustice attached to that character would be certainly compensated by the substantial blessings we should confer on humanity.

TRACT IV.

SICILY.

The position of the British army, and the situation of our affairs in Sicily, will be developed in the following papers: they tend to exhibit our actual conduct, as contrasted with that which our real interests require, inasmuch as all our views in Italy, our commerce and influence in the Mediterranean, must be intimately affected by the consequences of our conduct in Sicily; and every reverse that may hereafter

be suffered, will in a great measure depend on the neglect of admonitions founded in mature experience.—Let us premise however, that as yet the representatives of the British government have continued to act on principles diametrically opposite to those here recommended, we cannot therefore be very sanguine with regard to the happy result of a war, which from the beginning has been carried on from false data, and from hypothesis assumed on no rational grounds.

PIECE I. *Letter addressed to the Right Hon. General* EDWARD FOX, *&c. &c. &c.—Dated from the Elysian Fields, Sept.* 20, 1806.

"Ηκω νεκρων κευθμονα και σκοτου πυλας
Λιπων, ιν' αδης χωρις ῳκισται θεων."
Ευριπ'. εκαβη Act. 1. Sc. 1.

IT is necessary, in order that I may explain to you the cause of this letter, to call to your memory the history of my life, and none of the moderns who have studied history, are ignorant of the name of Phalaris, the tyrant of Agrigentum; twenty-four centuries have nearly elapsed since the hand of death has put a period to the evils which I inflicted on my devoted subjects; my temper and turn of mind were so constructed, that I could not conceive how any happiness could accrue to myself from the general prosperity of mankind, but the human soul, when it has been so long a denizen of the dominions of Pluto, undergoes a long series of purification and improvement, which we are not permitted to disclose to mortals; nor indeed are there words among the living to express the ideas which we acquire in a change so full of wonder and mystery; suffice it to declare, that however depraved I was when clothed in a mortal body, the beauty of truth and virtue, and the happiness which results from conferring benefits on our fellow creatures, now strike me in their full force; but as I feel the loss of the opportunity which I

possessed of doing good, and that the term of my suffering is expired, and my faults expiated, this remorse would be eternal!——I have obtained from our gloomy sovereign, at the intercession of Proserpine, the permission to address you; and as it will not be allowed me to write you a second letter, let me conjure you if you wish to profit by my lamentable example, not to neglect its contents. Since the times when I lived, the island which gave me birth, and of which you are now become the defender, has undergone the most extraordinary revolutions; but it has been the peculiar ill fate of Sicily to be held by nations, either too distant, or too ignorant and corrupted to avail themselves of the natural advantages it possesses; and though five centuries have elapsed since I have had the permission to write a single letter to the living, yet I have never found so good an opportunity as the present. For in the ages which succeeded to the epocha of the Sicilian vespers, men were too bigotted and too barbarous to listen to my advice; nor were the circumstances of the country capable of any amelioration. But the picture which I will here briefly draw of the state of Sicily, will amply prove to you that I could not have chosen a better moment than the present to avail myself of the privilege allowed me, for the purpose of giving an impulse towards the improvement and happiness of those who are still in part descended from the victims of my tyranny and cruelty.

After the conquest of Sicily by Roger the Norman, the history of the country has been marked by a continual series of the changes of its masters, and exhibits a register of all the evils resulting from an erroneous system of revenue, and from the fendal institutions; but these were at that time in their vigour, and the evils which were suffered from them were common to the rest of Europe. But in the northern parts the laws have been revised, justice has been better administered, and the knowledge of letters has by degrees mitigated the mischiefs arising from ignorance and barbarism. The nations beyond the Rhine and the Danube, as well as those of your

native isle, are now the most civilized and enlightened of mankind; the northern parts of Italy have felt the rays of science by the dispersion of those clouds of superstition, which so long darkened the atmosphere of Europe. None of these advantages have yet been felt by my countrymen; but every aggravation of misery, poverty, corruption, and ignorance, has been there accumulated! But the period of the total dissolution of the whole system, civil, political and military, is at length arrived; the laws are either silent or contradictory,—the clergy are ignorant and depraved,—the tribunals of justice venal and insolent,—the revenues of the country are embezzled by its ministers,—and the sovereign, who is no other than Augustulus, the last of the western Cæsars, whose soul has been again sent to animate an human body, nods on his tottering throne!

When the final period of an empire is arrived, it is not in the power of man to prolong its existence; and though the British cabinet has employed its best troops and ablest generals in defence of the island; though it may be possible to keep out the French, who wish to invade it, for some time longer, yet the predicament in which the country is at present, will make it impossible for them to persevere for any length of time in this policy. The torrent of events held back for a short interval, will burst forth with redoubled fury, and baffle the vain attempt to resist its course; and proving to the whole world the infatuation and absurdity of such an effort!

This assertion requires proof, and it is fair that you should have it; but it is necessary that you should interest yourself in the acquisition, since before any accurate knowledge can be gained, we must possess the elements of it. It is therefore proper that you should make yourself perfectly acquainted with the manner of raising the revenues of the country; how those revenues are applied, or how they have been alienated from the crown, and mortgaged to individuals;—that you should be made acquainted with the unequal distribution of the public burdens; the cruel and oppressive taxes on corn and

bread, and the monopoly of those provisions;—that your troops are now paying taxes to the state of 60 per cent. on the bread which they eat; and that the government, besides what it receives from the prodigality of your ministry, raises a revenue of nearly 100,000 sterling on your army.

When you shall have felt, that since the revenues of the country are so raised, that any freedom of commerce, either foreign or interior, can never be allowed without virtually annihilating them by evasion; and that since the system, by its oppressive nature, is destructive of the wealth and industry of the subject;—that by corrupt administration, the taxes become every day less productive, and more insufficient for the necessities of the state, it will be evident that the duration of the system must produce universal misery and desolation;—that consequently it can never be adviseable to devote such an enormous expence as your cabinet directs, to perpetuate evils from which it can derive no advantage. For to carry your commerce to a country, where the absurdity of the laws throws so many obstacles in its way as amounts to a total prohibition, or to trade with a people whose government dries up the principal sources of their riches, you will confess, with me, resembles much those fruitless toils, which my old friend Homer so well described when he sung of infernal punishments.

It is not only the prohibition of commerce by absurd regulations which contrabands might evade, but the corrupt dispensation of justice, which takes away all security from transactions between man and man; but the inefficacy of the laws, the impunity of crimes, the shackles of landed property, the forgery of papers, all these openly defended or secretly protected by the ministers of the laws, contribute to heap misery upon misery, and to deprive the island of the hope, nay even the right, to a wise and just government. When a longer residence in the country shall have made you acquainted with all these circumstances, and when your own good sense

and sagacity shall have enabled you to form a just estimate of the deceit, the meanness, and the falsehood of a degenerate court, you will be fully convinced that, in its present state, Sicily can produce not a single advantage to your country.—That it will cost to Britain, annually, some millions sterling; and that she must content herself with submitting to this sacrifice, which cannot but be felt by her subjects at home. Or, that if she does not propose to give it up to the enemy, she must for her own sake compel the government to new model itself. But here I may be told that we are in hopes once more of replacing the king on the throne of Naples. Be it so:—and when you have placed him there, can you suppose he will be fixed very firmly, unless you conquer Italy, to the very Alps? This is another difficulty which lessens the probability of success;—but let me ask, O mortal, will the people support your cause when you come among them to perpetuate the evils of a vicious government? Will they fight for you, to offer again their necks to the yoke of despotism in the event of your success? Consider then the dangerous effects of neglecting these reflections;—consider the fruitless expenditure, to supply which you must entail perpetual burthens on your country, and the high probability of being at last constrained ignominiously to leave Sicily to those who will enter it as masters, and be received by the people with open arms, wearied as they are with oppression, and exhausted by disappointments, by their rational hopes of benefit, crushed by the false delicacy, and ill understood notions of honour and justice, in your government.

We have, in these nether regions, a manner of calculating the relative sums of good and evil, of which I am permitted to communicate to you this axiom—"that in any given mass where the sum of evil greatly out measures the sum of good, and vice versa, the effects resulting, are as integral parts of that mass; and must consequently contain of good and evil the same proportion as are in the sums of their causes." Hence you

see that if your government seeks to perpetuate the evils of this country, a great share of mischief will accrue to itself, and its own force cannot fail to be extenuated.

I shall not presume to point out to you what line of conduct you ought to pursue on the present occasion; as an English Member of the House of Commons, who arrived on this side the Styx a short time since, and who has translated this my letter from my Doric Greek for your perusal, tells me that ministers in England are very deficient in foreign information, and that they have not given you full powers to act. But surely, when you are fully satisfied that the eternal justice of Minos will not suffer the ghost of Phalaris to propagate falsehood on earth, you will not fail to represent these reflections in their true light, and if they cannot see as you do, you will be exonerated from the reproach that will be attached to having augmented the public distress of your own country, and to having perpetuated the miseries of the Sicilians.

What figure will Britain make in the history of great nations, when it shall be written, and when posterity shall read, that after having vanquished the dæmons of ignorance, superstition, and tyranny; that after her laws, her arts, and her arms, had raised her to the first rank among nations, she entered into a plan of policy which constrained her to make an alliance with, and to support, despotism, injustice, and even anarchy?—and this too without any motive of profit to herself, without the hope of being reimbursed the enormous sums she had expended for to gratify this singular caprice;—and was at last obliged to relinquish the prize she was too irresolute to hold, as a means of farther aggrandisement, to her most dangerous enemy?

If, in the vicissitudes of human events, it has been permitted to the natives of your empire to arrive at the highest pitch hitherto known of human happiness and human perfection; if your philosophers teach that the general improvement of

mankind is the great field for the exercise of virtue; if they hold that the happiness they have received from the favor of the gods is a gift which it is your duty to transmit, not only to your own posterity, but to those nations which the power of your arms has brought under your protection: how will your government be able to vindicate the dereliction of this principle with respect to Sicily? To urge a motive of delicacy to the sovereign who has been partly the cause, and is now the victim of an erroneous system of policy, is an argument you could not bring forward without blushing, since its insufficiency is evident in every point of view in which it can be regarded; and a continuation of the present measures, must inevitably produce the very effect which they were intended to prevent.

If those who have inherited the supreme power in any state, by their vices and follies precipate it fall, its can never be expected that reason and philosophy should regenerate them, or retrieve the country; and when reason is insufficient, no other means can be recurred to than force. To oblige a people, or a government to correct its errors, is to correct them ourselves; but to be at an enormous expence to support the latter in its absurdity and tyranny, is a conduct of which history furnishes no example; and which I trust will never disgrace the annals of the empire of which you are a member. If you reflect on the causes which produced the necessity of your coming to this country for its defence, it must strike you that the weakness of the government and the public poverty, had rendered it unable to defend itself: these circumstances operated to endanger its falling into the hands of France. If therefore the safety and prosperity of your own country require, that your enemies should be for ever prevented from getting possession of the island, surely it is the duty of your government to enable so fertile a country to defend itself; or at least to contribute something towards it, by making it for the general interest of the people to resist any attempt from without. Your present system, as I have already observed, is

ruinous to your own country, and oppressive to those whom you protect! It is therefore necessary that you make your illustrious brother acquainted with these matters, in order that a plan may be adopted more beneficial to all parties. It will require some experience to be acquainted with the characters of those who are at the head of affairs.

A stranger, though apparently displaced, is the great main spring which gives motion to every department of the state, and he has introduced a party of foreigners, who secretly rejoice at the victories of the French, and the misfortunes of your country. In the midst of these, the Board of Revenue, called in Sicily the Tribunal of Patrimony, are the very tyrants of the country. They are execrated by the nation, they obstruct commerce, trample on justice, and observe no law either ancient or modern. Their arbitrary and occasional mandates are the only rule of conduct before which the people tremble and obey. The only hope of the latter is in the interference of Britain, in their government, despair may one day carry them still farther! the roads are infested by banditti, who are protected by those who should chastise them, but who share in the profits of their rapine; while many landholders who cannot obtain the favor of government, have abandoned their estates, not being able to pay with the produce the impositions laid on them.

These unfaithful servants of the crown may perhaps find their account in the present scramble, but surely it cannot be for the interest of him who has an hereditary right to reign! If you defend him from his open enemies you are certainly bound to put him on his guard against the traitors who surround his throne; and if you have generously lent him the purse and the sword for his defence, you have some right to be listened to when you offer counsel. But is it not a duty on his part to provide that the plan of his interior policy should be in unison with, and in support of your measures? At present nothing can be more opposite, nor more calculated to thwart the

best and most honorable designs, and to produce the bad effects which have been above hinted.—Have you to fear any thing from the idle declamation of a few disbanded adventurers, when the voice of the whole people will drown their guilty groans—and have not the protectors of Sicily a better right to share in its councils than a party of Florentines and Neapolitans, without family, without property, without courage, without virtue! Men who have been introduced into the government to second the views of an individual, at the expence both of the monarch and the people. Will your ministry, when they know these circumstances, submit to be the tools of such men? I conceive the great statesman, who is at the head of your affairs, would feel the highest indignation, should he become satisfied with the truth of this statement.—As we every day receive news of what is passing on earth, the intelligence is often the subject of much conversation among those spirits who have been distinguished while alive. In a conversation at which I was present, in company with Hiero, Julius Cæsar, the historian Polybius, and Frederic of Prussia, the present affairs of Sicily became the topic of our discourse; and it was agreed by all that the British could not long defend Sicily, unless it was governed on principles conformable to the spirit of their own institutions, and that your government should authorize its agents to alter the system of its internal polity, cause the sovereign to chuse ministers who would restore the revenues of the country, and heal the wounds of the state. To the sovereign, who is indifferent about what is not connected with his pleasures, it must be equal whether he is ruled by the cabal above described, or guided by the wisdom and virtue of his allies and defenders: at present he is a tool in the hands of the former, and as he can never emerge from his state of dependency, it is better that he be directed by ministers who will do honor to his choice, than that he should be the pernicious instrument of those whom the whole nation execrate, and whom you must despise.

Adieu,

PHALARIS.

TRACT V

THOSE who cannot answer what has been stated in the last tract, may pretend that Sicily is a military post from which we may watch the neighbouring continent, but the following pieces will shew how far those hopes can be realized, acting as we do on the principles described by Phalaris, at the same time it will shew the propriety of our seriously considering at home the urgent necessity of conducting the war with a vigour and decision fitted to the exigencies of the time, and not on reasonings evidently founded on false data, ignorance of facts, and general error.

PIECE II. *Letter addressed to Lieutenant General Sir* J. STUART, *on his victory at Maida.*

July 29, 1806.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HOPE you will not be displeased when an individual gives way so far to the impulse of his feelings, as to congratulate you on your late brilliant successes in Calabria. Under your command, the character of British soldiers has been completely vindicated from the insidious aspersions of bad men, who have pretended that our forces by land were not a match for our enemies. Your decided victory has shewn their superiority, and your name will live for ever in these countries. Though I am no soldier, and probably not calculated to become one, yet may I be allowed, as an individual, to express my sincere joy on the occasion. Notwithstanding that I have been blamed for speaking my sentiments too freely when I last had the honor of seeing you in Messina, this has not extinguished in my mind the disposition to exercise that prerogative which we lawfully possess, of offering our candid opinion on public events. On the contrary, the reflections which were made upon me on

that occasion, excited in my breast the most flattering sensations! an individual so private as myself could give no umbrage to any one, when the imperfections of his reasonings was equal to the obscurity of his condition; and had not my arguments carried conviction with them, they could have offended no one. Were all men as just and candid as yourself, this assertion might easily be refuted; but unfortunately there is a great variety in the characters of mankind. The present position of affairs opens a wide field for reflection, and if I trouble you with mine, be assured it is not from any ill-founded hope or presumptuous wish to draw from your pen any thing which, as a public character to a private one, it would be unbecoming to write. A time may come, when, in the confidence of friendship, and in the bosom of peace, we may meet on more equal terms, and discourse on the past transactions with the same ease and freedom that posterity will trace them in the page of history.

I sincerely hope, and even flatter myself, that the tide of success is now turned in our favor; and I contemplate with pleasure the gratitude and praise which you will so justly receive from your countrymen; but I should wish, in order to perpetuate your glory to a more distant period, that your victories should be the forerunners of such events as may enhance their value by stamping on them the character of solidity! though you do not pique yourself on being a statesman, yet I conceive that to deny you the faculty of judging on clear and simple ideas, would be to commit an outrage on your character, as a man of good sense who possesses historical information. I appeal to your own knowledge of the national character of these kingdoms, its court, its nobles, and its people; if their downfall was not as much to be attributed to their own internal corruption as to the foreign force by which they were overthrown. When a government ceases to support itself on the principles of public good and public justice; when in the breast of the nobles is extinguished

every sentiment of patriotic ardor; when the sense of honor, and the love of military fame, are only empty sounds; when the general corruption of the mind has totally unhinged the ties of civil society; when those who dispense the laws in the name of the sovereign, interpret them according to their own caprice and interest;—in short when the government has no confidence in the people, nor the people in the government, how long can we hope that the superstructure will be supported on so mouldering a foundation? Suppose you succeed in once more replacing the king on the throne of Naples, how long will he be able to remain there, while the internal political wounds remain unhealed? Two things are necessary to insure the duration of his government: the first, that the principles on which it is administered should be rendered more tolerable to his subjects; and the second, that his enemies should be driven beyond the Alps.

Both these are necessary and inseparable, the first cannot be effected while a foreign enemy remains in the heart of Italy; and the second can never be secured while internal weakness and discord allure them to return; we have a report here that the Russians will land on the side of the Adriatic, and that Prince Charles of Austria is marching from Hungary towards Trieste with 200,000 men;—suppose these our allies to be victorious at every point, Italy again will be portioned out in different pieces, all of which will offer an easy prey to a future invasion of the Gauls, and thus our work must begin again. It is not from the *steppes* of Russia, nor from the distant regions of Hungary and Transilvania, that we must seek the means of repressing the power of France, or liberating Italy from a foreign yoke; it is in Italy herself that we must find the means of her own emancipation. If the licentious conduct of the French in Italy has rendered them odious to the people, it must be remembered that the Austrians equally oppressed them, after the victories of Suwarrow had restored them to the possession of their provinces.

Should Prince Charles again penetrate into Lombardy, the inhabitants will wait the event, either with sullen indifference, or passive despair; because they know that this country will be devided amongst the conquerors on the one side; or that they must relapse into their present oppressed state. It is for the interest of England to create as many powerful rivals to France as she can; Italy consolidated into one great and independent state, would become our natural ally: but we must not liberate Italy from the French, to introduce into her bosom strangers, who as a reward for their services will insist on her dismemberment, and thus renew the circle of the same revolving misfortunes.

There exists in Upper Italy a society of men, consisting of the principal nobility, whose political views are directed to this grand object. This society has existed for several years, and many who adopted the dress and language of republicans, secretly held the following doctrine:—"That Italy ought to be under one head;—and that she should adopt, as far as circumstances would permit, a limited constitution of monarchy, and enter into a firm alliance and commercial intercourse with England." Could you keep your ground on the continent, and hold out this hope to the Italian people, all ranks of men united by every tye of interest would support you, as the representative of a nation who prides herself on the fulfilment of her engagements. You see, my dear Sir, a most interesting object of exertion, the attainment of which is not to be despaired of, with the means which might easily be put into your hands (I mean a considerable reinforcement), and the brilliant figure your name would make, if successful, in Europe. "A British army in Italy, commanded by Sir J. Stuart, and assisted by the force of conviction on the minds of the Italians, overturned in a short space of time the military despotism of the French, which Buonaparte had taken ten years to erect, without being able to consolidate."

I have been laboring to establish the following poposition

which results from all that has been here said, " that to carry a war into Italy, merely to drive out our enemies, is a fruitless toil ; unless we provide the means of preserving the independence we shall have procured, by protecting and supporting the natives in their efforts to give it stability ; that to re-establish the throne of Naples, unless the French evacuated the whole of the country, is a chimera, only to be contemplated in the foggy regions of London coffee houses ; and that to seek foreign aid, while we have the whole country in our favor, is a gross political mistake." Buonaparte conquered Italy by means of manifestoes ; and such as might emanate from your pen, would be more powerful auxiliaries than all the Hungarians and Tartars, which false policy, seconded by English guineas, could embody or put in motion. Recollect, Sir, these will never be so firmly interested in your success as a people to whom you hold forth the flattering hope of becoming independent, at the expence of your rival, and the common enemy. It may be objected, perhaps, that you act under precise orders, from which you cannot deviate ; but since your irruption into Calabria it is evident you have acted from present circumstances ; and no orders could be so precise as to prescribe a line of conduct providing for events not to be foreseen at so great a distance. Since then you have the confidence of government, in part, it is in your power to give your own views on the general state of all Italy.

The invasion of Calabria may have for its object, either a simple inroad on the enemy, or be connected with a plan to restore the crown of Naples:—if the first, it will terminate in abandoning in a short time the Calabrese to the fury of their conquerors ;—if the latter, the reflection on the inseparability of the conquest of all Italy from that of Naples, recurs in its full force. And it is to be maturely weighed, whether this object has been clearly foreseen and provided for ? Should that unfortunately not be the case, we have nothing to expect but fresh misfortunes, and a cloud of future calamities, which will

again threaten Italy, and obscure the political horizon of Europe.—Were I not as fully satisfied as I am of the liberality of your mind, I should rather have encountered the risk of offending, than not communicate reflections which appear to me, from the long experience I have had of this country, not to be easily controverted. If it be evident that the fortunes of the kingdom of Naples depend on the destiny of northern Italy, (a fact which history fully establishes), you see how impossible it is to retract with honor, how difficult it is to keep what you have acquired, and how much more so to bring the work to an end! An universal revolt in the Cisalpine territory against France, can alone bring this matter to an happy issue; and to obtain this end, every inducement must be held out; and whatever is promised in the event must be scrupulously fulfilled. You know that since we met at Minorca, in 1799, I have ever held the same language; it was approved by Sir Charles Stuart, and though I did not enjoy his confidence, he did justice to my sentiments; and we have now no reason to alter opinions which so many subsequent events have confirmed. I am sensible that I am perhaps taking a greater liberty with you than either the length of our acquaintance, or your manner towards me when at Messina, can authorize, because at that place I thought I saw a visible diminution in your confidence. I am not conscious of any cause for such a change, unless it be the sentiments I expressed regarding public affairs. I cannot be supposed to have any motive in this address, but to communicate such reflections as I thought might be useful. I have no wish to obtrude myself in affairs above my sphere; but I have the consolation to reflect, that, as a spectator, I have the means of forming a comparatively impartial judgment on transactions in which having no share, of course, my passions can be no way implicated. Should the contents of this letter be eventually verified, and should the policy recommended with respect to Italy be attended with success, it will not, it cannot, but re-establish me in your esteem; on

the contrary, should my system prove false, it will give occasion to reflect how cautious we should be in deciding upon the mode of acting on a new theatre, when men after a long residence in it, can mistake the true state of a country.

I will now take my leave, and finish this long letter, fully persuaded that of two effects, it will have one; either, that I shall have forfeited your friendship by an officious interference, or encreased your esteem by reflections congenial to your own. In the one case I shall hope to regain it in some happier moment; in the other, it will be flattering to my pride to have thought rightly with you. May you continue in your career of success and glory, and be assured no one will be so ready to unite his voice in the general acclamations on your triumphs, as my dear, Sir,

Your's, &c. &c.

PIECE III. *Second Letter from the same to Sir* J. STUART, *Kt. &c. &c. dated Aug.* 10, 1806.

MY DEAR SIR,

IN my letter of the 29th of July last, I advanced some propositions to which many objections may be made; it is for this reason that, animated as I am with my subject, I again intrude on your more serious moments, and beg of you to take a retrospect of the history of Italy; perhaps one might cite an example in which your own situation resembles that of former generals, who have trodden on the same theatre many ages ago.

If we recur to that distant period, when the effeminacy of the Italians had yielded the sword to their barbarian mercenaries, a total disuse of arms, with a weak and vicious administration of government, prepared the whole of Italy to submit to the yoke of Alaric, and his successors. The feeble hand of Honorius was unable to re-animate a people whose energies had been evaporated so many centuries, and Italy yielded an easy prey to the followers of Alaric, of Attilla, and of Theoderic, who finally established the Ostrogoths in Italy, of

which he assumed the crown, distributing a third part of the lands among his native subjects. The rapid corruption and decay of the Gothic kingdom, was felt and made subservient by the courage and superior wisdom of Belisarius.—A comparison of the state of Italy at that interesting period, with that which obtains at the present moment, shall be the subject of a few lines—and I hope will excuse me for again interrupting your leisure, if it should fail to afford you any amusement. I propose to draw a short parellel between your situation, and that of the Great Belisarius, with due attentions to proper discrimination of the similarity or discrepancy of your respective situations.

When the effects of the revolution in France began to pass the limits of that kingdom, Italy, though divided among several potentates, exhibited a uniform picture of peace, effeminacy, and passive decay.

The Popes who were unequal to the task of reducing the whole country under their dominion, abused their influence and authority over the contending powers, to sanction the invasion and division of the country. But the authority of the Popes had long since ceased to excite any strong sensation; though the effect of this abominable policy remained; and Italy, at the period we describe, was disunited by mutual jealousy and fear. Buonaparte has neither exactly imitated, nor entirely deviated from the examples of Alaric and Theoderic; but he has seized the kingdom of Upper Italy for himself, and he has placed his brother on the throne of Naples: the intermediate kingdom of Tuscany, and the Papal territory, can hardly be exceptions to the universal dominion of the French in Italy. Theoderic strengthened his position by dispersing his subjects throughout the whole country; but he stood alone, and depended on his own resources for his support and defence, while Clovis was occupying the kingdom of France.—At that period France and Italy had no ties to hold them together. Buonaparte has planted no colonies; but his

mighty power in France maintains the structure which he has established in Italy. The mild government of the Goths, notwithstanding they were tinged with religious opinions obnoxious to the bigotted Italians, for a time insured a cheerful obedience to their laws; and the climate and manners of Italy softened and subdued the ferocity of the conquerors. Buonaparte has gained adherents to his usurpations by distributing employments civil and military, but his government and his system of revenue are alike oppressive to the landlord, the farmer, and the merchant.

Belisarius was called to the deliverance of Italy by a people who were weary of the Gothic yoke, but they had forgotten the refinement of corruption and oppression prevailing under the Roman government.

Belisarius had an army of nearly 25,000 men, he rapidly delivered Sicily, took Naples, and advanced to Rome. His defence of that city is one of the most extraordinary events in history; and he succeeded in dispersing the besieging forces of Vitiges, consisting of 120,000 men, advanced to Ravenna, and thus rendered the Po once more the frontier of Rome! You have landed in Sicily which is already friendly; you have invaded the continent, and the natives on every side have risen in arms in your favor; you have beaten your enemies in detachments more than proportioned to your forces; and the flame has caught through all the provinces of the kingdom of Naples. This spirit may go still farther,—the people of Abruzzo may receive and communicate it to Rome and to Tuscany, and Lombardy may finally follow their example; the rising in masse, if it cannot beat a regular force, may cut off their supplies, and a panic and total discouragement may cause the sudden evacuation of all Italy.

The success of Belisarius was equal to your most sanguine expectations; yet in seven years after the surrender of Ravenna to the general of Justinian, Totilla had recovered his lost kingdom of Italy. The Italians had again felt the corrupt

and feeble governments, from which they had been rescued by the hand of Theoderic; the Romans not having the means of preserving what good fortune and Belisarius had restored.—Italy had been conquered, but no measures were taken to preserve it; and the treasures devoted to the expedition may be pronounced to have been thrown away on an enterprize producing no essential advantage. I cannot do so great an injustice to your patriotism, or to your self-esteem, as to suppose you to be indifferent to the consequences of your own atchievements. This would be putting you on a footing with the commander of a body of mercenaries; and denying you the honorable feelings of a general who loves the country which he serves.

Let us suppose that your victorious troops, seconded by the armed mass of Calabria, &c. should clear the whole kingdom of our enemies; the restoration of king Ferdinand will resound in every quarter, and every honor he can bestow will be poured with a liberal hand upon your head. The provinces which have risen in arms, will expect, at least for some years, an exemption from taxes, or at least a diminution of them; this was extorted by the followers of Ruffo; but no sooner had the administration at Naples resumed its power, than every condition was violated, and that violation aggravated by an increase of taxes, while the licentious bands of Greeks and Epirots disarmed and trampled on the people.—The flight of the Neapolitan army through Calabria, and the enmity of the people where it passed, evidently shew that the subjects of Naples expect more from you than the power of your arms;—they rely on your interposition in their favor, and the respect they have shewn to your standard, when compared with their treatment of the hereditary prince and his army, fully evinces the truth of this assertion.

The numbers of your own disciplined troops are not proportioned to the theatre on which they are destined to act. Should the people rise in masse and declare in your favor as

you advance, we have already hinted the possibility that Italy may be cleared of the French armies. But these numberless undisciplined bands, will become an unmanageable and dangerous engine; not united either in their sentiments or ultimate views; not acting from the same principles, nor directed by the same mind; the whole of Italy may thence become a scene of rapine* and confusion! and the evils which we mean to avert, may return with redoubled violence on that devoted country. To regulate—to persuade—to restrain different classes of the population of the several states, and to unite them in one political view, is the only means of preventing this dreadful engine from recoiling on ourselves. The principal nobility should be induced to regulate their movements; and their interposition, founded on the prospect that must be opened to them, will give a form to the otherwise shapeless mass. I may venture to assert that if ever the old government of Naples should be restored, the ministers accustomed to injustice and oppression, whose long habits have taught them to confound the exercise with the abuse of power, will soon make the people repent of their rashness in having assisted a British army to re-establish a government which they cannot love, and an order of things which they had so lately consented to dissolve; the odium of this counter revolution will be laid at our door, and your victories and their consequences, will again be an ominous resemblance to those of Belisarius.

Belisarius was the general of Justinian, of a weak and tyrannic court, governed by women and eunuchs. All that he did was in spite of the cabinet which he served, and with troops unaccustomed to discipline.

You serve the greatest and most enlightened empire, where a rational freedom, and the candour which governs the public

* This has actually happened in Calabria, and has been so ever since the expedition under General Stuart.

opinion can defend and vindicate the character of every individual; we live in an age when the truth can always be told, and cabal and intrigue are ever in fear of the blaze of light which she always displays.

If Belisarius was unable to consolidate the work which he atchieved, the corruption of the court which he served, and the declining state of the empire plead sufficiently his excuse; but the vigour and energy of the British government is in the meridian; and should all the success of our arms in Italy be rendered unavailing by want of attention to give stability to our atchievements, the British government and its victorious general would blush to plead the same excuse, which, in their circumstances, might exculpate Belisarius and Justinian.

A man may be a politician, without being a general; but a general, in this and every age, must be a politician. If we take a view of the defection of the Netherlands in the reign of Philip II. will not the Prince of Orange stand high in our estimation in both these characters?—Shall we not allow the same merit to the Duke of Parma, who opposed the impolitic measures adopted by Philip? America was lost in spite of the valour of our troops, and the military skill of the generals; the fact is, that they were bad politicians:—but the successes of Lord Clive, were owing perhaps more to the political views by which his conduct was regulated, than to his experience in the field. Lord Wellesley's policy in India has brought that immense empire into our dependence; and I conceive your situation at present not only requires the skill of the general, but also the foresight of the politician,—this observation is intended to shew how inseparable the two characters are, and the pernicious effects that must follow, if, in the present instance, you are not suffered to combine their operation.

Should you readily admit this reasoning, it may not be foreign to the purpose to sketch out a plan for the settlement of all Italy, and the arguments which should induce you to recommend these measures strongly at home:—for it is

evident that, unless some plan is formed, the sums employed by his Majesty's government in this expedition will be reckoned among the fruitless expences of the war; the ministry will be loudly blamed by the opposition; the conduct of the general will probably be arraigned by party writers; and every seeming fault will be exaggerated by all the power of faction.

I have, in my last, suggested the instability of the crown of Naples if restored to its owner, so long as Upper Italy remains in the hands of the French; yet I feel that we are bound, if we are able, to restore it. But should the tide of insurrection drive the French out of Upper Italy, I conceive that the people would never consent to submit to the degenerate government of Naples. This reduces us to the necessity of having two kingdoms, making another state of all Italy, northward of the Neapolitan dominions. We have the authority of Macchiavelli to shew that all the disasters in Italy have arisen from the existence of the Ecclesiasical State; it should therefore be added to the kingdom of Upper Italy.

The whole extent of this country will have been abdicated by its sovereign, and its usurpers; and the people (not the populace) ought to give their voice in the choice of the prince and the government. This was the conduct adopted by the Prince of Orange. Deputies from the different provinces might be called to fix the future destiny of their country; and I think the nation at large might be induced to accept a wise prince and a rational government, placing their constitution under our protection, as they would already have found reason to rely on our friendship; but the temper of the people, their disposition, their fears, and prejudices, must be respected.

Let us suppose, on the other hand, that this plan should be overlooked, or too hastily rejected;—the people, in arms from one end of the country to the other, will know their own strength, they will repent of their confidence in the British, and they must then be open to cabals on all sides.

They may turn the machine we have set in motion against ourselves, or against one another, and the peaceful part of them will deplore the loss of those chains, which they had a little before thrown off.

Every thing shews the necessity of giving some system to the insurrection of the Italians. It should be guided and conducted by some legitimately constituted authorities, and these must at first be under the control of the British general. By degrees, the government and the laws which they have themselves established, will acquire reverence in their own eyes; if a competent organization be not given to these insurgents in the beginning, it will be difficult, perhaps impossible, when they become more numerous to bring them to any degree of order. I shrink back with horror at the prospect, if this necessary step should be omitted; and doubt not but that you have taken such steps as will prevent these evil consequences. I conclude this letter with reminding you, that the independence of Italy, and its consolidation into one or two well ordered states, is the first and most essential measure towards confining the ambition of the French within the barrier of the Alps.

Your's, &c. &c.

TRACT VI.

"Such extraordinary efforts of power and courage will always command "the attention of posterity, but the events by which the fate of nations "is not materially changed, leaves a faint impression on the page of "history; and the patience of the reader is exhausted by the repetition "of the same hostilities, undertaken without cause, prosecuted without "glory, and terminated without effect." GIBBON, chap. 46.

MACCHIAVELLI's History of Florence, opens with a retrospective view of Italy, from the reign of Honorius to the period when the republics of Tuscany and Lombardy began

to be considered as independent states. After the revolutions occasioned by the Goths, Huns, and Lombards, the powers of Italy were balanced between the latter, the exarchs of Ravenna, and the Popes. The establishment of the kingdom of France by Clovis and Theodebert, the renewal of the western empire by Charlemagne, and its separation from France under Arnulph, left Italy in a fluctuating and divided state.

The Popes, whose ambition aimed at nothing less than the dominion of all Italy, which they had neither the means to acquire, nor the power to sustain, followed a line of the most destructive policy. When they were unable to withstand the Greeks they sided with the Lombards; when the Lombard interest preponderated, they invited the Franks. By the same policy, they called in the Germans, to whom they gave the kingdom of Naples. Not content with these, they invited the Normans; against them they supported Manfred; then brought forward Charles of Valois; and with equal mutability raised up a rival to him in Peter of Arragon: ever hoping to rule through their newest ally, they were constantly disappointed, yet ever repeating the same experiment. This tract would swell to the size of a volume, if we were to enumerate the successive cabals and intrigues, by which they kept the country in a constant state of inquietude. As the influence of superstition abated, it ceased to be the motive or pretext to disturb the peace of Italy. The war of the succession having finally given the thrones of Spain and Naples to the younger branches of the house of Bourbon. Italy remained for a century divided among the various contending princes and states which possessed it at the opening of the French revolution. The popes had ceased to be prompted by the dæmon of ambition, and nearly a century passed without disturbing the repose of the Italians. Men had become accustomed to the order and distribution which was established by common consent, after so many ineffectual struggles, and had begun to consider them as essential to the peace and advantage of all

Europe. When the French in 1796 invaded Italy, the arms of the church had long been blunted, and the vatican had ceased to hurl its thunders; but the disjointed and feeble state of the whole was unable to survive the humiliation of the house of Austria.

Every enemy to France on the continent being silenced, nothing could stop her progress: the burden of the war fell on the British; and they, in imitation of the Popes, invited the Russians into Italy. The transient victories of Suwarrow, which in one year had left no trace behind them, shewed that we were blindly following the old policy here alluded to.

We come to the present moment* when we have invaded Calabria, in alliance with the king of Sicily:—Every page of the history of Italy is full of the deplorable consequences of its dismembered state, which during a series of ages, has been alternately the cause and the effect of its own misery, and the disquietude of Europe.

The British in landing in Italy, avow no other motive than their alliance with the king of Naples: what every nation in Europe has in succession done either for or against the pope: in this case, without being conscious of it, they are again acting for him. There is another striking analogy between this and former invasions; it has for its object a partial, or a provincial conquest. No invasion has ever been undertaken with a view to the permanent arrangement of the affairs of the whole country, consequently no nation has ever yet come with both the means and the intention, at once of rooting out the cause of its continual discord.—And in the event, the same sources of internal weakness, and liability to the same misfortunes, have been left to cause future disturbances.

If the British land in Italy, merely to drive out the French, and at the same time propose to themselves to respect the claims of all its fallen princes and states, they will inevitably leave the apple of discord to future generations, and their

* August, 1806.

atchievements, however brilliant, will be stigmatised with the same character of short-sighted ambition, which has marked the career of former invaders.

If the British carry their views farther, why have they not brought out a more efficient force, and why have they not held out the doctrine of the union and independence of Italy to the natives? To establish a cluster of small states without force, and without energy, is raising but a feeble barrier to the formidable power of France! To limit their prospects to the kingdom of Naples, while the French remain masters of Upper Italy, is to overlook the example of twelve centuries, and to expose a weak and declining kingdom to the ambition of an haughty conqueror.

Like the Byzantine throne it will totter at every movement of its northern neighbours, and we shall ever be making war to obtain a durable and honorable peace, without constructing a basis which alone can give it stability! What are the probable consequences of this conduct?—We must look forward to have an army perpetually on foot in Italy, and finally worn out with the exertion, yield to the current of French invasion—or lay aside our dubious and hesitating policy, boldly proclaim independence and unity to all Italy, and send a sufficient force to protect the insurrections of Lombardy, Tuscany, and the Roman state. By the power of the sword, aided by the vows of the people, we must impose one simple and individual government to all. By these means alone the sources of contention would be dried up; a proper limit set to French ambition; and the withdrawing Italy from both France and Germany would balance the power of both, while we should create a new and powerful ally. *Divide et impera* has been the maxim of every power which has yet visited that country; but the adoption of such a system *to the views of Great Britain* can be productive of no permanently good effect to Great Britain, and our exploits will bear the stamp of those atchieved in the last twelve centuries by all the adventurers which Papal

ambition, and internal discord, have called thither, to the misery of successive generations.

The power of the French in Upper Italy is founded on the opinion that their arms are invincible; but their insolent behaviour since the battle of Marengo, has disgusted those who had been favorable to their cause. The change of government from a republican to a monarchical form, has thrown down the ladder by which they ascended to the supreme power: the higher orders of society have been estranged by the want of due respect, with which they have been treated; the humiliations they have received have fully wearied their mind with the yoke of the French. The Italian, who considers the past and the present, who sees and feels that nothing can relieve his country from a state of dependency, turns away with despair, from the prospect of again seeing Italy divided into feeble and inconsiderable principalities. If he repines at his slavery under the French, he equally dislikes the German yoke; and the principal and best informed persons, see that none can be their true friends, but those who endeavour to promote their union and independence. If Buonaparte by tumid and pompous manifestoes in favor of liberty and equality, addressed to the populace, made good his way to Rome, a British general by proclamations addressed to the feelings, the good sense, and to the interests of the nobility and people, might shake the Italian throne of the Corsican usurper.

It would perhaps be useful to our cause, as the opinion that the French armies are irresistible shall begin to decay, to awaken the nation from the sullen apathy in which they are plunged; but they must remain in it so long as they are uninformed of what is the end of our interference in the affairs of their country. To give them hopes of tranquility and independence; to promise to relieve them from the oppression of foreign powers, will be the only method to arm the whole of the nation in our cause. It would be of use to disperse books

among them well written, properly digested, and carefully arranged in point of stile and argument, by which it might be proved to them that Britain is their only friend, and safe ally and protector; this would appear evident from a view of the past, of the present, and the future state of Italy. It must be made clear to them that our interests are connected with the freedom and happiness of their country; that we do not, and cannot entertain any ambitious views towards the continent; that the unity of Italy is connected with the prosperity of England. Most of the families which distinguished themselves in the middle ages still remain. In the breasts of many of them a latent fire may yet break forth; it would be to our honor to rekindle it, and to direct its light and warmth to the general good. Many are the families of Rome, Genoa, Florence, Milan, Venice, Rimini, Bologna, &c. &c. &c. who are now waiting in silent expectation the result of the present momentous contest. If these assertions are true, would it be justifiable in us to disregard such useful assistance? The neglect of these men will mortify the pride of the individual, and confirm in the mind of the Italians the opinion that pride and presumption, of which the French so frequently accuse us, are peculiarly the defects of Englishmen.

Any war in Italy, in the present circumstances, must be a war of opinion; and if we trust merely to force, we throw away one half of our means. The power of eloquence, and the influence of the press, will often be useful, and most efficaciously employed in concert with the sword. Our hopes, in such a contest, must depend on the influence we obtain over the mind and affections of the people, whose energies we are desirous to wield.

TRACT VII.

SICILY.

In the above letters addressed to Sir John Stuart, and the tract immediately foregoing, the means of attacking the French in Italy are sufficiently developed. At the same time it must naturally follow, from the reasoning there adopted, that Sicily is to us a necessary point; and, laying aside its known fertility, its various products, and all the other advantages it affords, that to cede it to France would be, in other words, to confirm and ensure to her the absolute and impregnable possession of all Italy. The danger therefore of losing Sicily must be evident.

Let us reflect that at this moment Sicily and Malta are the only friendly ports we have in the Mediterranean, unless the precarious tenure of Alexandria can be an exception; and that if we lose the two former, that sea is effectually closed to us; this point once gained by the enemy, the frontiers of the French empire will be not the coasts of Europe alone, but the Euphrates and the Atlantic ocean*!

Sicily is then the boundary at which we may hope to stop

* Non vos pro Græciæ libertate tantum dimicare—neque ea tantum in præmium vestrum cessura, quæ nunc in regiis castris sunt, sed illum quoque omnem apparatum qui in dies ab Epheso expectatur præedæ futurum. Asiam deinde Syriamque; et omnia usquè ad ortus solis ditissima regna imperio Romano aperturas. Quid deinda aberit quin ad Gadibus ad mare Rubrum oceano fines terminemus, qui orbem terrarum amplexu finit: et omne humanum genus secundum Deos nomen Romanum veneratur?

Tit. Livy, l. 36, chap. 17.

Let us not flatter ourselves that Buonaparte has not read this passage, and made the same application of it. This will appear more clearly when we treat of Greece.

the triumphs of France, and which we may hold firm until such opportunities occur as to justify the enlargement of our views. We are obliged to support the king of this country, in order to maintain our footing in the Mediterranean, it may be not unwelcome in the beginning of this new political connection, to give some clear and distinct notions on what we are about to undertake; what is the island we are defending; what are the people with whom we have to deal; what the form and spirit of the government; what are the difficulties we shall encounter, and what the advantages we may hope; in a word, what is the probable order of events in the course of these transactions?

Hitherto the various authors who have described Sicily, have confined themselves chiefly to the sweetness of its climate, its productions, its antiquities, its present declining state, with general reflections on its government. The object of the present tract is less to entertain than, by a strict enquiry, to prepare the mind of the reader for what must naturally happen under a new order of things. The detail of the government is different from that of any other in Europe; and though its ostensible constitution is formed originally on the same plan with our own, yet many extraordinary regulations have so far cramped its energy, that it exhibits a curious phenomenon in politics. Unless we understand this matter clearly, we shall always meet with obstacles to any measures we may propose, without well knowing whence they arise; and neither be able to accommodate ourselves to the inconvenience, nor to apply a remedy.—We have a very delicate task to fulfill; we have to support our ally on the throne; it is our duty to do it to the utmost of our power. Yet, from the nature of the laws we shall meet with such difficulties as will not a little perplex us; our engagements to the crown will often be found at variance with our political principles, with our notions of justice and freedom, and with our ideas of the happiness of society.—We cannot interfere in the laws of the country, without virtually assuming

the supreme power. We cannot support the present system of laws, of impost, and of judicial administration, without committing an act of violence on common sense, and without subjecting ourselves to many inconveniencies, with respect to our commerce, and the temper of the inhabitants towards us, as well as subjecting our merchants to an excess of venality and corruption, which none but those who are intimately acquainted with the island can form a clear idea of.

It is not intended to infer that many of the Sicilians are not aware of the defects in the present order of things; but the evil is of so long standing, and so connected with the whole fabric; so many powerful individuals are interested in its duration; and the abuse of the laws is so lucrative to the advocates, that though all men feel and confess that the government is vicious and defective, none will say where the reform should begin. All are afraid to touch it, lest the whole fabric should fall to ruin. The city of Palermo which contains the plurality of those employed by the government, has been mistaken for the kingdom at large, while the welfare of the whole has been sacrificed to the capital. Another reflection should be made:—From the injustice and absurdity of many of the laws, the non-observance and neglect of them has arisen; and this, which would be in England the greatest evil, is here a palliative in many cases where the ill consequences of a strict enforcement of them would be incalculable.

Nor should it be supposed that works are wanting which discuss the means of reforming the revenues, and other branches of the government. These have been known and approved, and attempts have even been made to act on the principles recommended in them, yet every thing has taken its former course; the evils have remained unremedied, and the sums destined to promote the reform, have been embezzled and wasted.—It is no less a curious than a lamentable fact, that in consequence of every attempt hitherto made to reform the different branches of the government, or rather the defects in

the constitution, the evils which appeared barely calculable from the change, and none of the good effects intended, have been realized;—but this is to be imputed to the character of the nation, as well as to the not having struck at the root of the evil.

The British cabinet either acts, or wishes to act, on the principles of justice, honor, and equity. Here the great difficulty occurs; we feel it a duty to defend and support the royal family in that part of their dominions which is within our sphere and element. Yet we cannot carry any important measure, without stumbling over some law, or violating the œconomical regulations of some place or other; and must therefore either tacitly abrogate the laws, or submit to be paralised by our respect for them*.

It will be evident in the course of these reflections, that the defects in the revenue system are the grand causes of all the miseries of this country. That it has been invented to make the poor pay for the rich; and of course has occasioned the languor of agriculture, the destruction of commerce, the corruption of morals, and the perversion of justice. This order, or rather disorder of things, has reduced the subject to a state of slavery. All the natives feel the truth of this, and they all expect impatiently an alleviation of their grievances.

As it will be seen from the sequel, that the greatest portion of the landed property is in the hands of the barons, and as these are totally exempted from any share in the contributions to what are called territorial impositions, the whole weight of these taxes falls on the middle ranks of society who hold farms in copyhold, or perpetual quit-rent tenure; all noble and ecclesiastical fiefs being one way or other exempted. But when an Englishman is told, that the bread which the labourer and the artisan consumes, is the principle object of public impost, it will be problematical with him whether any

* This has since precisely happened, and we are in Sicily the least favored nation, not even the French excepted.

moral principle can sanction the maintenance of such an institution. The system formed and supported by a short-sighted avidity, is cherished by the influence of the barons, who are yet ignorant enough to conceive that their prosperity is inseparable from the universal misery of the people! As their influence is still great through their numerous voices in the general parliament, and through the deviations from the original constitution in what regards the representatives of the pe ple, the king's ministers have acquiesced in their usurpations, blinded by the false representations of the Tribunal of Patrimony, which is at once a board of revenue, a tribunal of justice, a self-created legislative assembly, and a warehouse for the sale of decrees!—This tribunal is by turns the tool and the tyrant of the nobles; by means of this, (as well as the other courts) they give a judicial sanction to the greatest injustice, and are often in their turn the victims of its power in their litigious contests with each other. This will be more distinctly seen when we treat of the courts of justice; the dangerous power which these have usurped of interpreting the laws, by which in virtue of a law, a decree is sometimes issued of a tendency perfectly contradictory to the law itself, adverse to its spirit, and destructive of its intention! Thence it will be seen that no confidence can be reposed in the justice of a plea; consequently no commerce can possibly exist, where, added to so many obstacles, so much facility is given to bad faith! We have seen the vast importance of Sicily in a political point of view. We have seen how much it behoves us to defend this island; yet it ought to contribute something to its own defence; and as our policy is not that of oppressing the nations we profess to defend, it were to be hoped, that the profits arising from a well-regulated commerce with the island, might defray a part of the charges we are at for its security. But when we see what are the commercial, or rather anti-commercial laws of the country, and the other obstacles that present themselves, it will be felt that the British mer-

chant must, before he opens his trade, either see these regulations totally changed, or obtain an exemption from them in his favor.—In doing the former, all the opposition which the ignorance of commerce in the Tribunal of Patrimony, and the oppressive rights of the barons, can throw in the way, must be anticipated. To effect the latter may be more easy; but the trader will never be able to realize his privilege from the present bad faith of the ministers; or should he succeed, it will be an incalculable evil to the native; it will subject him to a monopoly on the part of the foreign merchant, ruin the imports of the kingdom, and render our name odious to every Sicilian—it will defeat the very end of our coming, as it will make our protection a compendium of all the evils that were to be feared from the French!

Let us only reflect one moment on the peculiarly lamentable state of this country! Unable to defend herself,—groaning under the defects of her own institutions, and not possessing energy or virtue sufficient for her own reform; falling under the protection of a government, whose delicacy and point of honor, may permit her to continue for an indefinite period, in this hapless state, rather than expose itself to the blame of usurpation, by an interference, which must not only be beneficial to the nation, but also to the sovereign!—Sicily is in the state of one oppressed by the night-mare; she cannot move, she can make no exertion, Britannia is sitting by the bed-side, and though she knows the malady under which her sister labours, permits her suffering to continue, lest herself should be accused of officiousness, or of unfriendly intrusion!

If this statement be just, in what an aukward dilemma do these circumstances place our government! The opposition at home, on a superficial or partial review of its policy, will accuse it of usurpation if it meddle with the internal administration of the island, while if it remain totally inactive, we shall justly incur the odium of the natives. These will soon feel that the weakness of the government in the execution of the laws, and

the consequent facility of evading what could not be done away, has made room for the power of enforcing them by the support of a British army. That their yoke is thus rendered still heavier, while our troops become the janissaries of a body of lawyers, who have explained away the laws according to their own interest or caprice, ruined the commerce and agriculture of the country, and assisted the despotism of the minister, while the sovereign, blinded by official forms, is the dupe and tool of both. Nor should these reflections be attributed to a desire to urge ministers to any act by which the British name might be exposed to dishonor. Let us not merit the charge of usurpation on the one hand, nor that of being the passive tools of a vitiated and depraved government on the other! The means of avoiding both these extremes may be seen in the letter signed Phalaris in the beginning of these tracts; and other pieces in the sequel will perhaps throw a still clearer light on that subject.

Let us indulge ourselves with a view into futurity, and hence draw some arguments in favor of the measures we have proposed. There is reason to doubt that the immense empire which Buonaparte has founded, will easily be kept together in case of his death. The comprehensive energy which he possesses, will probably not be an hereditary virtue with his successors; and it would be salutary to prepare the readiest means of availing ourselves of such an event. As the French yoke is known to be oppressive to the Italians, it would be expedient to provide an asylum for those who wished to fly from their tyranny. It is on this account, as well as on every other, to be wished that the government and laws of this island were so happily contrived, as to form a striking contrast with the military despotism of the French. This, in the event of any convulsions which may hereafter have place in that empire, may induce the Italian people to regard the exiled family of Naples as their real sovereigns, and to look up to them as a refuge from their sufferings; if they can have

confidence in the wisdom of the Sicilian laws. It is by these means alone that the king can ever hope to regain his lost throne; and it is the surest method of laying the foundation (if not for himself, at least for his heirs,) of one more brilliant, and more exalted.

Independently of all former arguments in favor of a reform in Sicily, let us reflect that the French revolutionists extended their power by affecting to assimilate the government of other countries to their own; and if this deceitful plan succeeded, Britain by propagating among mankind the principles of freedom and of justice, may hope to counteract them with success. Were the spirit of our institutions imitated in other parts of Europe, wherever this happened, we should find friends and allies; and our system ought to be opposed to the military and revolutionary code: it is the only one capable of being contrasted advantageously with them, as all the simple monarchies on the continent have crumbled before them.

During the Peloponesian war, the Lacedemonians supported the aristocratic, the Athenian the democratic party. Had one of these states had no proselytes or adherents in political opinions, it could not have resisted the other; which had that advantage. By being the head of a system of polity, our existence would be essential to that of every inferior state founded on the same principles. It therefore seems reasonable as a point of self interest, to promulgate our political sentiments, and impart them to those whom we protect; since we should thus form a party united to us not only by opinion, but by the desire of self preservation.

TRACT VIII.

PICTURE OF SICILY.

Syracuse, July, 1806.

Situation, Extent, and Produce of Sicily.—SICILY is the largest island in the Mediterranean, situated between the 36 and 39 deg. of N. latitude, and the 12 and 16 long. east of London, in the very centre of the Mediterranean.—Its climate has not the disadvantages of a tropical region, while it is exempt from the rigours which are felt in the north; partaking equally of the advantages of both;—its warmer vales are equal to the production of many East and West India commodities, while the mountainous parts yield the fruit of Europe; the fertility of the soil has been from the earliest ages the theme of both poets and historians, and its natural curiosities attract the attention of the modern traveller. It is of a triangular form, the smaller side of which from Cape Pelorus to Pachynus looks to the east, and the apex at Trapani to which this is the base, point to the west. It contains an area of about 9600 square miles; a continuation of the Apennine ridge runs throughout its whole extent, from the point of the Faro of Messina called Pelorus, to mount Eryx, at Trapani; while another branch extends round Mount Etna across the south-west, uniting with the former chain, and branching off to south-east to Caltagirone, where it is intersected by the plain of Catania, but approaching at the celebrated Lake of Palica to the Hyblean chain, occupies the county of Modica, which it divides from the plains of Noto and Syracuse. Sicily presents to the eye the figure of a triangular wedge, whose thickest part is to the north and east, while its edges gradually fall off towards Mazzara, Marsalla, and Trapani.

The interior of the country presents a bold and varied surface; the mountains are higher, and the vallies more narrow in Sicily than in many other countries; this unevenness of surface, and the height of the mountains, gives in a short space all the varities of climate experienced in the course of long journeys. To enumerate the various productions of Sicily would require a volume; suffice it to touch on those objects which we stand most in need of. Its wines are equal to those of Spain and Portugal, when properly attended to:—could the wine trade to Portugal, which is now totally tributary to and dependent on France, be transferred to Sicily, the value would not go to enrich our enemies; the cotton of Sicily is equal to that of Surinam. Hemp grows in abundance in Sicily, and there are vast tracts of low and rich lands yet waste, where the culture might be extended with success. As yet, however, it is produced only in proportion to the demand; but there is no doubt that were that encreased, and the difficulties of exportation lessened, at the same time that the peasantry should be better treated and encouraged, that Sicily might render us less dependent on Russia, for a supply of that commodity. Sweet oil, both coarse and fine, is abundantly produced in Sicily. Raisins, figs, pistachios, almonds, rice, Indian corn, flax, guinea corn, soda, and even the sugar cane flourish here. There is also a mineral pitch or asphaltum, which chemists call sulphate of petrolium; this might be used for ships bottoms with success. Fossil coal is abundant, but no mine is worked—timber is still abundant in some parts, but the woods are neglected and destroyed, partly from ignorance, partly from bad policy, and erroneous system of forest laws.

Distribution and Population.—The whole island is divided into three provinces, viz.—the Val Demona, Val di Noto, and Val di Mazzara, this topographical division seems to have no connection with the government, as the whole kingdom politically

considered, is comprehended under the three bracci (arms,) or orders. The military or feodal, the clergy, and the demesne, or royal townships, which answer to our free burghs in the rest of Europe. The population of the whole kingdom is estimated at 1,500,000. Palermo contains 200,000 souls; Messina, 80,000; Catania 70,000; Caltagirone 50,000; Noto 35,000; these are the principal towns in the island.

Division of the Landed Property.—Roger the Norman, conqueror of Sicily, cotemporary with our William the First, on his accession to the throne, divided the lands of the kingdom into three portions, one third of these were called the demesnes of the crown, which are administered by the corporations of the royal towns where they are situated, each town according to the revenue of its demesnial lands, pays to the king a certain income, besides maintaining the police, roads, &c. &c. and the tribute which each territory pays is called the royal patrimony. The Tribunal of Patrimony, of which we shall give a description in its place, is the supreme moderator and comptroller of this revenue.

A next third part of these lands was distributed by King Roger among his nobles; some of these were fiefs contained within the territory of the royal or demesnial towns, while others had a town of their own, of which the estate or barony formed the territory. Sometimes the townships of these baronial towns have estates belong to them, which are administered by their corporations, called giurati. The remaining third portion was either distributed among the bishops or mitred abbots, or served to endow the several convents which in an age fertile in superstition were so generally established.

This distribution of property has remained thus ever since the Norman conquest, and all the noble fiefs as they are held by a grant in military tenure, are supposed to belong to the crown, and given to a family and their descendants, subject to military service. This circumstance supposes an absolutely

strict entail, which prevents the sale of fiefs without the king's sanction (verbo regio); it supposes also the indivisibility of the fief—hence the rights of primogeniture, which has reduced the younger branches of families to a most miserable state.

Thus the lands of the nobles are entailed in their families. Those of the church are attached to it, and the demesne lands are equally so to the corporations, as is above-mentioned.—Though the obstacles to the alienation of property are in some measure removed, yet enough remains to generate numerous law-suits, and to prevent those who have much land and no money from selling one part in order to improve the rest. For if any claimants in succession put in their plea, either the sale is prevented, or the title becomes disputed. This is much the case with the inferior class of landholders who possess farms granted in copyhold, on noble, ecclesiastical, or demesnial estates. In Syracuse the low lands near the Fountain of the Cyane are now marshes, the possessors have no capital to improve them; and, as they are entailed, no one else who has money can make the acquisition.

Orders of Society.—Those princes, dukes, marquisses, and barons, who hold estates which have a town, or sufficient population, are called parliamentary barons, and have a right to sit in the assembly of the nobles: all others are called rustic fiefs, and give no right of this kind to their landlords, though they be decorated with a title.

The next order of men are the clergy, who form a distinct assembly or house in the parliament, and consists of archbishops, bishops, archimandrites, mitred abbots, &c. The principal of these are younger brothers of the noble families, so that, in fact, the ecclesiastical house of parliament is tied to the lords.

The next order of men consists of a second rank of nobles, who hold fiefs without burghs or towns, and who, though they

have the same splendid titles, have no seat in the parliament; many of these inhabit the principal cities in the kingdom.

The next order are the burghers of the different towns; these apply to agriculture, to the church, and to the medical and legal professions; then come the artizans and peasants. These are the peasants of the demesne, and those who are the vassals of the parliamentary lords.

Royal Demesnes.—The royal demesnes, consisting as we have before observed, of those lands which King Roger reserved to himself, are the territories of the royal townships.—Each town contributes its quota to the royal patrimony, and all must send their accounts to the tribunal of the same name in Palermo. The giurati (or aldermen) are annually nominated by the tribunal, from the list of principal nobles and burghers, in each town, as well as the captain of justice, answering to our sheriffs; and the latter is answerable for all robberies committed within the territory between sun and sun; the quota of each township is fixed; the surplus serves for paving streets, or any other public work.

"Monstrum horrendem informe ingens cui lumen ademptum," VIRGIL.

The Tribunal of Patrimony.—The Tribunal of Patrimony consists of six members, viz. the President, the Conservadore Generale, who is the King's Advocate, and four judges.

As this board superintends the king's territorial revenues, so it commands the municipalities of the royal and baronial towns; and as the porperty of every individual is implicated either in the one or the other, so it has become a civil court, under the pretence of an authority in what regards the royal interests. In the same manner it has an authority over all ecclesiastical lands, and the copyholds granted thereon by the crown; thus no act whatever with regard to landed property can be done without its cognizance. In the same manner as all duties on exports and imports (which answer to tunnage

and poundage), and which are enforced with all possible rigor: and the exports and imports themselves interest the royal revenues, so this board has assumed a dictatorial right to command,—not by fixed rules or general laws, but by issuing an order or permission on every individual occasion. None of the produce of the country, that is, corn, oil, and some others, as cattle, &c. can be exported without its permission, though the exporter offers to pay the duties; the permission to export hemp is given annually, as an exclusive privilege, to one person in a maritime district; so that the merchant who would export it must not only pay the duties to the king, but a duty to this individual; thus the Tribunal, after obliging the merchant to pay the tax, farms another for their own emolument to the best bidder. With regard to corn, cattle, and oil, the greatest difficulty occurs in the exportation: and a particular order is requisite from Palermo, to obtain a permission for the same; to procure this the trader must bribe through thick and thin. Sometimes the right of exportation is allowed for a short time, and then suddenly stopped; and thus causes the ruin of those who had provided a quantity to ship off.

The Tribunal of Patrimony sends a strict order, either to the corporations of the towns, or the corn deputies, where these exist, (for every town in Sicily has its particular government, weights, and measnres, by which much profitable confusion arises) to provide as much wheat as will serve for the whole year; this, under pretence of being directed for the public good, produces the disorders and injustice which it is here our business to unfold. The corn trade is a monopoly in the hands of the corporations; in order to support them in this abuse, these are invested with an absolute authority to prevent the produce of their district from being carried to a neighbouring town, and to forbid that of another from being admitted into their territory. Thus arises a complete stagnation of the inland trade; if once the prices of corn should fall after the corporation has made its provision, the severest

penalties are inflicted on any one who should endeavour to bring his corn to market, and he must submit to sell it, giving up his profit to the corporation, or let it spoil in his magazines; if he grinds it into flour it is seized, and should he attempt to export it, he runs the risk of being cashiered and ruined.

A certain farmer of the town of Granmichele, in the Val di Noto, had in a granary in the territory of Mineo, about fifty quarters of wheat, which then bore an high price, as it was a year of scarcity:—the giurati or corporation, without asking any questions, broke open the same, and took the wheat to their town. The farmer's complaint to the tribunal was answered by a full approbation of the conduct of the giurati, but with an order that he should be paid by them, allowing a credit of some months; during this interval the office of these (who are chosen annually) expired; their successors refused to pay, and the farmer having prosecuted the corporation, before the same tribunal which had given the above order, was cast; so that he was first plundered, and the public robbery thus sanctioned by a decision of the court, made contrary to their own orders. This person is still alive, and is baronial governor of Granmichele for the Prince of Butera!

The privelege of supplying the city of Palermo with oil and cattle is granted to contractors; these exercise every kind of tyranny; as the tribunal supports them in every measure which they can devise to oblige the holder to sell to a disadvantage, and these gentlemen are in return handsomely complimented by the contractors. Until these last have bought the oil they want at the price which suits them, no exportation is allowed; and even then the tribunal makes so many difficulties in order to get bribes to permit the exportation, that the whole disappears in contraband; thus the smuggling trade saves the country from absolute ruin; and if it could be prevented, no one would find it worth his while to press out his olives; as the above illicit trade prevents the prices from

being totally degraded: two years since though the failure of the autumnal rains prevented the growth of the pastures, and though the cattle were dying every where for want of food, every one seeking to get rid of that portion which he could not support, the stupid tribunal never relaxed the prohibition to export.

By another effect of the consummate ignorance and wickedness of this board, the duties on the importation of these commodities, bears no proportion to that on exportation; and foreign produce re-exported, is not worse treated; so that it seems deliberately intended to encourage foreign agriculture at the expence of their own.

It will be natural to ask who are the men who compose this board? They are lawyers, whose whole lives having been spent in scenes of the most iniquitous litigation; possess no kind of information on commerce, when they are promoted to this rank; so that all commercial regulations, which with us are fixed by act of parliament, are here left to their absolute will and caprice, to ignorance and venality.

Foreign imports are taxed at Valoren, and a tariff has lately been made to that effect; but the raw produce of the soil which is the only source of riches to Sicily, finds so many obstacles to exportation, from the difficulties which are ever thrown in the way of the merchant, that it seems as if the Tribunal of Patrimony took all the pains possible to keep the balance of trade always in favor of foreign nations.

As this tribunal has a control over all the corporations in the kingdom, it has multiplied its regulations and orders so much, with respect to the privileges of each town, that though these are clear and explicit, and though the law prescribes the extent of their powers, the tribunal has by degrees caused every thing to be referred to itself—this has been done in order to multiply fees and writings; and it has so well succeeded, as to cause all the confusion which at present reigns,—the sup-

pression of papers, and documents, which are wilfully set aside, so that delay, discouragement, and ruin, are and have been the inevitable consequences.

Corn Laws.—It is impossible to give a distinct account of the corn laws of this kingdom, as they differ so widely in one place from those which obtain in another. The general idea, allowing for particular exceptions, is nearly as follows;—As has been already observed, the Tribunal of Patrimony annually gives an order, not only to the corporations of the demesne, but also to those of the baronial towns, to provide at harvest a supply sufficient for the whole year, this of course forms a complete monopoly of corn in every part of the kingdom. The jealousy of each corporation in the material concern of provision for the year, causes the most prohibitory orders to be issued in every township.

As the country is very various in its surface, so the abundance of the harvest is often partial, nature generally providing more than sufficient in one district, and leaving but a scanty allowance in another. In the abundant districts, the corporations, after they have obtained enough for their own supply, forbid the exportation of the overplus. The holders of the corn must therefore sell it to the neighbouring districts by stealth, or give a share of their profits to the corporation, which turns the right of prohibition to its own advantage. In the district where the scarcity is felt, the corn for the use of the town is bought at a high price; and when the demand is satisfied as to the quantity required, or that the corporation have a sufficient supply to go on for a time, the holders of corn find means to sell it to the traders in those towns where it is still at a high price. Here begin the endeavours of the corporation to prevents its sale, and the diligence of the merchants to deceive their vigilance; for should the price of corn fall after the corporation has laid in its stock, they would either not be able to sell at all, or sell at a loss. They are obliged to make up the loss to

the patrimony, or capital of the township, and the tribunal holds them answerable for the same. In one town, the flour was sold by the corporation for eighteen taris the tumolo, while in the neighbourhood flour of the same quality was distributed at twelve to the people.

Another law is in force in Sicily with respect to corn, the absurdity and barbarity of which is unknown in any other part of the world, which however it has not been possible to get rid of.—In every township, with the exception of a very few, the corporation takes an account at harvest, and obliges every farmer, renter, or landholder, to give in a declaration of the quantity of corn his lands have produced; the price of grain is fixed by an assize on the 15th of August; at this price the holder is obliged to deliver in, to the corporation, the third part of the produce of his estate on demand, notwithstanding the prices may have risen considerably. Sometimes the corporation after having given permission to the landholder to sell his corn off, saying they had a sufficient quantity, two months after, has called on him for his quota, and he has been obliged to buy the quantity required, late in the season, at a loss of 30 per cent!

Sometimes the corporation agrees with that of another district, or with a rich landholder, for a quantity of corn, at a price far below the assize fixed in their own tariff. This corn is then brought into the public magazine, where it is exclusively ground in the mills, and then, as no other can be ground, no purchaser can buy but of the corporation, and the unfortunate holders are obliged to sell at the price imposed on them. It is unnecessary to enter farther into this matter, all the fatal consequences of such a system are obvious.

In abundant years the surplus corn which cannot be consumed, and is intended for exportation, is carried to the caricatori, or places destined for a depôt. The possessors who then deposite their corn hold it as joint stock; by an abuse in the officers who preside over these, it is necessary frequently to transfer the stock from one name to another in the books,

TABLE,

Showing all the Burthens imposed on the Kingdom of Sicily for the Donatives, Ordinary as well as Extraordinary, with the Commutation on Tobacco, and the Rate of the respective Contributors according to the present System, 1783.

Ordinary Donatives, which are paid to the Crown, and appropriated by the Tribunal of Patrimony.	Actual Import of the ordinary and extraordinary Donatives imposed at different Times on the Kingdom of Sicily.	Rate, of which the parliamentary Prelates contribute only a Sixth Part of their Proportion, for some of the ordinary and extraordinary Donatives.	Amount of the Tenths contributed by the City of Palermo on each Donative, first deducting that Part paid by the parliamentary Prelates.	Barons Feudatory and Nobility contribute only a trifling Proportion, to the extraordinary; none to the ordinary.	No. of Souls in the Towns of the Royal Demesne, according to the Numeration taken in A. D. 1748, not including Palermo.	Value in Sicilian Ounces of the real Property in the Corporations of the Demesne, after deducting the Burthens they are subject to.	Rate contributed by the Corporations of the Demesne, according to a Division made in the Year 1770.	No. of Souls in the Baronial Corporations, according to a Numeration taken A. D. 1748.	Capital Value in Ounces of the real Property in the Baronial Corporations, having subtracted the Burthens to which they are subject.	Rate contributed by the Baronial Corporations, according to the Distribution made in the Year 1770.	Loss suffered by the Fisc on some of the Donatives in which the Rate of the six free Corporations Demesnial and Baronial is not charged to the others.	Loss suffered by the Fisc on the Donatives of the Collectors, and for the Cavalry, in which the 6th Part due from, but not paid by, the Prelates, is not charged on any other Contributors.	Rate contributed by Foreigners, secular and ecclesiastical, on three extraordinary Donatives.	Produce of the *Sargenteas* suppressed, not to the Alleviation of the Corporations, but to fulfill the Balance on the Donative of 80,000 Crowns levied A. D. 1754.	Rate contributed by pious Institutions, Churches, Monasteries, and other Mortmain Lands, on the Donative for the high Roads.	Rates contributed by the Fathers of 12 Children, and the Towns, Abbacies, and free Prelates, on the Donative for high Roads.	Total Amount of the Rates of all the Contributors, and the Loss suffered by the Fisc, on some of the Donatives.
					No. of Souls.	Ounces.		No. of Souls.									
					395067	10,793750 22		780648	13278804 14	7465 3 12	X 1061 17 15						
					XIX	XX		XXI	XXII	2488 15 3	Y 353 25 18						
1. Ordinary laid on in the year 1494, in ounces	20000	B 3333 10	1666 20				6473 8 13			7465 3 12	Z 1061 17 15						20000
2. Fortifications laid on in the year 1531, oz.	6666 20	C 1111 3 7	555 16 13				2157 18 9			2488 15 3							6666 20
3. Galleys, 1561 oz.	20000	D 3333 10	1666 20				6473 8 13			7465 3 12							20000
4. Macina, or Excise on Flour, 1564 oz.	40000	Q	3863 11 16				11165 13 5		EE	24971 4 19							40000
5. Palaces, 1567 oz.	2666 20	E 444 13 7	196 21				1025 22 8			999 23 5							2666 20
6. Percettori, for the Collectors of Revenue, 1570, oz.	1440	N	108 0 4				551 29 16			540		240					1440
7. Cavalry, 1567, oz.	16000	O	1200 2 4				6134 4 16			5999 3		2666 20					16000
8. Crowns 45,000, 1642 oz.	18000	R	1651 3 7			KK	6847 5 17		LL	9501 18 16							28000
9. Crowns 65,000, 1642 oz.	26000	F 3333 10	2079 7 17			MM	8722 15 16		NN	11864 26 7							26000
Ordinary Donatives for the Corporate Bodies, and which are administered by the Deputation.																	
10. For Bridges, laid on in the year 1555, oz.	3200	G 533 10	266 20				1199 13 1			1200 16 19							3200
11. Towers on the Coast, 1579 oz.	4000	H 666 20	300 11				1533 16 4			1499 21 18							4000
12. Reggenti or Directors, 1609 oz.	1145 25	I 190 29 3	85 28 6				439 13 14			429 13 17							1145 25
Ordinary Donative, which is administered by the same Deputation for the Use of the Crown.																	
13. Crowns 300,000, laid on in the year 1612, oz.	72712 12	S	6544 19 9			FF	33453 4 13		GG	32714 21 18							72712 12
Total of the Ordinary Donatives,	231831 17	12946 15 17	20184 19 7				86176 25 5			107139 25 3	2477 1 8 AA	2906 20 P					23183 17
Extraordinary Donatives administered by the aforesaid Deputation.																	
14. Crowns 80,000 laid on in the year 1754, oz.	32000	K 4784 8 14	2870 17 4	5600			6049 19 4			7001 7 3			2400	3294 7 15			32000
15. Crowns 150,000, payable in four years, 1754 oz.	15000	L 2500	1500	2625			2562 3 15			4187 26 5			1625				15000
Extraordinary Donatives for the Corporate Bodies administered by the above Deputation.																	
16. Crowns 5000, imposed in 1735, for the salary of the President of the Giunta resident at Naples oz.	2000	T	100	500			900			500							2000
17. Crowns 24,000, for the roads, laid in A. D. 1778 oz.	9600	M 1333 10	800 OO	1400			1366			2233 15 5			866 20		1280 V	320	9600
18. Burthen as the Commutation on Tobacco, imposed in 1780, and the Tax formed by the Tribunal of Patrimony oz.	102058 16 14		38915 22 6				32457 9 11			30685 14 17							102058 16 14
Total of the Donatives, ordinary and extraordinary, and the Commutation on Tobacco,	392490 3 14	21564 4 11	64370 28 17	A 10125111			129512 12 10			151747 28 13	2477 1 8	2906 20	4891 20	3294 7 15	1280	320	392490 3 14

NOTE.

The number of souls in the corporations of the Demesne, as at Note XIX. amounts to 325,967

That of four free Corporations, as appears from the numeration taken A. D. 1748, is 45,366

The number, therefore, of the souls in the Corporation subject to taxation amounts to 350,601 — CC

The value of the capital property of the above Corporations, in Sicilian ounces, as at Note XX, amounts to 10,793,750 22

And that of the free corporations, by the same numeration, amounts, in Sicilian ounces, to 1,473,663 18

Remain taxable 9,320,087 4 — See note HH

The number of souls in the baronial corporations, as at note XXI, amounts to 780,648

That of the free, to 5119

Remain the number of the souls in the taxable corporations 775,529 — BB

XXII

The number of Sicilian ounces of the capital property of the above corporations, at 13,278,804 14

And that of the free corporations 66,406

Neti remainder 13,212,396 25 — II

EXPLANATORY DISCOURSE

On a plan proposed by the Marquis of Caraccioli, Viceroy of Sicily, to his Majesty, on which was expected the royal determination.

Such are the donatives which from time to time have been granted by the kingdom of Sicily, for the expenses of government, by the three orders, viz. the demesnial, ecclesiastical, and military or noble. In the first are considered the corporations of the demesne; In the second, the ecclesiastics, provided by royal patronage; and in the third, the barons, in the name of the corporate bodies existing on their fiefs.

In the offers of parliament it has been held that such contributions depended on the free will and faculty of the order; as to lay taxes on the people, and take proper measures for the public expenditure, a spontaneous act is to be understood, in the contribution given, since the donatives are supposed to be applied for the general advantage of the public: wherefore it is, that by an express law of the kingdom, promulgated by king Alphonsus of Aragon, no one can by any means be exempt.

From such an ill-supposed free will of the three orders, in the taxes by which the donatives are raised, arise those abuses which are not only prejudicial to the revenue, but also to the corporate bodies.

The barons, at the same time that they are not subject to the annual burthen of *Adoa*, contribute nothing to the thirteen ordinary donatives, but only a small rate to four of the extraordinary, (A) in 10,125 ounces, including in the same tax those who simply bear a title, and who possess no fiefs, which greatly lessens the quota of the barons. All the weight, therefore, of the thirteen donatives ordinary falls solely on the corporations, deducting the sixth part which for eight of the said donatives is paid by the ecclesiastical order.

The Palermitans who possess in the kingdom any allodial property contribute nothing in those places where their property is situate, for which reason those of the rest of the kingdom who possess allodial property in the territory of Palermo pay no kind of tribute; and all this deficiency falls on the corporations.

The parliamentary prelates, for some donatives, contribute a sixth part, (B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M.) Of the donative of crowns, 65,000, (or 26,000 ounces) they pay only on 20,000 ounces, their sixth amounting to no more than 3333 10, (F); whence it arises, that for two of the donatives, (N) for the collectors and for the cavalry, (O) the government suffers the annual loss (P) of oz. 2906 10.

And as this order contributes nothing to the excise on flour, of which they ought to pay a sixth, as at (Q); the loss on this exemption amounts annually to ounces 6666 20

In the donative of 45,000 crowns imposed in 1642, (note R) amounts to 3000

In that of 65,000, A. D. 1645, the sixth of which would amount to oz. 4333 10; and as they *declared* they would only contribute (F) 3333 10, the deficit is 1000

In that of 300,000 crowns, A. D. 1612, (S) amounts to 19,118 12

In that of 5000 crowns, A. D. 1735, (T) amounts to 333 10

Total deficit of the clergy, 23,118 22

The deficit is therefore thrown on the corporations, viz. oz. 23,118 22; and be it observed, at the same time, that this burthen is thrown on these also for the above-mentioned oz. 2906 20, (N and O) not charged on them, the loss falls solely on the Treasury.

In the numeration of the year 1748, the allodial property of the churches, pious institutions, monasteries, and other mortmains, were not considered; so that these paying only oz. 1280 for the donatives of the roads, (V) all that which they should over and above pay on their property redounds to the disadvantage of the corporation. In A. D. 1748 the deputies of the kingdom demanded a declaration, but nevertheless they were not taxed.

For three donatives, the ordinary, (X) that of fortifications, (Y) and that for the galleys, (Z) in that numeration, was classed the rate of the six free corporations, viz. Augusta, Carlentini, Marsala, Syracuse, Siciliana, and Villasmondo, in oz. 2477 1 8, (A); wherefore not being paid by these, nor being charged to the other corporations, as has been done in the case of the other donatives, the treasury loses annually, as at (AA), the said sum oz. 2477 1 8

This sum added to oz. 2906 20, which is lost by the non-contributed share of the parliamentary prelates, on the donatives (N, O) as at (P), amounts to 5383 21 8

The treasury therefore loses annually oz. 5383 21 8

In the thirteen donatives, there is that of the Macina, or excise on flour, (No. IV) and that of 300,000 crowns, (No. XIII) which, by the express law of the kingdom, has been declared to be merely a personal tax. In this case, two thirds would have fallen on the baronial corporations, the number of souls amounting to 775,529, by deducting the number of souls in the free corporations, (BB); and the other third part from the corporations of the demesne, the number of whose souls make the number 350,601; and also those of the free corporations, (CC). The tax on the Macina is well distributed, (DD, EE); that of 300,000 crowns, raised by a tax of four tari the salm on the Macina, should also have had the same result, but is divided between the corporations of the two different classes, almost half and half, (FF, GG); for this reason the corporations of the demesne are very disproportionately burthened.

The remaining eleven donatives are real, and therefore ought to have been divided *ad ratam bonorum*, and the corporations of the demesne would have been assessed at Sicilian oz. 9,320,087 4, (HH) which was the amount of their capital, after deducting the property of the five corporations; and the baronial corporations would have been at the rate of Sicilian oz. 13,212,397 25, (II) deducting the capital of the free corporations. The donatives, viz. that of 45,000 dollars, (KK, LL) and that of 65,000 dollars, (MM, NN) are justly divided: all the others are divided half and half. Hence it appears that the corporations of the royal demesne are unjustly burthened.

The commutation made by the Tribunal of Patrimony for the abolished duty on tobacco on the excise on flour (taking it for granted that it ought to be established without proving that in some places such a consumption appeared, since much was sold to the neighbourhood or to travellers) has ruined many corporations, and the people of Palermo is much oppressed by it, since that community pays Sicilian oz. 38,915 22 6, (OO). This abuse ought therefore to be reformed.

The corporations of Sicily are much over-rated, particularly those of the demesne, on which, according to the capital amount of ounces assessed in the numeration of 1748, deducting the property of the free corporations, the whole weight annually falls on the tax of the above donatives ordinary and extraordinary, and including the commutation on tobacco, it results that for every hundred ounces of income, valued at 5 per cent. it amounts to 27 oz. 23 tar. 19 gr. 27 23 19

And the annual burthen on the baronial corporations, deducting the property of those that are free, the burthen on every hundred ounces of income is 22 29 0

Whence it results that the corporations of the demesne, which jointly possess less property than the baronial, are overcharged for every hundred ounces of income 4 24 17

In this account is not reckoned the rate of the last donative, granted in the year 1783, nor the *civic taxes* annexed to the corporations, which these are obliged to bear for every exigency of their respective internal economy.

In order to avoid these disorders, it were possible to propose various expedients for the alleviation of these corporations, and to supply the loss suffered by the public treasury every year: but perhaps the best way would be to consolidate all these burthens into one, and to reduce the whole to real burthens, and to bring into contribution every sort of real property existing in the whole kingdom; and thus, according to the assessment of property made in the last numeration, to add five other assessments which do not there appear, viz. the value of the feodal property; the value of all the property of the parliamentary palaces; the value of all the property of the citizens of Palermo situate in every part of the kingdom; the value of all the allodial property of the Palermitan barons, wherever they are situated in the districts of their fiefs, or in any other part of the kingdom; and finally, the value of all the property of churches, monasteries, pious foundations, commanderies, and other mortmain property, as will be hereunder specified.

Now it is certain that the territory of Sicily, reckoning the property above mentioned, amounts to considerably more than 100,000,000 of ounces of capital value, which at 5 per cent. would produce 5,000,000 of revenue annually; and therefore if the burthen, deducting the rate paid by Palermo, were equally distributed, *per æs et libram*, according to the value of property, this repartition would fall most advantageously on the public at large. Even if we reckon according to the extent or the fertility of the land, or to the quantity of produce which is annually exported, or according to the number of souls, it ought to produce, according to the testimony of all financiers, a much greater sum. This arrangement would also be of the greatest advantage to the city of Palermo, whose *public patrimony* is ruined, since it would save the annual sum of 25,000 ounces, which, according to the actual system, it pays over and above the tenth on the tobacco commutation: also, without laying on fresh burthens, it would render obvious all that which is due on the donatives, that is to say, it would, on the one hand, receive annually oz. 5383 21 8, as has been above demonstrated, which is not exacted on the total of the donatives; and on the other, it would receive, on the donative of 300,000 crowns, two amounts, the one annually of 15,000 crowns, or 6000 ounces; and the other, 1706 ounces annually of the remainder of monies due to unclaimed dividends, which are at present, by abuse, applied to the relief of insolvent corporations; and in this case, deducting the tenth paid by Palermo, amounting to the annual sum of 39,249 ounces, the remainder would fall on all real property situate in every part of Sicily, at the rate of 7 per cent. on income; and this supposing that all the property in the kingdom, not reckoning Palermo, should yield no other revenue than 5,000,000 of ounces annually; and finally, the happy results for the utility and benefit of the kingdom would be, the extinction of all the troubles, the disputes, and the expenses which are incurred by the internal management of the corporations, in realizing the above tributes. The new system will abolish the taxes on flour, consumption of bread, and the burthens imposed on the produce of farms, all personal taxes, and others which produce the greatest oppression to the poor, and to divers orders who live by industry; at the same time the inland trade would be promoted, and agriculture not less so, by paying, directly and invariably, those taxes which compose the donatives, according to a just valuation of landed property situated in the three districts of the island.

N. B.—Two and a half Spanish dollars are equal to one Sicilian ounce, which is divided into 30 tari, each equal to 20 grains or farthings.

J. TYLER, PRINTER, RATHBONE-PLACE.

otherwise its existence is forgotten or denied, and it becomes lost to the owner. He must then recur to the tribunals in Palermo, where in the space of two or three years, and after he has spent the whole value of the object in dispute, he gains his cause; by that time the officers of the caricatori have been changed or dismissed, and their successors do not hold themselves answerable for the malversations of their predecessors, though these very caricatori are under the faith of the crown; and thus the farmer or merchants is reduced to beggary.

Revenues of Sicily.—The flagrant abuses in the revenue system of this kingdom called forth the attention of the Marquis Caraccioli, who was viceroy of Sicily about 25 years ago; under his auspices a Neapolitan jurisconsult, called Don Saverio Simonetti, undertook to give to the public an account of them. His book was printed by authority, he was sent to Sicily by the king's order; he wrote with truth and clearness; every one thought that a new revenue system would be established. Simonetti suddenly gave up the pursuit, Caraccioli was superceded in the government, and all the old abuses remained to the oppression and ruin of the country: the reader may here read a faithful translation of the opening of his book.

"The present system of the kingdom of Sicily in the very 'interesting subject of tributes, which in that kingdom are 'called donatives; the more we reflect on them, the less we 'are able to define; since it contains a mass of disorders, in 'which no law or rule of proportion, among the various classes 'of those who are taxed is considered, but merely the caprice 'of those who regulate them. I ought either to abjure my 'right to common sense so as to be persuaded of what is 'asserted to the contrary, or to report to the king any thing 'else but what I feel within my conscience, both for his own 'interest and the public good. I feel myself unable to do 'either; and I shall therefore first give a general idea of it,

" and then proceed to examine it in all its parts; finally I shall " declare with that candour which I owe to myself, what is " my opinion on the subject."

This exordium is here translated to shew how evidently those truths which we have recorded, have struck others long ago, how irresistibly they have forced themselves on the attention of men expressly occupied with the examination of this subject, and what hope the body of the people may be allowed to cherish of a reform of their grievances; but the system is kept up by the barons; they form the deputation* of the kingdom, and whatever may be the voice of the gentry and people at large, the government has adopted the pernicious practice of sending the memorials presented to the crown, back to the tribunals and junta, or board, to be examined, in order to have their counsel and opinion on them. As these memorials are in fact nothing else than complaints against the abuses of these very boards, they are by these means called on by the government to become judges in their own cause; their answers accordingly regulate the orders of government, which by acquiescing in them, has sanctioned a system of the most odious tyranny and oppression under which a civilized people ever groaned.

According to the original constitution of Sicily, the three houses of parliament have the faculty of granting supplies to the crown; but the majority of two houses is sufficient; by which means the house of commons, or demesnial assembly, becomes totally nugatory, and the lords and ecclesiastics, after generously granting the supplies, throw the whole burthen of them on the commons. Whatever remonstrances are made, the matter is left to the decision of those who have done the evil, and the mischief is thus perpetuated.

Simonetti further says, the supplies, according to the spirit of the institution are called *donatives*. Of these some are ordinary, and others extraordinary; the ordinary are in number thirteen, and in order to divide the burden, the depu

* See parliament of Sicily.

tation of the kingdom makes a census of property, and a numeration of subjects. With respect to the barons, who pay nothing, no notice is taken of them, nor are their feodal estates calculated, which in Sicily form the principal part of the whole landed property in the kingdom.

The property of the parliamentary prelates is not properly assessed, notwithstanding they contribute not to all the thirteen, but only to eight, and an arbitrary quota of the contribution for seven of them; they pay only the sixth part of what is due from them for these, and even something less; the city of Palermo taking the numbers of its citizens, and not making any assessment of the property situated within its own territory, is considered as the tenth part of the whole kingdom; Messina on the contrary, notwithstanding the members are taken, as well as the assessment of property, is considered as two thirds of a tenth of the whole kingdom. Palermo in fact contributes the tenth, not of the whole burden, but of the remainder, after deducting the amount of what is paid by the ecclesiastics; and of the two thirds of a tenth, laid on Messina, contrary to the orders of his majesty. The city of Messina in fact does not pay these two thirds, but only a quota far inferior; and the overplus is lost to the revenues on the sum total of their amount.

All that remains is raised on the other corporations of the kingdom, first making among them a division, and then a subdivision. The division regards the universities or corporations of the royal demesne, and those which appertain to the barons: the subdivision regards each corporation in particular in its own order. Of the above donatives ten are divided equally between the corporations of the demesnial and those of the baronial towns, without any regard to the number of inhabitants, or the value of landed property; but in the subdivision, which is made of the quota to each corporation, another burden is added called bonatenenza, in proportion to that property which is assessed in the district.

For the other three donatives the same rule is not attended to, nor is the division made between the two orders of corporations equally, but each is taxed by a distinct rule, one order according to the population, and the other according to the assessment of property.

From this assessment is excluded the property of the citizens of Palermo, as well as that of the parliamentary prelates. That also of the churches, of monasteries, of priories, and other mortmain property, is not estimated; so that the whole falls on the smaller landholders, and on the civic revenues.

The extraordinary donatives are five in number—each of these is rated differently from the other on the several classes which are rateable, whose contributions thereto are fixed by an assessment entirely arbitrary. The barons contribute their share of the extraordinary donatives, some more and some less; which in the whole amounts to a sixth part of the burden. This sixth, however, they do not fully discharge, their share of the tax being diminished by obliging those persons to contribute, who without possessing any estates, are decorated with the titles of prince, duke, &c. &c.

This (says Simonetti) is a brief sketch of the present system by which the distribution of the public burdens of the kingdom is regulated; and if a painter would wish to delineate, or a poet to describe disorder, he could not conceive a clearer idea of it, than by studying the present subject. In consequence of this confusion, notwithstanding the smallness of the sums raised, the nation at large is oppressed, and unable to bear the burden.

From what is quoted above from Simonetti, it appears that no land tax whatever is imposed on the great landholders, who are thus exempt. And those fiefs which have no town or village in them are also exempt. The royal town in whose territory these are situated, assesses them in the following manner:—A calculation is made of what land is cultivated and grazed; of course what number of people are

variously employed on the estate. From this another estimate is made of the quantity of bread consumed annually in it, this is called *consumo*, and the renter pays the amount according to this assessment. Besides these, there is a tax called il pelo, which is levied on all cattle bought and sold. There is also a duty on the cheese which is manufactured,—and these duties fall on the husbandman, as he is forced to indemnify the renter for the money advanced on the consumption of flour. He also pays it on his cheese, and also on the ox which he buys to till his ground; while the lord who receives the revenue is exempted. The duty on the *macina*, or grinding of corn, is the principal source of revenue in Sicily, all flour which comes in from the mills pays at the gate of the city. In these places where the farmers make their own bread, they are obliged to pay a tax which, as above observed, is called *il consumo*, which is a commutation for the flour excise duty, and is farmed out. The farmers of the tax go from house to house to examine the bread which the unfortunate husbandman makes, and he who should sell a loaf to an hungry traveller, would subject himself to fine and imprisonment.

Formerly the exclusive commerce of tobacco belonged to the crown; this was a residue of the Spanish government; but it was found impossible to prevent the contraband trade, by which the produce of the duty was not found sufficient to pay the officers employed. The parliament consulted on the means of commutation, by which the revenue should be indemnified, and the monopoly done away; the exclusive trade in snuff was abolished, and an additional duty was imposed on flour. This very wise regulation took place about thirty years ago, and exists to this day!

As we have above hinted, the marquis Caraccioli proposed to take a census of the whole landed property of the kingdom, and to establish a tax which should affect every proprietor in proportion to the value of his land. This plan would have raised a much greater revenue, and would have been scarcely felt, as the burden would have been equally distributed. It would

have far exceeded the present taxes and impositions, together with the whole amount of the duties on exports and imports; but the cabals and intrigues which were excited at court in opposition to this great and salutary reform, occasioned the recall of the marquis Caraccioli, and the downfall of his projects.

Since the time when Simonetti wrote his book, the crown has applied to parliament for farther supplies, which were called *millioni;* the burden was distributed as usual between the corporations of the desmesne and those of the barons, excepting the quota of the barons themselves, each share of which for a barony amounts to about as much as a small landholder pays who possesses one or two hundred acres of land in the desmesne. But the baron if he is assessed at £20, for example, levies an arbitrary impost on his vassals, which he takes care shall produce so much as to satisfy the demand, with a profit to himself of about five or six hundred per cent, so that his vassals not only pay as a body corporate their share, but also as individuals a farther heavy tax to the lord:—but what is still more incredible, these lords are now five and twenty years in arrear to the crown!

Parliament of Sicily.—The Parliament of Sicily consist of three houses, viz.—the barons or lords, and such only as possess fiefs, including within their limits a town or burgh. A baron has as many votes in the assembly, as he has villages or towns on his various estates.

The next is the ecclesiastical assembly, consisting of archbishops, bishops, the heads of monastic orders possessing of lands, abbots, &c. &c.

Next in order follows the demesnial house, or the representatives of the towns of the royal demesne, but there are no provincial representatives, nor are any of the baronial towns represented. There are no elections for members in the towns, nor have the inhabitants any share in chusing the deputy. The corporation nominates him, and he is in general their

attorney in Palermo. Thus a single man is often representative for several different places at once; and as these men are lawyers dependent on the nobles, the house of representatives is never convened, but its vote is obtained as a matter of form. The parliament of Sicily has no legislative power, and the only influence it has therein is by the usage of tacking laws to money bills, to which the assent of the crown is obtained as a favor, in consideration of the supplies granted, nor do the members possess the right of deliberating, or discussing the measures of government as in England. As all taxes are laid on for three years, the parliament is convened at the end of that period, to renew the old supplies, or grant new ones, in case the necessities of the government require it; the manner of distributing these taxes has been already described. The burden laid on the desmesnes is in the following manner: a reparition is made at Palermo by the deputies of the kingdom, assessing every township at a certain sum, if it is that called *the million*, it is laid on the smaller farms, whose share of this donation rises about 400 fold higher, in proportion to the quantity of land occupied, than that imposed on the nobles. If it is a permanent tax, an additional duty is laid on wheat, or some necessary of life. The parliament has no authority to impose duties on foreign imports and exports. These, of right appertain to the king, and answer to the tonnage and and poundage which caused so much bloodshed in England. They are the king's patrimony, of which the tribunal has the sole and supreme control. No regular system of taxation exists throughout the kingdom, and every township has its own fiscal regulations. When the quota on each township is fixed, the corporation finds the ways and means. The result is transmitted with a present in money to the Tribunal of Patrimony for their approbation. Hence the discordant and opposite revenue laws in the different districts, as soon as parliament has arranged the supplies the members are dismissed, and they leave a council to represent them, called

deputati del regno. As the dismission of the parliament is its political demise, so the *deputati* are the executors of the testator. This is the sum total of the parliamentary constitution and liberties of Sicily; by which it may be seen that the only order which requires some management is the upper house. A profusion of stars, ribbons, and gold keys is therefore distributed on this occasion, which gives to the Palermitan nobility all the external decoration of a splendid court.

Deputati del Regno.—The origin of the *deputati del regno*, goes as far back as the year 1446. In the reign of King Alphonsus, it was requested by the parliament held in that year, that the donative then granted, of 120 thousand florins, should be deposited in the hands of deputies, who should have the power to levy a tax, and to collect the amount of the said donative, applying it to repurchase the lands which had been alienated from the crown. (see cap. regno, chap. 403.) In 1457, the parliament having petitioned the crown in the name of the kingdom at large, that deputies should be chosen to distribute the impositions for the royal donatives, it was answered,—*Placet regiæ majestati; dum tamen de quolibet brachio, vel statu interveniant ad minus tres ex-deputatis cujusque Brachii, simul cum vice rege & magistris rationalibus.* This magistracy, besides the *deputati*, which constitute it, has its notary, or secretary, which office is held by the prothonotary of the kingdom; and also many other subordinate officers, as the assessor or judge, advocates, solicitors, *razionale*, *coadgiutore*, and architect, or commissary general* of bridges, towers, maritime guards, and others.

Army.—Of the younger branches of noble families a few individuals have entered into the army; the officers for the most part consisting of an inferior class of inhabitants of Palermo, and other cities and towns. Among these are mixed

* These have totally disappeared.

Neapolitans, Swiss, Greek, and Italian adventurers; as the pay they receive is trifling, they cannot appear like gentlemen; hence the envy and hatred they bear to our troops, among whom opulence and splendour are so conspicuous. In such a state, the military profession can scarcely be in high repute; and such men can hadly feel either the stimulus of professional ambition, or the charms of glory. The discipline of the troops is in consequence much neglected, while the contractors for provisioning the army, reduce the soldier to a very miserable state. The officers know their inferiority to ours, and as they deserve contempt, so they give us their hatred on account; and we may venture to say that almost the whole of the Neapolitan and Sicilian officers, would prefer joining the French, to defending their sovereign in conjunction with the British army; their recent behaviour in Calabria, under the prince of Hesse, has fully evinced the truth of this prediction.

Baronial Towns and Fiefs.—In the baronial towns and fiefs the lord nominates the *giurati*, the civil and criminal judges, but they must be confirmed* by the Tribunal of Patrimony; and the quota of territorial imports to be paid to the crown, is regulated by these as in the royal towns.

By the parliament of 1564, the donation to the crown were raised by an excise on flour; this is called *il dazio della macina.* The quantity of this duty varies in the different towns; in consequence of which the Tribunal of Patrimony has an authority over every royal and baronial town, both as it regards this tax, and the election of the municipal officers.

In the baronial towns sometimes the corporation possesses lands which belong to the public; sometimes the citizens are opulent from the possession of a great extent of copyhold land,

* This rule has some exceptions; but where the lord has the absolute choice, the slavery of the peasant is complete.

and quit rent farms. In these cases the burghers have endeavoured to get rid of several baronial oppressions, such as the exclusive right of the lord, to bake, to slaughter cattle, and to oblige his vassals to carry their olives to his press. These causes have been tried in Palermo, between the lords and the burghers. Some cases have been decided affirmatively, some negatively; in some places the rights have been abolished by the courts of judicature, in others they have been confirmed by the same courts, so that every distinct territory is marked by a contradictory and confused system, at variance with that of its neighbour; but as he who has the longest purse gains his cause, it would have been impossible for the learned judges to decide them all alike.

We must here take notice of the relative condition of baron and vassal, and hence endeavour to prove what has been already asserted.

Before the administration of the marquis Caraccioli, many of the barons lived on their domains; in those days they possessed great herds of cattle, and in proportion to the extent of the fief, a capital in wheat and barley for seed; they allotted each year to their vassals a quantity of land, for which they advanced the seed, and often the oxen for tillage, if the vassal stood in need of them.—The lord named the corporation, the sheriff, or captain of justice, and the civil and criminal judges, but reserved to himself the right of distraining in case of the non-payment of the rents, which for the lands annually given to sow was paid in kind. When the marquis governed Sicily, he destroyed many of these privileges; and among others, the power of distraining by the baron's own authority. He was thenceforward obliged to recur to the court, which though elected by him, was now to be confirmed by the Tribunal of Patrimony. This change, added to the temptations of luxury, caused the barons to establish themselves in Palermo, to let their estates to graziers or middlemen, as in Ireland, and to employ the stock of oxen and corn converted

into money in procuring the elegant indulgencies of fine liveries and fine equipages. This practice had indeed begun before, but was confirmed by the recent innovation.

Thus the barbarous splendor of the barons was abolished, the circulation of money more confined to the capital, the demand for objects of foreign manufacture increased, and much money was by those means exported, to the detriment of the interior. The middlemen not having capital sufficient to resist the effect of bad seasons, many of them failed, and the agriculture of the country was visibly diminished, as the marquis Caraccioli was recalled before he could perfect his plan.

The changes which he had introduced were however perpetuated, because they produced a considerable accession of power to the courts at Palermo. The evil of the change was felt, and the good intended could not follow, unless the plan of reform had been executed in all its parts.—The barons still exercise many rights injurious to the people at large, which it is necessary here to point out:—They have the exclusive privilege of baking the bread which is sold in the markets; this right is farmed to the best bidder; and no one can publicly or privately sell bread, but he who has bought the privivilege for the current year—consequently as there is no competition, the bread is generally of a bad quality, ill manipulated, and altogether unwholesome. The shambles also are farmed by the baron to the best bidder, and no one can sell his ox but to the butcher; as two lean oxen will sell cheaper, weight for weight, than a fat one, and as the price is fixed by the contract, so it is for the interest of the butcher to sell as much bone as he can, and refuse to treat with the owner of the fat ox. Besides this, a duty on every head of cattle slaughtered is paid to the baron.

The shops where cheese, oil, wine, lard, &c. are sold, are also comprehended in the exclusive privilege of the baron, who farms them in the same manner.

The same may be said of the public inns, called *fondaco*; none have a right to open an inn but he who rents the fondaco of the lord; and the premium paid for this licence, absorbs so great a share of the profit, so that the innkeepers are among the most miserable and dirty of the people, thus the privileges of the barons are in direct opposition to the commerce of the country.

Again, as the right of dealing in articles of primary necessity is thus generally exclusive, this branch of commerce, which ought to belong to the lower orders, and which in all other countries is the great source of their support, is in Sicily withheld from their hands. Improvements in houses of reception for the traveller, are by this pernicious arrangement totally prohibited. In some places the lord exercises an authority still more odious: if he has oil in his magazines, he orders the keeper of the shop or *zagato*, to purchase his own oil exclusively, prohibiting that of the neighbouring towns or fiefs from entering his domain; so that his vassals are sometimes compelled to buy their oil at 20 per cent. more than it might be bought for at a village two miles off.—It is impossible to enumerate all the various methods taken to oppress this unfortunate people, who, added to these evils, support the whole weight of the public impositions. Let the reader refer to the section which treats of the public revenues, for further example of the cruelty and oppression of the barons.

Suffice it to observe, that under the present system that commerce cannot exist, nor can any improvement have place, until such regulations are made as to put an end to the moral impossibility of being industrious. We cannot leave this subject without adding, that in Francofonte, a village belonging to the prince of Palagonia, a fine is levied on the marriage of a vassal in money, which is actually a commutation for the ancient right of cuisage!

Thus on the one hand the barons contribute nothing to the support of the state, on the other they enjoy the faculty of

oppressing their countrymen.—Unless the feodal rights are abolished, the revenues raised from proper objects of taxation, and a free inland trade established, with an uniformity of weights and measures, Sicily must remain a permanent and conspicuous monument, of the insufficiency of a rich soil, a fine climate, and all the gifts of nature to procure national happiness or prosperity where the government is vicious.

Education and Character of the Nobility.—As soon as the son of a nobleman is old enough to be taken out of the hands of the nurse, a priest is hired to teach him his letters, to give him the rudiments of writing, and to attend him when he is out walking. As the salary allowed to this tutor is from sixty to a hundred dollars per annum and his board, it is not likely a man of learning will undertake the drudgery of this office; it sometimes happens too that he acts as house steward, and is ever the confident of the master or mistress in their amours. If he has some humour, he becomes the butt for every one to pass their jokes upon, familiar with the heads of the family, he is also the confessor and spiritual comforter of all the servants; and as he is forced to accommodate himself to all circumstances, his manners can neither be dignified, nor his sentiments elevated*. Under such a preceptor, the young nobility of Sicily learn to write and read, with some rudiments of the Latin tongue; but a principal part of their education consists of religious doctrines, and they are early initiated with all the immorality of the catholic persuasion. As the preceptor is familiar with the servants, so are his pupils, and all the falsehoods fabricated to deceive their parents, become the examples for their conduct through life. The preceptor is ever the sycophant of his pupils, and favors their idleness by some plausible excuse.

* See, a similar account of education among the Romans Dial. de Claris oratoribus.

When they are old enough to be sent to college, they are again put under the direction of priests, who teach them theology, the history of the saints, a smattering of the Roman history, but not one science which can be of use to them. When a lad is arrived at fourteen or fifteen, he comes home to his parents, where he enters into the routine of *elegant* society at Palermo. The females are kept in a convent till they are married, whence they sometimes come out without knowing their letters; and there are many women of the first rank, who can neither read nor write.

From such characters, with the exception of those foreign adventurers whom we have above described, are chosen the subaltern officers under the government, from men who have no sentiments above their servants, no application, no acquired knowledge, no firm and manly sentiments of honor or virtue, no military spirit, no ambition to be distinguished but by their liveries and equipages:—these are the nobility of Sicily.

A few individuals are to be admitted as an exception to the general rule; among the first, is the prince of Ventimiglia, who has both read and travelled, and who is on a footing in point of acquired knowledge and reflection, with any gentleman in Europe. A few more might be named, but far inferior to him.—The house of the prince of Ventimiglia is the resort of strangers, and of the learned few who inhabit Palermo; the rest of the nobility are such as we have described. Yet these men are to wield either the arms of the executive power, to preside over the finances, to administer justice, to distribute the public burdens; and with such men must a British minister concert measures for the defence and independence of Sicily!

Messina and its dependant Villages.—Messina has many privileges, among others, that of having its own courts of judicature, civil and criminal; it has no sheriff or captain

of justice, but the military governor acts in that capacity, and is president of the senate. It was anciently the capital of the kingdom, and is still styled in the public acts of the city *caput regni*. Many of these boasted privileges were bought by the senate in the last, and preceding centuries of the crown in consideration of large sums of money. A loan for the purpose of raising them was therefore opened, and the debt funded; the interest of the money is paid by a duty on corn, which independently of the macina and the commutation on tobacco, amounts to 14½ pence the English bushel; this heavy tax is joined to many other aggravating regulations, to prevent fraud in the macina or excise on flour; they are not allowed to use hand-mills, consequently private families who make their bread at home, have the greatest difficulty to prevent their flour from being adulterated. The senate also enjoys another exclusive right that of baking all bread in the ovens of the city, and by public authority; the consequence is, that the bread of Messina is the worst in the kingdom; it is mixed with beans, bran, and every other kind of trash. This abuse has often caused riots and disturbances among the people, but the military power and the inflexible cruelty of the Tribunal of Patrimony, continues and confirms it. In the forty-eight villages dependent on Messina, the absurdity and cruelty of the senate are still more striking; the inhabitants of the poorer sort, who do not make their own bread, are not even allowed a public oven. All bread exposed to sale in these villages must be senatorial loaves baked in Messina. The same holds with regard to butchers' meat, which must all be brought from the shambles of Messina. Sometimes in bad weather, and when the floods are out in a country intersected with torrents, the provision for the day arrives in the evening, some of these villages being 12 and 16 miles from the town, and the unhappy labourer is doomed to remain without the staff of life for an whole day. The senate stations officers in the frontier of their territory to

prevent provisions from being introduced to the detriment of the revenue of the city.

Messina is the only port where all foreign goods can be entered; and when they land at Palermo, or any other port, they must pay the free port duties to Messina. The fishery of the sword fish, in the streights, also belongs exclusively to the senate; if any one goes to see the fishery, he must first have a licence to buy his dinner of the fisherman, as no fish of this species is allowed to be sold until it arrives at Messina. The officer who presides over the fish market, takes care that too great a provision does not enter, least it should depress the price, and the surplus is prudently buried. This wanton oppression appears hardly credible, but the reader may receive the same information from the mouth of any individual in the place, and a residence of eighteen months authorizes the writer to make this assertion.

Character of the middling Ranks.—The middling ranks of people in Sicily, mostly live on the fruits of their small farms, and by renting the larger estates of the nobility.

All classes of people inhabit towns and villages, and there is scarcely an example of a family above the meanest rank living in the country, of course rural economy is at its lowest ebb. We do not find the simplicity of manners to be met with in those nations which have a contrary usage: from the manner in which the government treats its subjects, these naturally acquire much low cunning and selfishness. No traits of generosity, no public spirited ideas, no thought of general improvement, and but few of the refinements of life are discovered in them—and they are totally strangers to the literature of the continent; marriages are contracted by interest alone, and often a girl comes out of a convent to be a bride, when she has hardly seen her intended husband; of course little or no domestic happiness, and less virtue; fasting and religious observances, make up for all deficiencies, and when the Sicilian

is not endeavouring to over-reach his neighbours, he is either at his devotions in a church, or following some scandalous intrigue: in a word, he possesses all the vices of a civilized people, without their virtues; all the defects of a barbarian, without that courage and candour which can alone make up for the rudeness of his state. All this results from the corrupt administration of justice, the stupidity and ignorance of the clergy, and the total want of public education.

The Clergy.—All orders of the clergy, whether secular or regular, are, with few exceptions, illiterate, ignorant, and immoral: to recommend simple morality from the pulpit is so contrary to the system of the bishops, that any one who should do so would incur the displeasure of the pastor; and the archbishop of Messina once interdicted a priest for preaching for that offence!

Miracles and noisy declamations addressed to the passions of the hearers, with a view to excite their indignation against heretics, form the principal topics of the sermons given from the pulpit. As a great part of the revenues of the bishops arises from the fees of ordination, and as every family which is above want, has a pride in making one of its number a priest, the body of the clergy becomes far more numerous than the church can support; and so many are there in holy orders, and of so low a condition, that the profession has totally lost its respectability, and religion by those means has degenerated into the most abject superstition.

State of the Poor.—From what has been observed on the finances of this country, it is almost needless to touch on the subject of the poor, as the principal sources of revenue arise either from the excise on flour, or the duty on corn, wine, oil, flesh, fish, pulse, &c. and that the providing of corn is in every corporation the exclusive privilege of the giurati, or senators. As it has been seen that there is no free trade, so there is no

object for the industry of the poor; and as the corporation if they lose by the corn they buy, must make it up to the public capital, so in times of scarcity, all attempts to alleviate the distresses of the poor, by the methods employed in England, are here contrary to the laws, destructive to the corporations, and of course impracticable; for should the senate permit others to sell cheaper than themselves, the public capital would suffer, nor would the Tribunal of Patrimony pass their accounts: here are then in one point of view the defects of the public economy, the absolute impossibility of manufactures, and the misery and ruin of the people. In Sicily and Spain this system obtains, and it is from this source that all the sordid beggary results, which distinguishes these countries from the rest of the world. The people groan under the most oppressive monopolies; those articles of primary necessity, which are objects of commerce and gain to the lower orders, are here the only sources of public revenue.—In a certain port of Sicily, some years since, when the poor were literally dying of hunger in consequence of the scarcity of bread, a Danish vessel arrived laden with corn; it was proposed to sell a part of the cargo, as damaged, at a low price to the poor; to execute this was however impossible, the senate alledging that they had enough, and that the patrimony would suffer. They received official letters of approbation from the Tribunal of Patrimony at Palermo; and after all, finished by buying the same corn at the low price before fixed on it: it was afterwards sold as dear as all the rest to the inhabitants.

Courts of Justice.—It is necessary to say a few words on the courts of justice, civil and criminal; of the first there are two, viz. the Tribunal del Concistoro, and the Gran Corte. In each of these a law-suit may be heard five times over, and the last decision is generally given in such undefined, and equivocal terms, that it often is the cause of a fresh suit. The barefaced manner in which the judges sport with the happiness and pro-

perty of the subject, must excite the indignation of every honest mind; the judge receives private visits from both parties, who go to inform his worship on the cause, and they are not confronted, until it is brought to a public hearing; when there is so much falsehood to sift and disembroil, and the cause which was at first clear and simple, has become so puzzled, that it seems impossible to decide it. This occasions the necessity of putting off the hearing, and the judge at last decides by sending a written sentence, not from the tribunal where he sits, but from his own house; nor is it made public but by report. Hence it has not the effect of a decision pronounced in full court, and gives to the judge the facility of deciding rather according to his present interest than his own conscience.

The salaries of the judges are trifling, and the fees are multiplied by the length of the suit; so that litigation is calculated here to ruin all, and vindicate none. Many law-suits finish by a compromise between the parties, where the power and influence are nearly equal; when not so, the weakest must be cast.

In criminal cases, evidences are not taken as with us; a criminal sometimes remains in prison till he and his offence are totally forgotten, and the torture is still used to make him confess. The ordinary custom is to bind both the wrists together so tight as to stop the circulation, or to put the criminal into an arched dungeon, where if he does not confess or die in a few days, he gets off as innocent.

Conclusion.—Imperfect as this sketch of Sicily is, yet it evidently removes all occasion of wonder, that this kingdom is totally unable to defend itself; that its misery is at the utmost, and that the people desires a reform; but as that principle of reform is not within itself, it must either receive it from without, or fall a prey to the disorder which it cherishes in its own bosom. If the aristocracy of the kingdom is so base in its nature, and so insensible both to the distresses

of the people, and to the necessities of the sovereign, as to continue in the destructive system they have hitherto pursued; if the nobility continue to support the perversion of justice in the tribunals, and if the deputies of the kingdom, and the Tribunal of Patrimony uphold the nobility in this dereliction of their country: if in the midst of so much secret influence and cabal, the crown has not energy sufficient to insist on a reform; is it for the glory of the British arms to maintain such a state of violence to nature and to justice?

Vicious as the system of finance is in theory, it is still more so in the application. There is a donative for keeping in repair the towers on the coast; but these are either in ruins, or do not exist. The donative for the roads is yearly raised, but the money never applied. The ministers of the government flatter themselves that we are to spend treasures to allow them to continue in the career they have hitherto run! With the malversations in the application of the revenues, added to the other abuses already mentioned, the public income becomes insufficient to support the present establishment, civil and military: the royal family have abdicated the kingdom of Naples, and the disbursement for their troops, with those of the whole court, fall entirely on Sicily; but from what funds are these to be paid in a state so exhausted? How will the island bear fresh burdens, when its mercantile laws are so opposite to the interests of the subject? If a transcient joy is felt at the protection of England, it is because all men look to the arrival of our army, as a prelude to a reform in the government; when they shall find themselves disappointed in this hope, from that moment they will be ready to receive the French, and to turn against their sovereign, their barons, and the British.

Thus a certain interference in the government on our part, is that alone which will give the crown that due influence over the barons, which it requires to effectuate what alone can save both itself, and aid our cause.

This island when unshackled by the chains here described is an object of high importance to us: its wines and oil would supply the place of those of Portugal and Florence; and the sums transmitted for these articles would not go to enrich our foes. But under the present form it appears difficult to conceive how any commerce can exist, and how we, by allowing things to continue as they are, shall avoid incurring the odium of the people.

The troops which the king has brought with him are jealous of the British; many are in the interest of the French, and none are sincerely attached to his cause. Co-operating with such allies, we stand in greater danger than if we were without any; and should the French attempt to land, it is certain that they will have some understanding with these, by which our army might be betrayed.

The representatives of Britain in Sicily will soon perceive that public credit is unknown here, and that no one would take the security of government for a farthing, and the funding system, on the British plan, the Sicilians are strangers to.

If Britons are doomed to become the defenders of such a system as we have here described, no honest mind can wish them success; but if they incline to be instrumental in establishing a just and equitable polity in the island, they will save the monarch and the people from the yoke of France, and they will draw resources from Sicily, which will make them masters of the commerce of the Mediterranean; they will protect it as a pledge to mankind for the renewal of civil government on the ruins of military usurpation.

Whatever difficulties may be suggested, whatever objections may be made in the House of Commons to our interfering in the internal government of the island, it will very soon be be felt that the measure is inevitable, under whatever aspect we view it; and as soon as ministers have become sensible of the state of the country, and its concomitant external circum-

stances, they must either adopt this policy, or cede it to France.

If the picture which has been here drawn of Sicily be just, it must be supposed that the bulk of the people cannot be very well contented with a government in itself so defective. The arrival of our forces in Sicily has caused a reflection which is in the mouth of every one:—"If we obtain an amelioration "of our condition from the British, their coming will be the "period of our ills, and the dawn of our prosperity; but if "they leave things as they found them, we are all ready to "join the French on the first summons." The French have had their emissaries in this country as well as elsewhere, and every argument has been employed to prejudice the people against us.

The revenues of Sicily, in its present exhausted state, were scarcely sufficient for the civil and military establishment before the loss of Naples; and such is its increased impoverishment, that that government will be unable to maintain the force which is arrived from the continent. To drive the people to despair is the worst policy; and unless the system of finance be reformed, Sicily can yield us no assistance. If we take the whole into our own pay, and *generously* determine to leave things as they are, we undertake to maintain a system adverse to the prosperity of the country, destructive to our own security, and ruinous to all parties; the commercial advantages, which we might reap, must be forgotten, and the kingdom must daily become still more distressed and calamitous. Let us bring the matter home to ourselves. In the time of Charles the First, when the odious right of tonnage and poundage was arbitrarily extorted by the crown, and afterwards when James II. would have established a system of government as obnoxious to the people as that which we have been considering, must be to the Sicilians, and which had it met with success would perhaps have reduced us to the same

deplorable and abject state; had a foreign power in either instance, successfully lent its aid to force such despotic measures on the people of England, what indignation would it not have excited among us?—Where then is our right to follow this line of conduct?

The laudable compassion which our gracious sovereign must feel for the fallen fortunes of Ferdinand of Bourbon, surely should have its due limits; and the desire to support him against his enemy ought to be blended with a proper regard for the happiness of his subjects, otherwise we sacrifice the welfare of a nation, to the ill understood interests of a deluded individual; and we cannot but stile him so, when his own welfare and that of his subjects are separated so widely from each other. This therefore cannot be a case brought home to our sovereign and his government, where those two interests have ever been considered as essentially united; and it may be asked if our executive government has a right to maintain those prerogatives in another crown, which it has solemnly abjured the pretensions to by a coronation oath.

In a little time it will be seen that the Sicilian government must look to the British to extricate it out of its pecuniary difficulties; and that can only be done by a radical reform in the revenue system. This too must be under the control of the British; for it will be soon found that the deputies of the kingdom and the Tribunal of Patrimony, have been accustomed so long to the disorder which at present reigns, that it will be impossible to trust to them for its cure.

TRACT IX.

" Nulla ingenia tam prona ad invidiam sunt quam eorum qui genus ac
" fortunam suam, animis non æquant : quia virtutem et bonum alienum
" oderunt." T. Livi. lib. 35. chap. 42.

The foregoing tract on the present state of Sicily was presented nearly in the same form in which it is submitted to the reader, to Mr. Drummond, the British minister at the court of Palermo. The following extracts of letters written by the same hand to that gentleman, shew how obvious are the arguments and the means to induce the King of Sicily, to adopt the line of conduct already recommended. And as the truth of the reflections was acknowledged by the minister, without his adopting the measures advised, it will either shew that gentleman's want of zeal, or condemn those who sent him to Sicily without such powers and instructions as the state of affairs evidently required.

Letter I. *To the Right Honorable* W. Drummond, *&c. &c. Palermo.*

Messina, April 29, 1807.

Par. 1.—The grand question which is always held up by the court to thwart the views you entertain for the advantage not only of this kingdom, but also of the cause in which you are engaged, seems not to have been discussed : for in the present state of things no line is drawn, no distinction made, between the absolute occupation of the government by the British, and that reasonable and just influence which they are entitled to exercise by the sacrifices which are made to his Sicilian majesty ; and it seems strange that nothing short of your being completely silent, and of becoming instrumental to the ambition of the Neapolitan party, will be considered as a

full assurance of the independence of the Sicilian crown. To satisfy this jealousy, the common cause, the public good, and the credit of the British, must all be sacrificed.

2. Since it is agreed that the kingdom of Sicily is considered and fully granted to be independant, the king should be convinced that the occupation of the island by the British forces is merely to maintain that independence; nor could the absolute possession of it give greater advantages than those which might result from a well regulated commerce and alliance, and it must be as pleasing to the British as to himself, to see his majesty re-established on his Neapolitan throne.

3. The interior weakness and corruption of the Neapolitan government, were certainly the causes of its want of energy to defend itself. Hence the fall of that state was indifferent or agreeable to the various orders of society of which it consisted. The disorder of the finances, the venal administration of justice, could do no less than render mankind insensible to the fall of a government from which no redress of wrongs could ever be obtained. These evils had increased to a most intolerable height under the administration of General Acton; and the same system was re-established, with all its glaring defects, when the kingdom of Naples was restored to his majesty. Hence the second example, of an ignominious abdication of a throne which no one would defend; and the same evils are now continued in Sicily by the same ministers, who by their false policy have certainly lost the better part of his majesty's dominions.

4. An expedition to Naples can have no permanent effect, even in the event of our being victorious; first, because the kingdom of Naples can never resist the accumulated weight of France and Upper Italy; and secondly, because the power of resistance would be annihilated by the re-establishment of the same system which has already given two examples of its baneful effects.

5. The firm and permanent possession of the kingdom of Naples is intimately connected with a reform in the vicious administration of the government, and the establishment of a public credit, resulting from the proofs that the government may hereafter give of its attention to its engagements. How can we expect that any regard will be shewn to promises which have been as often violated as made, unless we see an administration in Sicily acting on such principles as will give foundation to these hopes? And as the same evils continue to result from the same set of ministers, how is it conceivable that these very men will alter their conduct on their return to Naples.

6. You are fully aware of the arts of these designing men, who have plunged his majesty into the greatest misfortunes by their ignorance and misconduct; and who are still jealous of a power which they are totally unfit to exercise: for this reason they used every means to create a jealousy of the British in his majesty's mind: and every argument ought to be used to shew the absurdity of this jealousy in whatever point of view it be seen. Your own perspicacity will suggest to you the propriety of urging that, if the British wish to see the king firmly established on the throne of the two Sicilies, with such a government as shall, by its strength and justice, liberate him from the necessity of seeking foreign aid for his defence, it could not be from such a conduct that he ought to fear any thing derogatory, either to his dignity or his independence; for it is the highest absurdity to be jealous of those who recommend that system by which alone he can ever hope, in future, to stand in no further need of their assistance. For as the present is evidently the cause of the general debility of the state, so its languishing existence can only be maintained by the continual exertion of a permanent British force. The only advantage which they have a right to claim, would result from the commerce of Sicily; and that commerce would evidently tend to its prosperity. It is therefore necessary to have ministers chosen

from among those whose interest are connected with the prosperity of the kingdom. This is also for the evident advantage of his majesty, for as the revenues of the crown would be encreased with the general happiness of the people, and the public burdens would be more equitably divided, the subsidy he receives from the British would become an object of smaller consideration; at present it is highly essential to him, in the other case he might feel them to be of no consequence whenever his own dignity was called in question.

7. A change of ministry in Sicily might make a great alteration in the aspect of public affairs. The people would not only be disposed to serve the cause with alacrity, but it would be the only means to make a proper impression on the public mind in Italy, and encrease the number of his majesty's partizans. The impossibility also of maintaining a footing in Italy without the concurence of the people is also evident; from all which reasoning it is clear, that all parties must be condemned to perpetual inactivity so long as his majesty is guided by evil counsellors.

8. The unequivocal proofs of his Britannic majesty's sincerity in maintaining the rights of his friend and ally, entitle him to credit for the most exalted sentiments of justice and generosity; from no other motive could that conduct proceed The mistrust and jealousy which have been instilled into his Sicilian majesty's mind, certainly must give you the greatest pain, as they must totally destroy that mutual confidence which is necessary to the success of the common cause, and the welfare of his kingdom. The result must be ruinous in the event, either of a necessary inactivity, or in that of our acting without fulfilling the important objects above enumerated.

9. Let us consider the present state of the Sicilian army, its want of discipline, the bad choice of officers, &c. &c. and the total want of concert between that army and the British. This is a most inauspicious consideration: his majesty having

withdrawn his army from the command of the British general, has manifested mistrust without increasing his security, which his Sicilian majesty ought to consider as perfect under the sacred word of the king of Great Britain.

10. Let us suppose for a moment that the British cabinet could be actuated by any perfidious views; would these acts of mistrust operate otherwise than as a pretext for that very conduct which is apprehended, so injuriously to the honor of his Britannic majesty? Were the British ministers and generals moved by such unworthy sentiments, would they not throw off the mask at once? Their present conduct is therefore evidently sincere; but the distrust shewn is ill judged and useless, as the insincerity of conduct which is suspected would be superfluous.

11. Whatever may have been the assurances of his Britannic majesty's ministers, they must evidently have been founded on the unreserved persuasion that the conduct of the court of Palermo was guided by implicit confidence in their integrity; and it is natural to suppose that generals would act in such a way as to co-operate with their views. But will not those, who are on the spot and see the true state of affairs, be highly blameable to compromise the credit, and even the safety of their troops, in the support of an ally actuated by the most unwarrantable jealousy; and whose ministers not only counteract every endeavour to promote the common cause, but who have given such proofs of mistrust; your choice of B———e for a minister is therefore highly judicious; but at the same time you will perceive that your success in operating this change in the ministry will be the criterion of your having any influence at a court, where your present situation entitles you to every kind of deference and respect.

12. You cannot possibly suppose that the remonstrances above recited can be construed at all as trenching on the sacred principle of his majesty's independence as a sovereign; but as that independence is now alone supported by the British sword,

without which, it must evidently be totally annihilated, surely the counsels of the British are not those, which at this moment can be safely rejected.

13. What advantage, my dear Sir, will result to you from the secrecy with which the government is carried on, and by the exclusion of the queen from the public councils, while the same destructive system is the order of the day? As long as no change is made, your influence is inviolate, but the moment you seek to recommend measures indispensably necessary, you find that you can do nothing.

14. Do you really think that ministers at home would blame you, when these reflections shall have been received from this quarter, if they should hear that you took upon you to protest against the duplicity with which you have to struggle, and that you suspended the subsidy until further orders? Could they be so unreasonable, and so very unjust, your conduct would be highly laudable in the eyes of every man of sense, and whatever the result, it would be for your honor and credit.

15. If I were permitted freely to give you my sentiments in this instance, I can see no alternative between your suspending thesubsidies until the king be brought to a sense of the true state of things, and your remaining at Palermo a perfect cypher.

16. You may depend on it that the truth of sentiments of which you are as sensible as myself, must at last be felt in England, and that a proper degree of firmness and decision in the present moment, will finally redound most highly to your credit,—what greater or better advocates can you have for your justification, than the opinions of the most esteemed of our generals, with the most undeniable truth to support your cause? On the other hand, should you hesitate, the most vexatious results must ensue; every day the cause of the British must lose ground in the public mind, and perhaps opportunities may be lost which may never recur! At the same

time it must be obvious to you, that the present evils result from the indecision in which you now are.

17. Much allowance ought to be made for me, when I urge you to declare these obvious reflections to the court, and that you should act upon them; reflect I beseech you, that the oppression of Sicily, and the anarchy of Calabria, all result from our not taking on ourselves a more decided language; and even the ministry at home, unaware of all that is here stated, would perhaps in the event be the first to blame you for having paid implicit deference to their own commands, at the expence of your own judgment, and better opportunity of information.

I am, &c. &c.

LETTER II. *To the Right Honorable* W. DRUMMOND, *Palermo.*

Messina, May 3, 1807.

Par. 1.—IF you have received positive orders to pay the subsidy, those orders must have come direct to yourself; but if ministers at home have given such orders, they never could have dreamt that it could so far operate as to make you of no consequence, while it reduces their army to be as it were that of the king of Sicily; as it is for the support of a government, of the injustice, weakness, and cruelty of which you are convinced. Could they see the true state of the case, which by this time they cannot fail to do, it is not probable that they would have given those orders; but surely they do not consider you as the blind agent of their will, so much as the depository of their interests, and the guardian of their honor. If the payment of the subsidies violate either of these considerations, you now are in possession not only of all the reflections which your own judgment must suggest, but also those of General Fox, to justify your conduct.

2. You have made treaties I grant which you cannot break; but if those with whom you have made these treaties

counteract all your measures, and pursue a conduct not only ruinous to yourself, but also destructive of the very end for which they were made; surely to remonstrate and to suspend the execution of your part of them, is no more than putting a stop to a very disagreeable farce, and shewing the Sicilian cabinet that we have eyes as well as themselves.

3. I know fully that you have positive orders to be well with the court; let us define the term. In your present predicament, to be well with the court, supposes that the court should be well with you; to be well at a court where your measures are not embraced, and where your counsels are of no avail,—where the conduct of the government is in no way under your influence, does not appear to me to be the right definition; and if the result of the whole be no more than this, how can you have fulfilled the intention of ministry at home?

4. The king has written to the Marquis of Circello to beg you would cease to propose B——e, in the present circumstances. Let this fact open your eyes to Circello's real character; and Lord Grenville's opinion of him while in England, ought not to make you sacrifice your own better judgment here; if we see that his majesty is deceived, ought we to echo back his errors to himself, and give them the stamp of truth?—The very request of the king is a request of the queen. To beg of you to desist from demanding B——e, is to beg in other words that you will give up the very point for which you are contending!—What objection have they to B——e, if the queen has not privately the management of the machine?—What influence have you when you are forced to give up the whole question on a simple request?—This is so barefaced and so shallow, that it at once betrays the whole cabal.

5. I am obliged and flattered by your wish to see me in Palermo; if my presence can be of service, command me; but, my dear Sir, unless we determine on a new line of politics, to what end shall I go to Palermo?—I see the aspect

of things in such a light, and am so well aware of the triumphs of the party, that I can have no pleasure in meeting their insolent looks: I still think that the evils which result from the present position of affairs are so monstrous, that you will soon find it is impossible to continue much longer with them; as soon as you feel that sentiment fully, let me be made acquainted with your determination. It is then that you will find me ready to devote all my humble means to your service, and to the advancement of your designs: the credit that will accrue to you from such a successful negociation, will be infinite; the obscure station of a private individual in which I am, cannot entitle me to any share in it. But the gratification which I shall receive, will be reflected back to my heart in many ways; the general advantage, the increase of your esteem for me, and the sentiment of benevolence to the oppressed inhabitants of Sicily.

I am, &c. &c.

In order that the substance of the foregoing letters should be understood, it is necessary to say a few words on the state and disposition of the court of Palermo.

The darling passion of the king is the chace, and he has the greatest aversion to public affairs; this is in fact the origin of a custom which has been hinted at in a former tract, of referring all memorials to the very board against which the complaint is made, or from whose decision an appeal has been presented.

The queen, who has ever maintained an ascendancy over the mind of her husband, and who is well known to be fond of power and political intrigues, is nevertheless under the influence of those who control her mind by knowing her, availing themselves of her weakness, two parties unite to govern her mind. The first is an emigrant, who has a wife in Paris, with whom he corresponds; this man is the tool of another designing French-

man, enjoys great influence at court, and is, in every respect, inimical to the British interests. The ministry consists of the marquis of Circello and the prior Seratti; the former is minister for foreign affairs, and the latter for the finances. Circello is thus devoted to the queen, though he has apparently been chosen contrary to her wishes; and the facility with which he entered into office, while the choice of the P. of B——e to succeed to Seratti was obstinately refused, shews that her majesty was at the bottom of the whole affair, and that the whole was a contrivance to amuse Mr. Drummond.—Seratti is entirely in the French interest—this ministry, settled since the arrival of Mr. D. at Palermo, have never acceded to any one request he has made; and whenever they have answered favorably to his demands, a secret counter-order has always been issued to prevent the execution of their promises; for example, wine and other supplies for the British army have been detained, and obliged to pay duty* contrary to the agreement. When the minister remonstrates, it is always a mistake, and orders are immediately issued to remedy the evil; but these are never executed, and the business is at last forgotten by some new cause of complaint. The Sicilian army has nothing to do with the British General: it is ill-paid, ill-disciplined, and not at all under his control. If the enemy were to land in Sicily, there is no system of co-operation established; and their late expedition to Calabria under the prince of Hesse, was sent without consulting the British General. As no remonstrances like the extract of the foregoing letters were made to the government by the British minister, so the court is quite at a loss to know why there was no detachment sent to support them from Messina, and the misunderstanding is arrived at such a height, that it has been credibly reported, when General Sherbrooke was sent with a

* All other nations whose ships of war touch in Sicily are exempt but the British! This fact will be confirmed by the British merchants in Sicily!

reinforcement to Egypt, that the Sicilian ministry undertook to remonstrate by an official note sent to the British envoy!

In this state of things, the court is highly discontented with the British, and they, in turn, are jealous that every thing is done to shew the people of how little consequence they are, as will be seen in the sequel.

The court of Palermo desires nothing so much as to return to Naples to enjoy once more the phantom of royalty; to this object they would sacrifice every consideration. Could they have engaged the British to attack the kingdom of Naples, this object was considered by them in a two-fold point of view; either that they would meet with success, and their object was gained; or that if they failed, Sicily would be cleared of British troops. In this last case, they might make a very advantageous bargain with the French at our expence; and there is some reason to think that it is in consideration (seeing the character of those at the head of affairs,) could the British army be removed from Sicily, to cede the island to France as the price of a peace. The kingdom of Naples to be restored to the present monarch on the same plan of federation, as the kingdom of Bavaria, the electorate of Hesse Cassel, the kingdom of Etruria, &c. &c. The king of Naples would then be the friend and ally of France on the same footing as these. The present views of the queen and the ministers are pretty evident from her open and avowed hatred to the English, whom she condescends in their presence to flatter with the meanest servility, while she has publicly declared that when she sees an Englishman, she "*feels the guillotine on her neck.*" If, after the expences of the British government to protect the island of Sicily, the influence of France gains ground every day even in the cabinet, no one will grant us much merit, when after all the local advantages we possess, both from our power, and the sacrifices we make to preserve this remnant of Europe from the hands of our enemy, we can neither persuade by reason, nor actuate by fear, a cabinet totally dependent on us; and if we

eny ourselves the right to prevent them from deceiving us so arefacedly, the Palamitan ministry will have a very good right o terminate the successful career of duplicity, by laughing at ur skill in political negociation.

ETTER III. *Right Honorable* W. DRUMMOND, *&c. &c. &c.*

Messina, May 17, 1807.

Par. 1. LET it be granted that the advice to op the subsidies in my foregoing letters should be wrong, and at to adopt abruptly such a mode of conduct, before you ould be furnished with fuller powers from home, would be regular: but to make a spirited remonstrance on the present nduct of the court, and to shew that it must in the end oduce such a measure on the part of our government, would rhaps have all the effect desired.

2. Give me leave to make a distinction with respect to what are, what are not the powers of the king by the Sicilian constitu- n. It seems totally foreign to our present discussion, whether have or have not the power to prevent the corporate bodies m laying taxes on provisions; for if the king do not possess legislative power in Sicily, which he certainly does, that wer must be vested somewhere; let us but chuse such a nistry as would have the good will to alleviate the sufferings the people, and there would be very little difficulty about means.

3. But I will now give you full satisfaction why I conceive t Circello is unworthy of your confidence; and that he has y been endeavouring to amuse you—he pretends that Seratti n the point of falling, and that he is now thwarted and posed in every measure he undertakes; he pretends also t nothing is to be done but with your knowledge and ncurrence.

4. It is Seratti who has given the most inquisitorial powers to Mr. Rossi at Messina, who is now on the point of throwing

fifty of the principal merchants into prison, for being guilty of smuggling, and defrauding the revenues. Mr. Rossi is their accuser, their judge, their prosecutor, and acts also as king's advocate: but in the name of justice, if these people are guilty, why create a particular commission to try them, when there are tribunals in the place for that purpose? Why has Rossi not published his powers, and why is every paper relating to this extraordinary business to be excluded from the register, where all documents relating to the customs are kept? It is a proof that the government are themselves ashamed of the transaction—all this is going on while you have offered your mediation in this affair; and the answer which you received was that "government were so occupied with the prince of Hesse's expedition, that they had not time to advert to it." The same day which brought your's of the 4th of May to this purport, bronght a fulminating order from Seratti, that all such as chose to dispute the justice of Rossi's proceedings should appeal, but begin by going to prison; and should remain there until their cause was tried over again, at the same time his dispatch fully approves of Mr. Rossi's acts. This man has seized on persons, threatened them with torture, and even death, if they did not depose just as he commanded them, and he has thus compiled the processes against these unfortunate men. There may be some guilty, but if all are so, why take such extraordinary means of trial?

6. Three days ago these people appeared in a body at General Fox's house, to beg his intercession, and to deprecate the despotic conduct of Rossi. He was called, he declared all he had done to be legal, and after this base but bold assertion, the General could do no more than send their memorial to you.—Observe in this the malevolence of Seratti: he carries on a system of the most rapacious tyranny, and in the presence and under the eye of a British army; he has the double triumph of shewing to all, that he totally disregards your remonstrances; that the British are even the supporters

of his odious conduct; and he serves the cause of the French to whom he is attached, by thus endeavouring not only to ruin our credit with the people of this country, but to paint them to every nation as the tools of his own villainy.—What indignation must every man feel in observing that we are thus passively obliged to acquiesce in such a dishonorable business? Is it possible that ministers at home should still go on and say, "we have no right to interfere?" At any rate we might remonstrate, and tell the court that such unprecedented conduct would certainly bring fresh determinations from home, and as for the moment you could only protest against, what could not but be highly disapproved, that if they chose to persevere, they would have themselves to thank for the consequences which might ensue.

6. I will grant that as long as we consider Sicily as an independant state, we cannot wield the power ourselves; but if the present government pursue a system in the defence of the island, so totally ruinous to our credit as a nation, and also to our safety, you have the most undoubted right to protest against their conduct, and to give notice to ministers at home of the predicament in which the unnatural alliance between a noble and just government and of a most vicious and degenerate one, have placed both yourself and the British army; they must equally feel with yourself that this calls loudly for a remedy, and that if we have not the right to govern Sicily, we have a right to make war on all governments with whom we cannot agree, and who are doing all they can to betray us. These spirited remonstrances could not fail to produce the change in the Sicilian cabinet which you desire. B———e would come into power, and he having no other support than the British, would be obliged to concur with you in all your views. The difficulties which Circello has thrown in the way of the reform of the finances, namely, the mortgaging of the different duties to individuals in the time of the late king, are matter of very little moment; and it would be very easy

to arrange that business, when the government shall put on the appearance, and adopt the principles of good faith. But what arrangement can be expected from it, when only last week it has seized the money of individuals, lodged in the depôt of St. Giacomo, in Messina, to cover legal payments; and without farther ceremony has sent the same to the prince of Hesse! with a government that conducts itself in such an infamous manner, how can you long be able to preserve any terms? I am sure that you must feel the necessity of representing this matter at home, and of remonstrating to the king at the same time. Should you be silent on this subject, these facts will some day be made public, and you might be reproached either with having passively acquiesced in them, or with having totally overlooked them.

7. Let us revert one moment to the ostensible end and motive of the war, "to defend all regular governments from the oppression of revolutionary terrorism." Here we find ourselves in alliance with the very principles which we vow to attack! What commerce, what connection, can you hope to hold with such a government?

I am, &c. &c.

N. B. The principal agent of Rossi is one Caglia, who some time since was expelled from Malta for treasonable correspondence with the French.

LETTER IV. *Right Honorable* W. DRUMMOND, *&c. &c.*

May 18, 1807.

I HAD closed my letter to you when the paper, of which the following is a copy, was put into my hands; it comes from Seratti's office; the abominable doctrine contained in this letter shews the spirit which guides the whole transaction.

(COPY TRANSLATED.)

To Mr. Rossi.

Palermo, May 4, 1807.

Sir,

"The two representations which you transmitted to us of the 20th of April last, with one of which you have sent us the summing up of the process, and the copy of the same which you have compiled, respecting the contrabands and frauds committed in the custom house to the injury of the fisc;—and since you have desired to know if the accused are to be proceeded against by legal trial, or by your arbitration.—And in the other letter, you have given an exact account of your own conduct in answer to the imputations laid against you, and signed by the deputies of commerce. His majesty being informed fully of all which you have done, has given full approbation to it, and has resolved that this affair should continue to be managed by you, and that you are to decide these cases. Provided also, that it should be permitted to any of those under prosecution to demand, at their own expence, a revisal and decision in the legal forms of justice, having first surrendered themselves into prison,—to be so tried before yourself, as commissary general appointed by his majesty, and by the secretary of states office and revenue department,—who makes known this to you for your instruction and correspondent execution."

This paper is dated May the 4th, 1807, the very day when the Marquis of Circello gave the answer on this subject to Mr. Drummond; and was published by Rossi, and sent to the accused.

Here, my dear Sir, you see depicted in the strongest colours Mr. Seratti's villainy, and Circello's falsehood. To

constitute a judge to hear appeals made against his own decisions, is a barefaced contempt of justice. The date of this paper is May 4th, the very day that you received for answer a palpable falsehood, "that the court were so occupied with the expedition that they could not advert to the business;" at the same time they press the matter on to the end!

You may not here have a right to use force, but we have a right to remonstrate for the reasons mentioned in mine of yesterday; and surely this letter throws a great light on the injustice of these proceedings; and, if represented in England cannot fail to shew the ministry at home, the truth of our sentiments, with respect to your conduct at such a court.

I am, Sir, &c. &c.

No remonstrance of the British minister on this disgusting subject had the least effect; Circello promised fairly, put off the discussion, and gave ample time to Seratti to extort the most arbitary fines from these merchants. The Commissary Rossi even threatened to accuse them of treason and rebellion, in having recourse to the mediation of the British General, which is in fact considering him as an enemy, at war with Sicily, and not an ally under whose protection the government is supposed to rest.*

The reader of these tracts cannot be more weary of this picture of Sicily than the writer, but before this subject is dismissed some final reflections must be made on it. The expectations which had been formed by all ranks of men on the arrival of our forces have been disappointed, and we begin

* Under these circumstances, and quietly pocketing these insults, we have since made a treaty with the court, confirming all the vexations of the people.—While ministers are fully apprized of this whole affair, but they will argue that there are reasons of state why this advice could not be adopted, and which for reasons cannot be divulged;—a common subterfuge with those who sacrifice their judgment to their weakness;—and which is no reason at all!

to be considered as the supporters of a system odious to all; could the French land a considerable force on any point of the coast, the country is in itself very strong, and the manifestoes they would immediately publish, holding out a redress of grievances, would cause a great impression in their favor. Could we expect that the people would join us to support a government which oppresses them? Could we hope to hold our ground without the friendship of the people, and without the revenues of the state?—Should this happen, it is needless to ask, what would be the prospect of the reigning family?—We must inevitably be obliged to yield to our enemy, and it would then be too late to alter our politics. Thus we see that a system of perfect deference towards the king and his ministers, in fact paves the way for his own ruin, and the triumphs of the French.

As long as these are kept out of Sicily the empire of Italy must be to them insecure, because so near a possession held by their enemies must always wear a threatning aspect:—therefore until Sicily is lost, the king may entertain hopes of recovering his continental dominions; but this reasoning has been fully discussed. It is therefore incumbent on the British cabinet to take such measures as shall preclude the possibility of the French making themselves masters of the island, and in the next place to render it capable of serving the common cause by the resources which nature has given it;—this cannot be done without making the people interested in the support of the king, whose government they must love before they can be persuaded not to betray it. They must also have more to fear than to hope from the French, the very reverse of which is the case at present.

The present ministry of Sicily are interested in the continuance of the present abuses; and the result must lead to favor the French, for the reasons above stated. It is therefore necessary to urge the king to a line of policy more favorable to our cause; and there is no fear that such a proposition firmly

made, would not have the desired effect, since the present measures lead to the most fatal consequences. This happy result would be felt by all; the goodness of the government would cause a favorable opinion to be formed of it on the neighbouring continent; the Italians may be, and perhaps are, already weary of the French yoke.

We have a right to interfere in the government of this island from the most pressing motives of self-defence; for if we cannot continue to defend Sicily on the present system, the loss of it will not only be fatal to its king, but such is the additional security and power that it would give to France, that Malta and the Mediterranean must be abandoned by our fleets; the continent and the isles of Greece would fall in the same way, and Egypt would require much greater efforts to defend it; the consequence of holding Egypt with the Grecian Isles in the hands of an enemy, are treated of in the sequel.

Let us now reflect for a moment on the incalculable train of mischiefs which must ensue to Great Britain, if she allow her delicacy to the court of Naples to thwart all her views of power, by which alone she can hope to maintain her independence from the haughty ambition of her enemy. And if her own national glory, power, and independency, turn on this point, ought she to sacrifice all these considerations to respect for a government, which meets with none from its own subjects; and of which the detail is so disgusting?—And let us ask ourselves, whether if we do not act on the principles here recommended, we are not deserving of all the vexatious consequences resulting from so useless and so ruinous a piece of generosity?

As long as the state of the country is unchanged, we have no means of making use of the people in our cause; a greater force is therefore necessary for the defence of the island, than if their interests and passions were called forth to our aid. Thus a great part of the force in the Mediterranean must be

confined to a fatal inactivity, when it is necessary to make the greatest exertions; when the Turkish empire is on the eve of its downfall, and when it will be prudent to have a footing in the islands of Greece, as will be seen hereafter.

Each of these events depends on the other; alleviate the misery and injustice which prevail in Sicily, and its people will be efficient in your cause; you will have leisure to undertake the same measures in Greece, and it will finally secure to you the safety of Egypt.

We must ever be embarassed for sufficient numbers of land forces to meet all our exigencies, unless we follow this system; by it we shall always find that men are to be procured in the countries we occupy, but if we dare not take these bold steps, if we dare not be just, we must cede the palm to such characters as Hannibal, Cæsar, and Buonaparte.

TRACT X.

Malta, June 10, 1807.

WHATEVER credit Mr. Gentz's book on the state of Europe may have gained, there is one of his positions which seems to be universally acknowledged, and on which a great part of his arguments turn; let us apply this to ourselves, and endeavour to deduce from it such consequences as may be useful to our own country.

He shews first, that the power of France, though formidable, was checked by the weight of Austria, and the rising energy of Prussia; every other inferior state had its weight in the scale. This order of things was calculated to render wars less destructive, and to accelerate the return of peace by the mediation of other states; and was propitious to the independence of the different countries which formed the great confederacy of Europe. A great portion of the civilized

nations of the earth, was exempted by it from those evils which befel the inhabitants of the Roman world, during the ages which succeeded to the first irruption of the barbarians.

Britain, who affecting the dominion of the seas, sought to enrich her subjects by commerce, and could have no view of aggrandisement on the continent, was thus interested to preserve her own place in the scale of power, by keeping every part of Europe as equally balanced as she could; and was obliged to watch and to check as much as lay in her power the aggrandisement and inordinate ambition of any of them, well knowing that should this order be inverted, and "*should any one state absorb the rest*," it must become her rival, and irreconcileable enemy. It is on this principle that the wars in which we have been engaged on the continent, for the last century and a half were undertaken. The temporary or peculiar circumstances which gave rise to these, are now nothing to our purpose, provided the grand principle of them be acknowledged; and as France from her power, her resources, and her ambition, was the point from which this invasion was most to be dreaded, it was natural that a struggle should exist between the two powers, one of which was anxious to preserve each of the continental states within its established limits, and the other constantly endeavouring to overthrow the balance which set bounds to her continental acquisitions.

Such in a few words was, as far as relates to Britain, the state of Europe when the French revolution broke out; but as the principles by which it professed to be directed, and the appeal it made to the passions of mankind, enforced by sophistical comments, on the faults of established governments, furnished to France new means of overthrowing the balance above-mentioned, by forming a party in her favor in every state, and by a system of corruption and cabal established at every court, the fidelity of those individuals, on whom the safety of each state depended, was undermined. France on the continent became victorious in every quarter.

The British cabinet in the course of the whole war since 1792, has pursued the system established under a different state of things, of making coalitions to repress this evil, and though these have been made on a more extensive plan, still they are on the same principle as those formed against Lewis XIV. Fifteen years have now elapsed since the beginning of this contest; and if we compare the boundaries of the French power at the commencement of this period, with that of the present day, we certainly have no grounds to boast of the success which awaits our political counsels, and it is fair perhaps to ask, whether by persevering in this system we can even hope to bring back matters to the old standard, and whether we can reduce France to her ancient limits?

In the mean time the whole scale of balances has given way: Holland, the Low Countries, the Empire, Switzerland, Italy, Savoy, and Spain, have become subservient and tributary states to our rival,—and the very crisis is at length arrived which we most feared, viz. "*that any one state should absorb the rest of Europe.*" This, though the event be lamentable, is a positive and evident fact; and yet, without reflecting on what the state of Europe was in the last century, we follow the same beaten track, not considering that circumstances are totally changed, and the state of Europe completely reversed. But in order to examine what prospects we have of realizing this scheme, let us consider our present alliances with Germany and Russia, and see how far it will forward our views.

As we have already observed, the great plan of British politics ever has been to check the ambition of France by raising up rivals to her power, in Germany. And the success which we met with in the time of Queen Anne, and the war of 1757 till the peace of 1760, has induced us to follow the same plan in later times. Experience has however shewn us that these wars, so far from preventing the encroachments of France on her neighbours, have had the salutary effect on her

frame of calling forth her energy, and perhaps enabling her still better to realize her project.

From the year 1793 to the present time, three coalitions have failed, and the fourth is now under experiment—the three former have not been able to stop her conquests.—Do we expect by this to recover what has been lost? or do we still cherish hopes of being able to fulfil the views entertained by the first coalition? If experience were taken for a guide, who is there who would not agree that hitherto the means have not been adequate to the end, on the contrary that every result has been as vexatious as possible.*

Before the present times, the thrones of Vienna and Berlin were filled by energetic characters; and men in those days were animated by other principles. The feeble princes who are their successors, and the cabals and corruption introduced by the French agents, had totally unhinged the strength and consistency of these monarchies. The series of defeats and disasters which the Austrians have experienced since the French revolution, were occasioned by the cabal in their cabinet, which displaced Prince Charles at the moment of his successes, and nominated such generals as were predetermined not to display the same vigour. This misconduct might naturally be supposed to occasion a general discouragement among the troops; but when we saw that the Austrian cabinet had neither strength nor virtue enough to remedy these evils, it might naturally have been concluded that such allies would receive our subsidies, and disregard their own honor; and hence, that very scanty hopes ought to be entertained of the effect of their exertions. Thus if a total want of energy and public virtue has been felt in every department of the government, and such a degree of baseness in its military leaders as to incline them openly to express their hatred of the British,

* Fama stetisse, non viribus Macedoniæ regnum eam quoque famam tandem evanuisse. Liv. lib. 31. ch. 8.

and accuse them of being the cause of all their disasters, how shall we hope that such a ministry can inspire in such an army a zeal for the common cause? When by the assistance of the Russians in 1799 the Austrians recovered Lombardy, their military contributions, their falsification and debasement of the current coin, made the people consider them as enemies rather than protectors; and the return of the French was desired by that devoted people. To encrease such a power, to enlarge its limits is therefore almost impossible, as the impolitic, barbarous, and tyrannical conduct of its agents undoes all the good we should seek to procure them.

The minds of men in these days are more open to indignation against the abuse of power then formerly; and the change of principles, caused by the French doctrines, as well as the decay of ecclesiastical influence, has sapped the foundations on which these governments formerly reposed; hence the frailty and weakness of those states which we honor with the name of allies.

When we reflect on the sudden downfall of the Prussian monarchy, when we saw an army, which we hitherto had considered as the model of our own, disperse without resistance before Buonaparte—when we saw the strongest places delivered up to an handful of men—ought we to attribute such extraordinary effects to the force alone of an enemy whose strength they did not try? The army must have been very ill-affected to the sovereign, and the people must have been indifferent to the government, when they saw it fall without one generous effort to avert the evil!

If once it is admitted that these fabrics have fallen from the rottenness of their materials, who will applaud the measures of those who repeat the same vain endeavours to put together the pieces, and patch up that which fell from want of consistency; and, if this truth be doubted, who will praise the wisdom of opposing a power with means which a little while since have been proved to be relatively so inferior? But even

should it be granted that with the assistance of Russia we may reconquer a great part of what has been lost; have we agreed with our allies what arrangement is to be made at the pacification of Europe? Should we even succeed to reinstate the king of Prussia, and the Emperor, in all they have lost, who is to inspire them with virtue and wisdom sufficient to withstand the pressure of France and Russia between whom they lie? The bad policy, therefore, which urges us so blindly to re-establish the weak and degenerate governments in Italy, induces us to act the same part in Germany; and thus the most free, the most energetic people on earth, is reduced to prostitute its means in behalf of those governments, which it would spurn at if they were proposed to themselves. To be the advocates for states which are not supported by the public opinion, nor the interest of the principal body of the people, is to plunge into a contest with the visible prospect of disappointment.

TRACT XI.

Malta, June 15, 1807.

The war, which at present subsists between Russia and France, seems to be an event on which great hopes and fears are founded, It is therefore the duty of every one who is attached to his country to submit his reflections to the public; if these are faulty, they will be refuted, and the refutation may suggest a new and a better view of events.

Many of those remarks which have been made on France as a continental empire may be applied to Russia; and perhaps the same injuries which we may have to apprehend from the one, may also be feared from the other.

Suppose the French are so defeated that they are obliged to fall back, and even evacuate Prussia, are we sure that we shall be able to dissolve the confederacy of the Rhine? And to renew the old order of things in Germany? And even if we succeed, are we not re-establishing a machine, of whose frailty we have had a recent proof? Unless we also intend to deprive the French of that restless ambition which will again disturb our arrangements. Let all this however be passed over; in the event of this great and improbable success, we must not forget that it is by the means of Russia, that all this will be operated! and what figure will Russia make in Europe, if she prove strong enough to humble France? Let us take care that while we would avoid Charybdis, we do not encounter the dangers of Scylla. The truth of this reflection has been already felt, because we are at every step afraid to excite the jealousy of our friend and ally. If two immense empires divide the continent between them, to subsidize the one against the other, must be evidently to elevate the one on the ruin of the other; but as long as they balance each other, a third power derives security from their rivalry.

But we are told that the old order of things is to be re-established, we are to call back events which have ceased to have existence, and expect the result of circumstances which are no more. The power that will be able to re-establish the old balances of Germany as they existed before the French revolution, will erect a fabric full of defects, and certainly not able to resist the encreased relative force of the neighbouring states. But the power which is to do all this, had not, when the above state of affairs existed, the same influence she now possesses; will not this very consideration do away the reality of the very plan proposed? Will not the vicinity of this new power alter the whole relative effect?

Let us remember, that the present theatre of war between France and Russia, is the spot on which three powers once combined to devour a fourth; and the king of Prussia may

now be sacrificed as Poland was before.—If once this plan is set on foot between the French and Russian emperors, the war between them will be soon at an end.

From what we have seen of the operations on the Vistula, the exertions are so great and so nearly equal on both sides, that it is difficult to foresee any great advantage to either party: but an accommodation between them may prove highly advantageous to both.

If what has been observed, therefore, be just, that France and Russia have at present more points on which they can agree than the contrary, a peace between them cannot be very far distant.

If the prospect of reducing France to her original limits becomes more remote every day, and if the princes who are all gainers, in some measure, by the confederacy of the Rhine, are interested in its continuance; if they content themselves for the present, hoping to profit by the convulsions which may hereafter take place in the French empire, to assert their independence, what rational hope can we have that the Russians will sacrifice the advantages which they may now reap by making a partition treaty with the French, in order to second our chimerical views? Russia who has tried her strength with France, and has found it nearly equal! What interest can she have in the re-establishment of the powers of Germany, when she must foresee the difficulties and struggles it will occasion her, as well as the precariousness of the result?

Until the present crisis, we have placed our own safety and our political tranquillity in the equal balance of power on the continent, we have seen that the principal motive for all our wars, for the last hundred and fifty years, has been to preserve the same; but that balance is now vanished from before our eyes, and we are making the last effort to re-establish it; with what probability, has been marked, according to our own view of the subject. It would, however, be at least, no more than prudence to ask ourselves, in case of our disappointment,

either through a peace between these empires, or in the event of France prevailing against Russia, what line of policy we must next pursue? Whether we are prepared to submit to an humiliating and ignominious peace with our rival, or whether we still have resolution sufficient to struggle once more for our greatness and independence.—We shall have before us on the continent the simple balance of two powers; we can therefore expect no other alternative to that of elevating ourselves to a counterpoise with these; to do this we have the means within ourselves, and if we neglect them, we must acknowledge others to be our superiors. We have seen that Buonaparte has brought under French influence all the western part of Europe, that Russia extends over the greater part of the remainder, and threatens the falling empire of the Turks; we must therefore determine to *Britannize* every part of insular Europe which suits our purpose, and, in order to give permanency to the same, to establish as much as lies in our power our laws and government. If usurpation and conquest be unjust, let it be remembered that self-defence is the first law of nature; and that the conqueror who civilizes those nations which fall under his yoke, amply compensates for the imaginary evil, while human nature in general is highly benefited.

Should we not feel the force of this reasoning, we must stand still while France and Russia are advancing by hasty strides to conquest and aggrandizement. We shall thus waste our resources, and still more precious time, in an unfruitful system of defence, which will retard the return of peace, in proportion as our haughty rival France, will rise in her pretensions; and our encreased expences, if not providently met by opening a new field of commerce, must encrease the difficulties of the people in bearing the burden, while the prospect of a long war is before them, which must terminate in an ignominious peace. Indeed it seems difficult to perceive any intermediate point between total ruin on the one hand, and a brilliant career of conquest and aggrandisement on the other. Should our views

be realised, the moment may not be far distant, when the bulky fabric on the continent may fall to pieces.—To what an incalculable degree of relative greatness will Britain have arrived, when there shall exist no power on earth able to shake its solid foundation! whoever will follow this train of reasoning, and compare the measures here recommended, with those that have hitherto been taken, and with the vexatious results we have experienced; when he has reflected on the serious and lamentable consequences of our want of decision and energy, in those situations where they are highly necessary; when he considers the levity with which we evacuate possessions which have cost us so much blood and treasure to acquire, and thus sacrifice our friends and partizans; that thus also we neither excite love nor fear, he will discern no rational end to be expected from our measures.

Our alliance with Russia does not seem to promise the advantages we proposed to ourselves in entering into it; our present transactions in the Mediterranean betray a want of system, and the ability to seize the true point of view in public affairs; thus we have mistaken our views in Egypt*, we are paralised in Sicily, and baffled in Russia. The greater powers receive our money, and dictate to us; the inferior powers are afraid to have any connection with us, because they are never sure we shall defend them throughout; so that while we excite the sneer of the strong and the mistrust of the weak, we preserve no salutary influence with either!

* This will be treated in the sequel.

TRACT XII.

——" Si quod novisti rectius istis
" Candidus imperti, si non his utere mecum."—Hor.

Malta, June 20, 1807.

We have in the foregoing tracts submitted to the reader our view of the defensive system of warfare, as well as that of our alliances on the continent; and if the arguments adduced are insufficient, we can do no more than appeal to the result of fifteen years experience on that subject. The same appeal may be made on our continential alliances; and if finally the consequences prove to be those which have been here prognosticated, if the suggestions of interest should induce Russia to make peace, or if a reverse in the fortune of war cause her to feel the necessity of it, Britain will then have no alternative between treating with France, whose pretensions will be higher than ever, and a continuing of the war. But the defensive system must be exhausting and ruinous; and where shall we turn our eyes on the continent to seek allies who will attempt to recal the golden days of the balance of power?—It is evident therefore that Great Britain must make war on a new plan; what that ought to be in such circumstances it is the object of this essay to develope.

The moment Russia shall have made peace with France, either in consequence of the reverse of fortune, or by a partition treaty, it is evident that the peninsula of Jutland will be totally under the authority and influence of France thus from the mouth of the Baltic to the Streights o Gibraltar, the whole line of coast will belong to the enemy.

Since therefore we are determined still to maintain our independence, though we are shut out from the continent of Europe, we have no other resource than to shut our enemies

within that continent, and debar them as much as possible from any foreign commerce by sea. On this system the scheme of an insular empire presents itself as the most obvious method to maintain our independence and power. Let us begin from the northward, and pass in review all the islands bordering on the continent of Europe.

At the mouth of the Baltic are the islands of Zealand, Funen, and Falster; as the king of Denmark, in case of the invasion of Jutland by the French, would be precisely in the same situation with the king of the Two Sicilies, such a chain of events would or ought to oblige us to make the insular part of that kingdom contribute a portion of its revenues to the defence of the state, and allow us the right of recruiting in Norway. A proper interference in the internal government of these islands would render the people more happy; as there is no doubt, from what we have been able to learn, that there are great discontents in that country, arising as well from the venality of justice as from the despotic conduct of the government. However hard and humiliating the case may be, the court of Denmark cannot expect to expend the resources of the state in idle pomp, while Britain is straining every nerve to prevent the king and his family from becoming wanderers on the face of the earth, no pretensions can be founded on more just grounds. Thus a great part of this state may be made to throw its weight into our scale; and thus we should keep up a communication with Russia and Sweden. Sweden will subside into a state dependent on Russia, while Britain, protecting what remains of Denmark, will form with them a northern league for mutual commerce and defence.

The next position necessary to our interest would be the island of Walcheren. The firm possession of this would render it the refuge of the people of Holland and the Netherlands, while it would completely shut the Scheld; their commercial spirit would attract them to a spot where they would be out of the reach of their oppressors; to this place would resort all those who were inclined to enter

into our service, both by sea and land, from the neighbouring countries. The merchants would gladly remove thither, and the commercial spirit of Holland would revive on this distinguished spot. It would in all probability rise as Venice did, when the invasion of the Goths in Italy, destroyed all security of persons and property. Our contraband trade with the opposite shores would baffle all the despotic vigilance of Buonaparte, and prove one important redoubt on that unassailable line by which it is proposed to surround all Europe.

Our influence in Norway and the Danish Isles, the possession of Walcheren, Guernsey and Jersey, Gibraltar, Sicily*, and Malta, Crete, and Cyprus, would thus draw a line of circumvallation around the mighty rival with whom we have to contend. Thus wherever he turned he would find the British standard ready to oppose his progress; and the activity of commerce which such an order of things would generate without, would counterbalance the evils which Europe feels within its limits; and on every side the French monarchy would be within the reach of our enterprises.

If it be the only alternative to create a maritime and insular empire, as the obvious counterpoise to the continental power of France, however difficult may be this task, or however extended the view, it is not for that reason the less incumbent on us to make it our great aim; and though it is not possible to attain this object at once, yet in the course of time it is far from being so unattainable as may be at first supposed; again, since we have no other means to counterpoise the power of the main land but by the dominion of the sea, so this mode of conduct would give us the mariners of all those countries which have been here enumerated.—

Let us reflect on the superiority we should decidedly possess from our great power at sea, by the completion of this plan;

* The system of our conduct in Sicily has been explained: the absolute independence of this country of a primary power is a chimera. To decree the independence of a state is not to create it it is only to utter sounds which have no meaning.

particularly in the event of those convulsions which must inevitably take place hereafter on the continent. Nations engaged in a contest for a master can never attend to the cares of keeping up a navy; and unless our posterity degenerate from what we are at this moment, they will find themselves by the provident care of their fathers in a situation too exalted and too imposing to have any thing to apprehend. No combinations of these states can ever oblige us to relinquish the hold we shall then have in every quarter of the globe; and it will be their duty to transmit to their offspring such sentiments as will still prolong the superiority which we shall have acquired over every nation on earth. Let us reflect that when the moment shall arrive, which will give birth to vast contests for the supreme power, or for securing the various parts of the continent to the different competitors who may start up, it will be from these points of our transmarine dominions, that we may have leisure to watch the storm, and to direct events towards the re-division of Europe into distinct kingdoms; thus re-establishing that balance of continental power, which in these days has been completely overthrown.—The decided superiority which we shall have acquired, will enable us to maintain the equipoise among the powers of Europe, and that with far less difficulties than we have had heretofore to contend with, nor will any other power be able to drive us from such positions as the supreme dominion of the seas will thus have insured to us.—These reflections might have been carried still farther, even with respect to the Russian empire, which will probably also undergo division when its population shall become more extensive, but this is foreign to the present subject. Are we not hence justified in concluding, that unless we cease to be enterprising, our prospects are flattering beyond what at first sight might be supposed?—Let us therefore here terminate this tract, which may thus leave an agreeable impression on the mind.

TRACT XIII.

Malta, June 21, 1807.

Before we proceed any farther in unfolding the system of insular aggrandisement, which is at present essentially necessary to the security of the British empire, let us begin by answering those objections which may naturally be made to its adoption.

The principal argument is, that the British Isles which form the nucleus of this great empire, from their extent and population, cannot furnish troops sufficient to cover this mighty increase of territory, which would also create a vast addition to our expenditure. This very objection is, if profoundly considered, the chief support of the doctrine here inculcated.

We have great demand for men to defend our East and West Indian territories, to equip our navy; and now the additional drain for the Cape of Good Hope, and our enterprises at Buenos Ayres: but if the acquisition of more European territory requires a greater force, surely those very provinces will also furnish more men than is necessary for their defence. The addition of fifty thousand able seamen which might be allured from every part of Greece to those islands which we should occupy, would be a great increase to our maritime power; and no doubt the happier government established by Britain, in Crete and Cyprus, would advance their population very rapidly, and furnish a robust race of people, well adapted to swell the numbers of our legions. It is because our tropical possessions require a constant and increased supply of European troops that the necessity of wider European territories discovers itself daily, thus preparing the means of a supply adequate to our wants. The Roman empire, as well as France at the present time, had the capacity to supply the consumption of troops inevitable in those wars which their gigantic

views led them to undertake. This fact therefore, if correct, will shew the plan here proposed to be founded in reason, and that it is the only resource we have left in the present position of affairs.—In order to unfold the means which now offer themselves to second our views, let us take a rapid survey of the present state of the Turkish empire.

The fanatic fury of the Mahommedan religion, and the decline of the Greek empire, at a time when the weak and divided state of Europe rendered it unable to prevent the settlement of the Turks in one of its finest provinces, were certainly the cause which facilitated the establishment of the Ottoman power. The polity and religion of that people are now too well known, from the pens of numerous travellers, to need our dwelling at present on these heads. Suffice it to observe, that since the period of their establishment on the ruins of the Byzantine empire, population has decreased as barbarism has grown up. The same principles of landed tenure known in Asia, and described in a foregoing tract, have had still more destructive effects; inasmuch as the Turkish sceptre is more oppressive to the culture of the soil than that of the Mogul. Whatever part of this empire is visited by the traveller, he will perceive its baneful influence. The massive ruins in Greece and Asia Minor, sufficiently shew the former state of those countries, and though history give us but few lights on its ancient population, the country itself speaks to the eye of the observer.

The Peloponnesus, at present, contains scarcely more than two hundred thousand inhabitants: Cyprus hardly one quarter of that number: Asia Minor, once the seat of arts, of sciences, and of philosophy, wears the same marks of desolation; its beautiful and extensive vales and plains are left to wolves and foxes, while here and there a miserable Turkish or Greek village intervenes, as if it were necessary that a few of the human race should still remain to bear witness to the dreadful reverse which that country has undergone. Let the traveller

visit Greece, he will find the same lamentable effects of Asiatic despotism; should he turn his steps southward, and visit the plains of Mesopotamia, he will still trace the canals which once carried the waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates to fertilize them, and render them a fit abode for man; or let him visit and shed a tear of compassion on the present unhappy Egypt;—all will evince that such an empire, situated as it is, near to active and clear-sighted Europeans, can never be of very long duration.

It is a reflection worthy of notice, that the pride and stupidity of the Turks caused one of the greatest errors that ever was committed by a conquering people. As their bigotry has always kept them a distinct race from the nations who held the country before their conquest of it. They denied to the conquered nations the same civil rights with themselves, and refused to treat them in any way but as slaves. The Greek, the Armenian, &c. each has preserved his own language, his own religion, and customs; and as they were not put on a footing with the Turks, they have remained apart. The Christian subject could thus have neither interest, nor pride in such an order of things. Hence the Turk has remained to this day a foreigner in his own land, and he has left the means most available to his enemies for his own destruction.

Had the Turks waved the coercion of religious opinions, and amalgamated with the conquered, the whole empire would have formed one body; and as the same distributive justice, however imperfect it was, would have been the right of all, the whole people would have formed one nation, and the weakness and discord which result from the contrary system, would not have existed.

The map of the Turkish empire still exhibits the different pashalics and governments as it did during the meridian of their power. But these different vice-roys have long since bid defiance to the sultan; and all these examples prove that Mahommedan governments generally have the same principles

of destruction inherent in their constitution; the influence of the great Greek families at Constantinople increases daily, and the commercial spirit which has grown up among that people, in various parts of the empire, portends that the Greek is waiting for the first European power which will step forward and assist him in throwing off the yoke.

Can all the foresight of ministry prevent the gradual progress of these events?—Can we prolong the existence of the Turkish empire when the period is arrived?—Can we give it a new spirit and energy when these are once fled?*—What power on the continent is interested in its support?—And should any one consider it as conducive to its own interest, can they inspire it with the means of averting its own downfall? European Turkey will cede first to the shocks it may receive either from France or Russia. In this state of things it will be useless to think of making peace with the Porte, in order to protect it against its enemies. If we cannot prevent the downfall of the Ottoman power in Europe, to send troops to support an unpopular cause, is to render ourselves odious to the more numerous part of the people, and ridiculous in the eyes of all the world. Hence we ought to be prepared for this change, or be involved in the inevitable consequences of not having foreseen and provided for the event.

The British ministry in the conduct of the present war, seems rather to have been guided by circumstances as they happened, and these have followed each other in so rapid a succession, and so contrary to what they themselves held out to the public, that it is evident, they neither foresaw nor were prepared to meet them. Lord Bacon quotes a passage from Demosthenes, which defines the difference between a good and a bad statesman, "that the former governs events, while the

* On what solid basis can we treat with a state who can neither defend itself nor profit by our assistance, this reflection will shew the absurdity of the mission just sent.

latter is governed by them." Every one who is acquainted with the political occurrences in Europe, since the year 1792, will decide how far our ministry have taken the lead in them, and whether the French have not a greater claim to the merit, at least, of foresight.

If what has been advanced on the probable extinction, and the real weakness of the Turkish empire, be admitted, a partition treaty of European Turkey is an event to be shortly expected; and if we determine to remain unconcerned spectators of this event, it will be to tolerate the aggrandisement of our enemies; no other line of conduct therefore is left to us but that of occupying such insulated points as we have above hinted in the present lamentable circumstances in which all Europe is involved.

It is not difficult to foresee the consequences of our being indifferent to these events. Greece will rise in favor of France, and thus become our natural enemy, as being the ally of barbarity and ignorance; and we shall have the mortification to yield to France all influence in that quarter. The French are now in possession of a great part of Dalmatia, and the march from Aulona to Constantinople is not more than five hundred miles; perhaps, as we have done in Sicily, we may endeavour to cover some isle or province; but not interfering in the government, we come to act the simple part of spectators, this must terminate in the ruin of every cause we take up; for whatever is done on a false principle must have a vexatious result.

In order to pursue the plan of an insular empire, according to the principles which have been hazarded on this subject, let us turn our attention to the island of Crete; it will serve also to give a sketch of the temper and disposition of the Greek people in general. This, as well as Sicily, is a point of the highest importance to us: it may be easily obtained, but to keep it we must abandon the timid policy which has hitherto induced us to perpetuate the abuses and evils which we find

in the countries we occupy. It is for this reason that the French party increases, and that ours decreases, in proportion as the hopes which mankind had conceived from our power and activity are daily disappointed.

Crete shuts in the Egean Sea on the south, and covers the approaches to Egypt. This island is about two hundred miles in length and about forty in breadth; the soil is fertile and well cultivated; and though under the yoke of Turkey, the superior activity of the people makes the state of the country less languishing than that of Sicily, though the evils which they have to contend with are perhaps more violent in their nature. The human race here surpasses almost every other part of the world in strength and beauty, and the slavery of two centuries has not yet subdued the spirit of the Cretan people. From the most probable accounts of the population, we may conclude that it cannot be more than three hundred thousand, the sixth part of which only consists of Mahommedans.

The military power is totally in the hands of the Turks; and, with very few exceptions of Turkish villages, the Mahommedans are entirely confined to Canea and Candia; the strong fortress of Suda is in their hands.

To recapitulate the oppressive conduct of the Turks, would be to undertake a task at once disgusting and superfluous. They are in possession of the best lands in the island, which they have obtained by force and by fraud. The Greeks are mostly their farmers and renters, as well as land stewards; it is the policy of the Turks to prevent the Greeks from wearing arms, but many have them in their houses.

The following account of the state of this country was communicated to the writer of these tracts by a Cretan; and as it perfectly coincides with what he saw of the Greeks, and their disposition in the Peloponnesus; when he visited that country in 1790, he has the more confidence in laying it before the reader.

This man is a native of Sphakia (Σφακία) which has never been subdued either by the Venetians, or Turks; the whole district being so defended by passes, and the people so determined not to submit, that hitherto the Turks have in vain attempted to subdue them.—Sphakia has about twenty villages dependent on the little town which gives its name to the whole district: they have about four thousand men exercised in arms; each village is governed by its chiefs, who are united by the common danger which sarrounds them, but who are also sensible of the inconveniences and defects to which their constitution is subject. There are men among them not ignorant of the ancient freedom of Greece, and their future independence of the Turks is the subject of ardent desire, and the theme of prophecies among them.

In the rest of the island where the Greeks are in the power of their masters, they are more cautious, less independent, but fully as inveterate against them; and the following anecdote will justify the assertion. In 1798, when the French went to Egypt, it was supposed that the island of Crete would shortly have fallen into their power; the Turks, who had hitherto trampled on the Greeks, but who now feared that the tables would be turned, were fain to court them, and every Turk chose a Greek for his patron, under whose protection he was to support the political reverse. The Greeks acquiesced in this arrangement, and it was hoped that the Cretans would thus become one people, by destroying the civil distinction between the two religions—this would have been an happy event for the people, had the French established their power; but as soon as they were driven out of Egypt by the British, who were the friends and allies of the Porte, the danger was passed, and each barbarous client murdered his patron, to efface the memory of his intended submission. Thus the breach is irreparable between the two nations.

To the mind of this people the first consideration is the expulsion of their oppressors; and, indeed, on no other con-

sideration can they hope to enjoy the freedom which they so ardently desire.

Such is the present state of Crete, celebrated for her hundred cities, for her superior laws and government, for her maritime power, her commerce, her industry, and her riches. She has lost all these advantages, but she still possesses the soil, the same climate, the same hardy and athletic inhabitants, who are susceptible of again becoming what their ancestors were.

In the supposition that the plan of politics which has been above recommended, were adopted, let us trace out what conduct would be proper to obtain the dominion of the island, and also to preserve it. How we might assure the allegiance of the people by the system of government that should be established, and what profit or advantage would accrue from the possession of it.—First it would be proper to have some understanding with the chiefs of Sphakia, to offer to assist them with a body of troops, to hold up to them the advantage of being annexed to the British empire, and the terrible consequences to themselves, if, through their fault, we were unsuccessful in the execution of such a project. Hope and despair would lend their aid—four or five thousand muskets might be brought to arm those who were in want of them, and the landing of about five thousand British troops in the neighbourhood of Sphakia, would thus insure the conquest of the island, for the Turks would be obliged to take to the forts of Suda and Candia, to prevent the Greeks from seizing these ports, and they would not take the field, because they dare not trust the Greeks in the country; thus would they be finally obliged to capitulate. As there can be no reliance on the Turks, it would be necessary for them to evacuate the island; their lands would escheat to the British crown, and the letting of these to the same farmers, would produce a considerable income, perhaps nearly sufficient to pay the troops in the country. Should a contrary system be adopted,

the Turks will be constantly planning schemes of bloodshed and treachery, and the peace of the settlement would be constantly endangered.

The customs of Crete are ill regulated, but these would furnish another source of income to government, without forgetting that its natural products are the same with those of Sicily. While the people now under so easy a yoke, and amidst the joy for their liberation, might be induced to agree to such a code of laws as a virtuous and wise man would wish to establish.

As the property and person of every individual would be secure, the population of Crete would increase by the emigration of Greeks from every quarter. The seamen from every part of the Archipelago would flock thither, where the oppressive *charatch* or poll-tax would be abolished, and no power would be able to drive us from so strong a situation. The richer Greeks from Smyrna, Salonika, and Constantinople, would bring their capital and their ships; all must depend on a strict distributive justice being firmly established.

The want of this has reduced Sicily and Crete to their present state; the restoration of it will give a new spring to their regeneration. Crete, well administered, would probably pay its own expences; it would be a depôt of commerce for Egypt and Syria, and as its population would encrease with its prosperity, it would not only put at our disposal a number of seamen, as we have just observed, but the people by degrees might be induced to enter into our service, first within their own island, then under the pretence of assisting their countrymen, in other parts of Greece, to leave it for other islands; until at last, a general service would be drawn from them. The island might in a short time be able to furnish about twelve thousand men.

Cyprus is rather larger than Crete, less mountainous, more fertile, but unhealthy in some parts, from its present depopulation, and consequent want of culture. This island has no

good ports, but several bays with anchorage; its vicinity to the coast of Syria renders it of the highest consequence for our communications overland with Bussora; and were it in the hands of an enemy, or any jealous power, the consequences would doubtless be severely felt by the East India Company.

If the fall of the Turkish empire be not distant, and these islands should be left under a loose government, or totally without a master, there is no doubt but that the whole would become a nest of lawless pirates.

Should these reflections be rejected, and a peace with the Turks be made at the present moment, no line of policy can be better calculated to assist the views of the French, even if Buonaparte had suggested it himself; because it is leaving in Greece an hot bed of cabal and insurrection, which the French will foment against the Turks; and under pretence of delivering the Greek people from slavery, they will wield the efficient strength of the country, while we, as usual, shall again have to play the old part of the defenders of a weak and barbarous despotism, against the common rights of mankind;- thus ever opposing the improvement and civilization of the human race. This narrow policy, unworthy of a great and wise nation, will ensure to the French all their objects in Turkey; so that we shall have the mortification to find that we are assisting them in those very views which they are most eager to fulfil.

The French have sent officers to defend Constantinople and the Dardanelles; they are now the declared friends of the Porte. But at the same time they have attracted a Greek of the name of Koraës, to Paris, who is their party writer; his works inculcate the independence of his nation, and songs have been composed by him, tending to animate them to a general insurrection against the Turks.

Had Buonaparte not been employed in the Russian war, his intention was to have brought his army to Aulona, on the coast of Epirus, from whence his march in a strait line, would have been through Salonika to Constantinople, and the Greek

people were ready to rise in his favor. This should indelibly impress the necessity of ceding to the current of human events, if we cannot prevent them, of diverting the stream into those channels which conduce to our advantage. To prevent the French from getting a footing in Turkey, a partition treaty of the European part between Austria and Russia should be encouraged, while Britain should follow up the principle of the insular empire, leaving the continent to her allies.

The progress which the Russians have made in the northern provinces of Turkey clearly delineates what part will fall to their share, but we must differ in toto from that policy which has so prematurely urged the occupation of Egypt, as well as the inadequate force which has been sent to Alexandria; because previously to taking possession of a province, whether it be with a permanent view, or only to serve as an equivalent in negociating a peace, (a conduct which, as we have observed, is in other words, no less than an act of treachery to those who have espoused our cause,) it seems necessary to have the means of holding the same with advantage; for should it be perceived that the province you possess is either not tenable, or subject to great inconvenience, no merit will be attached to the sacrifice you make in ceding that which is expensive and disadvantageous.

Secondly, Egypt has for ages been in the hands of strangers, and it is one of those possessions which, though advantageous in many respects, certainly requires a great supply of men for its defence; the natives themselves being unwarlike, the military of that country, it is well known, has been totally composed of foreign adventurers. Let us here consider, in the event of the destruction of the Turkish empire, what will be the situation of Egypt relatively to the continent and isles of Greece.

If Austria and Russia should divide continental Greece, some barrier ought to be put to their seizing the whole; for it is evident that the masters of Egypt must be in a great measure

dependent on them, because much of the produce of Egypt is consumed in Greece, and many articles of primary necessity are totally denied by nature to the soil of the former. Planks and timber of all sorts, fuel, wine, and oil, are among the many for which the Egyptians are obliged to their neighbours. Hence the Greeks must have their share in the commerce of that country. Should we not consider the matter in this point of view, let us suppose the continent and isles of Greece were in the hands of an enemy. It abounds, as we have observed, with harbours and seamen, and what maritime power would it not require to prevent it from becoming a nest of privateers? It can now produce near 50,000 seamen, and when the Porte shall have lost them, some power will claim them. Every one can make his own reflections on the disadvantages which a British government in Egypt would labour under, in these circumstances.

The conquest of Egypt in its present state would be an enterprise of no great difficulty, though the extent of the country requires a great force; the principal object therefore is to know what might make that possession insecure. When Britain is mistress of Crete and Cyprus, she is so likewise of Egypt; without the possession of these islands, the possession must ever be an incumbrance, an expence, and a source of anxiety and inquietude.

Notwithstanding their present abject state, the Greek merchants of Constantinople, Salonica, Smyrna, Psyra, Hydra, Cos, Crete, Chios, as well as those of the Hellespont and sea of Marmara, have many of them amassed considerable riches by the corn-trade to Spain and Sicily; in both which countries there has been a scarcity for these twelve years past. These persons are many of them men of low extraction, but the influence of riches finds not only protection, but even power. Their commerce with Europe has extended their views, and the ideas of freedom and independence are become familiar to them. The many rich, and the learned few, are discontented

with their lot; but the bulk of the people have too much to fear from the Turks to raise their heads, as they have no common rallying point; in this state they are a fit object for the enterprises of any power that will make the attempt.

Whatever part of Greece be wrested from the Turks will be found totally without laws, except the Turkish which will be abolished, or the practice of petty chiefs in villages; no feodal system to reform, no ancient code, no abusive procedures, no false system of revenue or œconomy to amend; wherever you occupy you must legislate; and you must make your own laws acceptable, by a short but well reasoned commentary on their nature and intent, preserving the spirit, but varying the application as the circumstances of the country may require. The common observation in the mouth of the more learned Greeks, is, that no nation among the moderns has ever resembled their ancestors by their institutions more than the British.

How can we expect to have a party to support us, unless we hold out to them some hopes congenial with the interests of the people? This can only be done by the very means suggested in the sixth tract; "*if we trust merely to force we throw aside one half of our means—the power of eloquence, and the influence of the press may be often useful and efficacious allies of the sword; and our hope of success must in a great measure depend on the doctrine which we support by our arms.*"

Let us now sum up the advantages resulting from Britannizing these islands.

1. The position of them, on which depends the destiny of Egypt.

2. A population inclined both to commerce and war; hence a disposable force in these seas.

3. A barrier to France and Russia in those points where we are most jealous or vulnerable.

4. Resources in the above countries, sufficient for the disbursements of their respective governments.

5. Troops raised there, better able to withstand the climate of Egypt than our own, should we in future interest ourselves in that country; while British garrisons might defend these islands.

Let us also consider the utility of their marine, and the danger of their being ever employed against us.

Every man who gives to the world novel ideas, is often stigmatized among us, but the success which such new schemes has met with in the present times, ought to mitigate the severity of censure; particularly since we have seen that all the old established principles of conducting war have most commonly failed. It is necessary now to take a nearer view of human events, and not to be shackled by notions suitable to the transactions of the last century, any more than the actors of that day were confined by the maxims of their predecessors.

We cannot help quoting in this place a passage from the Edinburgh Review for the month of July 1805, page 340, and it will not perhaps seem quite foreign to the purpose; for should the event therein prognosticated be verified, perhaps the advantage which may result from our acquisitions in the Mediterranean may be felt, as the activity of our commercial enterprizes may require a fresh field for the exercise of it.

"To enquire what form the colonial society will assume "during the continuance of the slave-trade would be a super- "fluous task. For if it shall be continued, in all human "probability one of two events will speedily happen; either "the fate of St. Domingo will suddenly become the fate of "all the negro settlements, or the West-India system will "remain a little longer on its present footing. By means not "very easily perceived, the impending blow will be warded off "for a season; negroes will continue to be driven, tortured, "and wasted, in proportion as new recruits can always be "obtained from Africa. A scanty portion of the dregs of

" European society will still reside in the islands, and compose " the whole of that colonial body on whom the preservation " of the system depends. Each attempt of the enemy in " St. Domingo, or each effort of the slaves themselves to " imitate the example of that settlement, will shake to its base " the whole western ring of the European community, till, in " the course of a few years, the frail tenure will give way, on " which we hold those fine possessions; and all the monu- " ments of the European name in the southern part of the " new world, will vanish before the tempest which our short- " sighted and wicked policy has for ages been raising. It " is long since we predicted the consequences of a negro " commonwealth in the Antilles, and attempted to shew by " arguments, (the weakness of which has been unhappily " strengthened by the course of events,) that with the eman- " cipated Africans there can be no faith, no treaties, no " fixed connections of neutrality, not even the honorable and " settled relations of modern warfare, &c."

The abolition of the slave-trade, which has been since enacted in parliament, may perhaps not be able to put a stop to this evil; and the loss of our West-India islands is among the most probable of human events, since our writer has told us that no faith is to be had even in the emancipated Africans. These reflections naturally lead us to see the necessity of being prepared for such a catastrophe; and to what has been said on the advantages resulting from the possession of Crete and Cyprus, may also be joined the commerce of Egypt, and even Abyssinia, which being improved by our vicinity and influence, might furnish us with supplies of sugar, coffee, and cotton enough to console us for the loss of that which we had heretofore drawn from the West-Indies.

The great objection that will be made to the project of occupying these islands, is founded on the real or supposed

jealousy of Russia; but have we ever sounded the Russian cabinet on that subject? The possession of Greece is a favorite object of their ambition, and by giving us those islands we should guard that distant boundary of their empire against the French, at the same time that the opposition of Austria and England to their views would be averted. And this very reflection has been uttered by a Russian minister! At present we are expending immense sums on the precarious hope of re-establishing the old state of the continent; but with the certainty that the Russian power will be greatly increased, and with every probable prospect that the termination of the war between Russia and France will be profitable to both, while the present expence is ours; and in order not to disturb the unfolding of this plot, we abstain from any acquisition advantageous to ourselves. We fear that France and Russia may one day coalesce against us in case we offend the latter. Let us examine this point.—It is evident that Russia cannot make war in Prussia against Buonaparte, without the assistance of a subsidy from our government; by the same rule, we ought to suppose, that to make war on England, she must receive a much larger subsidy from France, as her operations must be carried on by sea; but the latter we know are not much in the habit of paying subsidies.

This reflection, if admitted, gives us little to fear from Russia. If it be not admitted, it is a stronger reason why we should take possession of Crete and Cyprus; and thus prevent the mariners of Greece from becoming her subjects. Are we afraid to excite the jealousy of Russia? Then to prevent this, we are to permit her to acquire the means of attacking us on our own element! The palpable absurdity of this reasoning needs no comment.

From the foregoing observations we are led to conclude, that whether we reflect on the state of our affairs in Sicily, or on what has been said regarding Crete and Cyprus, the taking possession of Alexandria was a premature and ill judged step;

it may also be shewn, that so far from being useful, it has been detrimental to us.

One of the means of carrying on war, which is neither to be despised or neglected, is to excite such apprehensions in the mind of your enemy, as may induce him to take such steps as will render him incapable of that very enterprise which you have the greatest motive to dread. A very clear example of this practise, and its advantages, has been given in our late expedition to Egypt.

The motive for the occupation of Egypt by a British force was to prevent the French from getting a footing there*. As this was declared, let us examine into the probabilities on which it was founded.

At the moment when it was thought adviseable to seize on Alexandria, Buonaparte was occupied with the war in Russia, and even forced to make levies for the campaign. Buonaparte had formerly invaded Egypt, while the French were still a great maritime power; and the decisive victories of Lord Nelson had not yet happened. Buonaparte therefore knew that by sending a force to Egypt, which he could not easily recruit, was depriving himself of an assistance of which he stood in the greatest need, while the necessity of a communication with that country would consume the remains of his shipping.

Buonaparte knew that the English army in Sicily was nearly 18,000 strong, and that in the event of his being embarrassed by the Russian war, Italy would be held by a precarious tenure. His interest, therefore, demanded that such a force should be divided, and his only means for obtaining this end,

* If the French could be supposed to attempt Egypt, by sea, our fleet might be supposed able to prevent them; therefore the force sent was superfluous. If they could arrive by land, the force we sent was inadequate to defend the country. It is always by half measures that we ruin our own cause.

were to persuade the British to act as he wished, at the expence of their own understanding! He employed men of address to persuade our agents in Egypt, that the French meditated a descent in that country; and the plan so far succeeded, that it was a Frenchman, at Palermo, who first asserted that from the expedition which was expected from England, a detachment would be sent to Alexandria. Our agents gave into the imposture, and the consequence was, that we dismembered our force to occupy a post which could be of no immediate importance to France, while our motion in the Mediterranean were thus totally paralised, and Buonaparte had full leisure to conduct the war in the north, while he had no fear of any insurrections or disturbances in Italy. Had these reflections been made, before this step was taken, on the probability of a French expedition to Egypt, it can scarcely be supposed that we should have sacrificed our evident interests as we have done, at the instigation of Buonaparte's insidious agents in the Mediterranean. This example of imposture, ought to shew the necessity of trying the truth of intelligence by the criterion of good sense, guided by positively known and pre-established facts.

TRACT XIV.

At Sea, July 6, 1807.

In Great Britain, though the privileges of the people are guarded by the Parliament, and though the result is the freedom of individuals and the general superiority of our polity to that of other nations, yet from this character in the construction, a ministry labours under great disadvantages when the energy of the state is called forth by foreign war; for it is then that it is obliged to employ a great part of the time

necessary for the planning of measures in* answering for what has already been done. It is then that it is obliged to look for help by giving employment to those who will support those measures which are subject to the daily criticism of the opposite party. These are constantly attacking the minister with imputations of injustice and violence, whenever he attempts any measure of an offensive nature, from these and other such springs arise those factions which weaken our political conduct abroad, and from this insidious source that moderation is so constantly preached up.

That the French are professed conquerors, no one will deny, but we are recommended to defend Malta, and allow them to occupy every other part of the Mediterranean. Perhaps, however, our moderation may be considered either as stupidity or fear, and how far such an impression of us on the mind of other nations can be of advantage has never yet been explained. It might be asked, how the love and esteem of our neighbours would secure us from insult, after it is found that our defensive system is guided by that very doctrine which our adversaries are desirous we should adopt, as they would thence have every thing to hope and nothing to fear but a simple repulse.

It is high time the people of England should open their eyes to the mischiefs arising from factions among themselves. The traitors are often those who call the loudest, and alarm the people by an affected anxiety for the dangers which surround them; for by often exciting groundless fears, and by shewing

* Though we differ totally from Mr. Pitt in the conduct of the war, which we consider as having been directed on a false view of events, ignorance of the actual state of his allies, and want of skill in applying the history of past times to the present; yet he must ever be considered as a very great man when we recollect his power and address in quashing faction, and in uniting all parties in unanimity to his politics: this he owed to the strength of his reasonings, and to his perfect knowledge of the internal state and resources of the empire which he governed. No minister who has not his address in strengthening his party by dividing his opponents, can ever display the energy necessary in the present times.

the weakness of the state while they suppress those suggestions of confidence resulting from its strength and resources, they paralize the public conduct, because they are jealous of the hand that wields its power.

It is an expression in the mouth of all people of superficial information, that we have already more territories than we can well govern. Perhaps the assertion may carry with it a great deal of truth, were all the world so peaceably inclined, as not to wish to pull us down from that pinnacle of prosperity and grandeur to which we have arrived. But we should remember, what every page of history tells us, that there is no fixability in human affairs; that an empire is ever progressive or declining, and that to attempt to render it stationary at any given epoch, is the highest proof of human folly; that it is the same as arresting the course of time, or fixing the sun in the meridian.

Man can never arrive at perfection, he must ever look up to an ideal point to counteract the principle of decay, and the moment he ceases to do so, the moment of decline is already arrived. The wisdom and perseverence of our ancestors, have brought us to a very high pitch of power and riches, the means employed by them to obtain power and riches were foreign colonies, manufactures, and a commerce founded on national good faith; their views in the beginning must have been indefinite, as no human wisdom could foresee what has happened in the course of this glorious and successful pursuit. Is it for us to stop short with the vain idea of keeping what we have, for fear of creating a jealousy in our neighbours? Will they not construe this into weakness and timidity, and be more eager than ever to pull us down? The great danger of these principles of pretended moderation will be seen clearly if we look at our present situation at home.

The continuance of the war has doubled the funded capital of the nation, the interest of which must be paid by the profits arising from that which is afloat in commerce. The moment the activity of commerce relaxes, a deficit will arise in paying

the interest of the funded debt. We are therefore brought to this result;—we must agree to sacrifice our national honor and public credit, our prosperity, our empire of the ocean, our distinguished situation among nations, the right of dispensing our laws and institutions to the woods and deserts of distant regions, to the conscientious doctrine which denies our right of interfering in the affairs of other nations.

What then is to be done? We must begin anew on this principle, that greatness and political existence are with us inseparable and synonymous terms. That if we do not go on in the career of aggrandisement, our national credit, our power, every thing will be lost.

The manufactures of Britain are the great support of its riches and prosperity, but they are now prohibited strictly in France, Spain, Prussia, Austria, and shackled in Russia. We are driven from Italy by her subjection to France. Let Manchester tell how many of her looms are decaying from the want of a vent to her commodities; let us reckon how many imitations of her arts have been transplanted to Germany and Switzerland,

As it has of late been much the fashion for politicians of all ranks to recommend moderation to our cabinet, perhaps it would not be foreign to our purpose, after what has been already said, to make a small digression on the pitch of greatness to which we have arrived, and on its physical and moral causes, as well as on the effects of our colonies in every part of the globe where they have been extended. At the time of the Norman conquest, the island of Great Britain contained scarcely more than four millions of souls; vast forests and marshes covered a great part of its surface. As its sovereigns by degrees emancipated the peasants and burghers, commerce began to dawn; and we find England as early as the reign of Elizabeth affecting the empire of the seas. As individuals found means of enriching themselves, the farmers and the merchants multiplied, and the number of

merchants encreased with the means of supporting a family. Thus by degrees woods were cleared, and marshes drained, and rivers and harbours which were before comparatively desert, were planted with flourishing towns. As the national capital encreased, money was found for establishing manufactures, and the journeyman acquired the means of supporting a wife and children. Thus population will always encrease with the demand, and overstep it. As a proof of this great truth, let any one trace the increase of numbers in Great Britain during the last three centuries, at a time when colonies were forming on the vast continent of North America, when we were cultivating the West India islands, during our conquests in India, &c. &c. On the accession of George the Third, to the crown of Great Britain, the arms of the empire were victorious by sea and land in every quarter of the globe; her maritime superiority was acknowledged and dreaded by all the powers of Europe; her distant colonies poured into the capital the produce and merchandize of every climate; her finances, her public credit were moulded into a system unknown in the history of nations. The prerogatives of the crown were circumscribed by laws, the privileges of each order of society were clearly defined and secured. The triple fabric of her constitution was well understood, and strictly administered, and the laws were sacred, and faithfully executed. The commercial spirit of the people, and their active enterprise diffused the blessings of luxury, while they averted its enervating and baneful influence on public virtue. The din of theological disputes, which had spread a gloom over former times, had gradually died away; a purer system of morals was adopted by the priest and the philosopher, while the example of the court encouraged and countenanced the innocence of domestic life. The love of war was checked by the decent pretext of self defence and public justice; and the luxury of peace was corrected by military exercises, and still more by navigation.

Rome, at the summit of her glory and power, was mistress of the fairest portion of the globe, and her subjects were the most civilized of mankind; but the constitution of Rome had fallen under the yoke of one master. The spirit of that republic, eminently fitted for conquest, was not prepared to receive a monarch without the danger of military despotism. When Augustus shut the temple of Janus, and contented himself with the empire as he found it, he gradually prepared the Romans for the disuse of arms. The law of hereditary succession was not properly established, and the influence of the legions in nominating the emperors, destroyed or effaced the beauties of the system, while it relaxed the nerves of military discipline. The decline of Rome may be dated from the renunciation of conquest; but that was retarded by the compact and uniform nature of its parts.

Rome had no dangerous rivals to dread, and the irruption of the various barbarians who overthrew her throne in the east and west, was more the effect of her own internal discord and relaxation, than of the real power of these enemies.—Carthage had become a dependent province, and the successors of Alexander, the republics of Greece, and the barbarian tribes of Britain, of the Rhine and the Danube, were become her subjects and her soldiers. Rome had arrived at the summit of her glory and prosperity, nothing now remained for her but the enjoyment and the preservation of her wealth and power; in the pursuit of the first she inevitably lost the means of the latter.

The British empire at the point of prosperity above described, had still rivals and enemies to contend with, enough to keep alive her energy, and to prevent the stagnation of public virtue and foreign enterprise.—She still has before her eyes the example of Rome, a dreadful example, which shews that it is more difficult to preserve than to acquire: that whatever is won, may be lost; and that to cease to acquire is to begin to lose. The testimony of Rome is not the only one which will

fortify this doctrine, but the history of every nation which has distinguished itself by its conquests and dominion over others confirms it. As long as the financial system of Britain exists, so long will last the propensity to active enterprise; and notwithstanding all the checks we have received from our enemies, as well as from our friends, and the pressure of public taxes, we find our commerce and our means encrease, population still progressive, and agriculture by enclosing the waste lands of the kingdom finding new space for industry and inhabitants. The time however must arrive, when the whole island shall be incapable of further improvement, and that moment is rather accelerated than retarded by our enterprises abroad. Whoever would wish to stop short, must begin by diminishing our enterprising spirit; but that moment will be the beginning of our decline, and that is the very point we must avoid as long as possible. We must therefore continue in the career we are entered upon, and never look behind us.

Let us reflect on the numbers of men who have fallen victims to the sword, and to the climate of the West-Indies—Do we find our population at home decreased? Do we find the emigrations to America decrease?* Is there a difficulty in finding people to occupy the lands brought into culture by the general enclosure bill? Whence then is the fear that we are not numerous enough to look forward to and embrace more glorious and brilliant atchievements?—The revolution in St. Domingo, which has happened within these few years, carries with it consequences which it is highly necessary for us to provide against. The spirit of independence has taken hold of the negroes of our islands, and the moment is not far distant, as we have before observed, when our power will give way to the natural current of events. The capital employed in that commerce must look for a fresh field, and if we stop we become retrogressive.

Hence we see how necessary it is to extend our commerce

* See Lord Selkirk's work on that subject.

and connections to every quarter of the globe; this is the more necessary when we consider the spirit which now actuates the two principal states of Europe. Timid men are always asking whether, by pursuing this or that object, we do not expose ourselves to the jealousy of other states? while they do not consider that these are following the same plan of ambition, without ever making the same reflection. Why then should we be constantly checked by this cautious policy, unless we wish to descend from the rank we hold among nations? We certainly cannot stop France and Russia in their progress; it is therefore necessary for us to keep pace with them, as all greatness and power are only relative to that of our neighbours. The more we are feared the more we are envied, 'tis true; but are we not also the more respected? Let us once abandon this ground, we shall be first despised, and then insulted; and foreign cabinets will get the habit of dictating to us, from what they must soon perceive of our system, and political temperament.

TRACT XV.

At Sea, July 9. 1807.

After fourteen years of warfare, in which we have been contending for that which has fallen by the order of things, namely the balance of power, we have embarked in an enterprize of the greatest moment to our own interests, as well as to the general commerce of mankind. The barbarous jealousy of Spain has kept the greatest part of the southern peninsula of America totally locked up from the society of other nations: this system worthy only of those who imagined it, has finally been violated, and should the result of the taking of Buenos Ayres open that vast continent, it will be one of the most interesting epochs since that of its discovery and conquest.

It may not be foreign to the purpose to ask on what plan the expedition has been undertaken, and what rule we shall prescribe to ourselves in our future transactions in that country.

If the expedition was planned with a view to conquest, the inadequacy of the numbers sent thither, nay, indeed of all that Britain could afford to detach thither in the present juncture, considering the immense extent of the country, must be too evident to need a comment.

If the expedition was connected with a view to animate the inhabitants to shake off the yoke of the Spaniards, no conduct could be worse calculated to obtain this result. The plunder of its public treasury, and at the same time the insuring and perpetuating to the people a form of government in its nature highly oppressive, without consulting their feelings, or asking them any questions on the subject, was certainly the surest way to render the people our enemy. The object therefore was neither of these mentioned.

The third and only consideration which can be suggested was, then, to occupy some position from which to open a contraband trade with the interior; and thus, as at Gibraltar, force an intercourse with the jealous and inhospitable Spanish government. If this was the object, the possession of Buenos Ayres, in a flat open country, exposed to the attacks of the Spaniards, was certainly not a proper place for such an operation: we must therefore conclude, that this, as well as every other movement in this war, was neither undertaken with a mature view of the business, nor with any determinate principle.—If this reasoning be admitted as just, on what plan ought we to proceed with respect to Buenos Ayres? We have no choice but to unite with the people to make them independent; or should the situation of Monte Video * be found,

* If instead of attempting to conquer this country, our object were only trade, the present necessity in which Spain labours for the realization of her American revenue, might induce her to mitigate her commercial

on a proper survey, well calculated to maintain a garrison; should it also contain a convenient port, we ought to make it a depôt of trade.—All these facts must be known, when we are better acquainted with the topography of the place itself.—It were perhaps better to content ourselves with this possession for the present, as it would answer all the objects of commerce; confining ourselves to this one object, until the people were more accustomed to our manners, and there might be time to sound their inclinations.—Should we in future extend our views, we should perceive how prudently we had acted; for it is not sufficient to occupy the country by force of arms, in spite of the illiberal prejudices instilled by a bigotted clergy into a people hitherto totally excluded from any intercourse with other nations. It will be necessary to make the change interesting to them, and the allurements of commerce which we hold forth, are the most powerful agents in softening the asperity of those notions which are hurtful to the union and intercourse of nations.

As the principle of the Spanish government in every part of America is despotic and oppressive, and as the native Spaniards are exclusively admitted to public employments, in prejudice of the Creoles and others, the native Indians are still subject to innumerable services, the destruction of these bonds would give us partizans far out-numbering the European Spaniards who oppress them.

The administration of justice is also totally in the hands of strangers, these are independent of the viceroy, and the abuse of justice, founded on the same doctrine of the Spanish and Sicilian laws, (the latter of which have been fully explained,) as well as the tedious modes of procedure, equally disclose the dominion of lawyers in these distant regions.—When the bulk

ealousy, and to permit the entrance of British manufactures into that country, this permission privately given, or winked at by Spain, is another argument to prove the wild impolicy of the attempt on Buenos Ayres!

of mankind in any state has lost the confidence which a subject ought to repose in the government, when he is subject to captious accusations, from which he cannot disentangle himself without money, when he is not sure of a favorable sentence, let his cause be ever so just; such a state may be always considered as ripe for foreign conquests, unless some extraordinary interest should unite the nation in spite of this defect. It is therefore obvious that if we wish to render our dominion permanent, the natives should be called to our aid. Confidence should be reposed in them, the strictest attention should be immediately paid to the distribution of justice; the improvement of agriculture and division of lands should be encouraged, and any cruel and noxious regulation, which so often checks the progress of society, while it weakens its ties, should be abolished. In all countries where the Spanish dominion has been erected, the revenue system will ever be found to be a mass of absurdity, tyranny, and monopoly, which, while it oppresses the interests of all, cramps the industry and productive power of the state. To communicate our views to the nations we come among, no doubt bears an affinity to the proclamations of the French, with this difference, that while these endeavour to delude by false representations, we should undeceive and redress real grievances. * To imitate that part of the conduct of our enemies which we must approve, and to apply the same to a better principle, cannot be censured but by those who rather wish to cavil than to reason, and to such men, no answer can be sufficient.

If on the western coast of this immense continent the British were in possession of the island of Chiloe, which lies in lat. 43 south, a great trade might be carried on with Chili and Peru. It could be made a considerable depôt of the manufactures of Bengal and the Coromandel coast. Perhaps such a commerce

* α συνιδοντες εμιμησατο ταχεως. Αγαθοι γαρ, ει και τινες ετερως μεταλαβειν εθη, και ζηλωσαι το βελτιον και, Ρωμαιοι

POLYB, lib. 6. ch. 25.

might supply Bengal with gold and silver, as the want of circulating coin encreases daily through the vast drain of cash from that country, and it would give a fresh vent to the manufactures of India; a result highly advantageous to our interests in that country.

TRACT XVI.

At Sea, July 16, 1807.

EVERY circumstance concurs to accelerate the improvement of the United States of America. As the population of this country bears no proportion to its extent, and as the freedom of our laws, and the whole of our mercantile and financial systems has been transplanted to it; this, added to the enterprise, the perseverance, and industry of the nation, provides employment not only for all who are born in the country, but also for adventurers of every description who resort thither: and settlements are extending every day. The cession of Louisiana to the republic has caused considerable emigrations from the more settled parts, and fresh room is given every where for the encrease of people; it is for this reason that the wages of labour are great in America, and to this source that they owe their present prosperity. Lands are cheap, and wages are high, so that in a few years every one is able to amass enough to settle himself; the more children he has the better, as he has more hands to help him. America has a people, but not a populace, hence she is not yet ripe for a monarchical form of government, because there is no needy beggarly croud ever ready to be the tools of ambitious demagognes. It is for this reason that the government is not troubled by civil broils, as in all other republican states; and it may at the same time shew the striking contrast which America bore with France, when that country changed its

form of government; every man seeks to improve his circumstances by the means which every day offers, and as soon as he is fixed, becomes a friend to good order and the laws. As long as things go on in this way, all will be well in America; but as soon as the number of inhabitants shall become disproportionate to the space allotted to them, (and that period is still very distant,) all the political evils which have been felt in the old, must be experienced in the new world. Until that time arrive, it will not be worth while for speculators to establish manufactures there, the cheapness of wages being one of the first inducements to such men in the choice of a situation. America, therefore, must for a very long period continue to receive the produce of our manufactures, while we shall also afford them a good mart for their raw materials. We have no points to gain which can at all cross them in their interests, and they are too young a people to think of distant colonies, for the reasons above mentioned. Nothing seems to lead to any cause of dispute or rupture with the Americans; the similarity of our civil governments and laws, together with our customs and languages, and the mutual and combined interests of the merchants of both countries, rather tend to strengthen the bonds of friendship: the national animosity between the people of both countries occasioned by the war which ended in the independence of America, is wearing off every day; and it is to be hoped that the liberality of a free people will not wish to visit the sins of the fathers upon the children.

When the predicament in which America is at present, begins to change; when the towns shall be crowded with a turbulent populace, and every thing shall begin to wear the appearance of the mature age of the old world, it is then, that further changes may be expected which will still put off the day of contest between us.

A great federal republic, in extent equal to all Europe can

never hold together, the local interest of the states and the ambition of powerful individuals, will sow the seeds of division among them. Louisiana, Kentucky, Tenasee, and the Floridas, will set up for themselves; the states on the sea coast from New England to Cape Florida may in time also divide. The slavery of the southern parts, will form a spirit widely different from that of liberty and independence, which distinguishes the north-west states. The great rivers which flow from the Apalachian chain into the Atlantic Ocean, will become the frontiers of independant states. The towns on their banks will then be fortified, and standing armies will be as necessary as in Europe; the same may be said of the frontier of Kentucky, and the banks of the Missisippi. All these changes will be worked by time, though the prospect is at present very distant. Whatever may have happened to Great Britain, during the interval, whether she continue to hold the empire of the seas, or whether she may in the mean time have suffered the greatest reverses, it does not seem probable that we can ever have any motives to interfere in these events. For the same reasons Canada and Nova Scotia can give us no uneasiness; it is not natural to suppose, that as long as extensive countries in milder climates are open to the Americans, that they will seek a needless quarrel with us to gain possession of these frozen regions, while the interests which commerce holds forth to continue the friendship between us intervene.

The Americans are, perhaps, sensible that the power of Britain at sea has saved the half of their country from the most dreadful horrors. The present vulnerable part of America is the countries south of the city of Washington. Had the French have had leisure, a nation so fond of doing mischief might have invaded one of the southern states, and by declaring freedom to the slaves, have completely destroyed the federal government in those parts, and severed them from the others.

The abolition of slavery would be a great political desideratum; but it appears that hitherto few have considered the subject in a proper point of view; that it has been taken up with too much warmth, and that the principal arguments have been overlooked. But of this when we come to make a few reflections on the West India isles.

America we see to the northward is occupied by a free and independent race of farmers, who know the full value of the privileges of citizens; while the southern provinces are held by great proprietors, who are far out-numbered by the negroes; every one will see at one view, how much this circumstance must render various and opposite the spirit of the government in these provinces.

After this favorable view of the United States of America, their growing riches and extensive commerce, it might be asked if, in its present state the American confederation would be able to maintain a war with England? Were the Americans to undertake this contest, it is evident that not only their trade to India would be intercepted, but their carrying trade would suffer very materially. The principal revenues of the United States arise from the customs, but as these would suffer a considerable diminution, to support the expences of the war, they must have recourse to other sources of public revenue; hence perhaps not only the necessity of a land-tax, but also excise laws and other impositions, the very same which occasioned their defection from Great Britain. A war with Great Britain would therefore be very unpopular in America both among the mercantile and landed part of the community. But if we consider the turbulent and independant spirit of the Americans, it seems difficult to conceive how their present executive power would have sufficient authority to enforce the execution of those acts which the congress would be obliged to make to pay a fleet, which would be sufficiently numerous to cope with that of Britain, or such a number of land forces as it would be necessary to levy; and it may be

doubted if detachments of tax-gathers would be made equally welcome in every part of their extensive regions?

The leaders of the American government, therefore, may menace and talk big, but they are conscious within themselves that they have not strength sufficient to concentrate the power of the state in their own hands, and be long able to wield it with any effect. They have felt the necessity of purchasing Louisiana, in preference to the waging war against an active people, who should occupy it. A republic consisting of a number of others confederated together, having each its separate legislative assembly, who acknowledge no order of patricians or nobility, and who are so near to a democracy, though refined by representation, must of all others be the most difficult to guide; for as the executive power is derived from the people at large, any president must in a great measure depend on the popularity of his measures for the maintenance of his authority. Or he must have a very strong party to support him; and this very party must make great sacrifices to sustain a war in which much may be lost, but where the hope of advantage cannot be very great. A British war must be limited to cruizing against our trade, but that must evidently be confined to privateers, as their navy will not be sufficient to protect their own commerce. So many therefore would suffer in America from such a war, that those who supported the measure at first would gradually drop off, and join the pacific party.

The weakness of the American government may be perceived clearly from its conduct in the attempt made by Mr. Burr to head the states on the Missisippi, and form an independant government. This attempt was premature, future ones will succeed! It has been objected to the remarks which have been made on the capture of American ships by English cruizers, that as most of these vessels would be insured at London, British underwriters would ultimately pay the losses sustained; but as the premium on insurance would be

proportioned to the risk, even admitting the truth of the remark, it is natural to suppose that the aggregate of the insurers would be gainers, though individuals might suffer, thus a certain profit, even in this hypothesis, would accrue to British merchants; and in fact the whole would amount to no more than rendering the American merchants tributary to our own during the course of the war.

These reflections are only made to shew that, however, unwilling we may be to go to war with America, we ought not for that reason to be dictated to by their government; as it is evident that the evil would at least be as great, if not far greater, to them than to ourselves; and that before they will be able to maintain a long war, their government must take a new form, and the people must be induced to give up certain notions of independence, perfectly incompatible with their present mode of thinking.

Εγώ δέ φοϐεροτέρον μὲν εἰνᾶι φήμι, το πολέμειν, ȣ̃ μὴν ȣτὼ γέ φόϐερον ωςὶ παν υπομὲνειν χάριν τȣ μὴ προσδέξασθαι πολεμόν. Ἐιρὴνη γὰρ μετὰ τȣ δίκαιȣ καὶ πρέποντος, κὰλλιςον εςὶ κτὴμα και λυσιτέλεςάτον, μετὰ δε κακίας καὶ δουλεὶας, επονεὶδιςȣ παντῶν ἀίσχιςον καὶ ϐλαϐεροτατον.

POLIBIUS.

TRACT XVII.

At Sea, July 21, 1807.

THERE is no disputing the advantages arising from the culture and commerce of the West India islands, and the revenues derived from the imposts on cotton, sugar, &c. but St. Domingo is fraught with evils which are already felt all over the West Indies. In the island of Cuba the slaves have begun to follow the example of their neighbours, and the Spanish government not being able to send succours thither,

the contagion spreads every day. Revolt has been also preached in our islands by emissaries from St. Domingo, and the negroes are becoming daily more unruly, and less submissive to their masters, while the government feels the danger which surrounds it. It becomes the more necessary to encrease the military force to prevent a general insurrection. In a country where the climate is so very inimical to an European constitution, should such an event take place, there are many reasons for supposing that the negroes would finally be successful: should the rebellion however be suppressed, there will be a constant danger of its breaking out again, and the settlements will never feel the security they formerly enjoyed.

The inhabitants of the islands consist of Europeans, people of colour, and negroes, it is objected to the latter that they are lazy and insensible to the stimulus of gain, yet it is found that the little spot which they work for their own account is not less attended to than the lands which they till under the lash of their masters. The love of labour increases with the advantages it yields, and if the negroes worked lands on their own account, they would probably produce as much as they do at present.

If a fund were raised for reimbursing, by degrees, the proprietors of the negroes and making their children free, as well as by accustoming those of the people of colour, best able to resist the tropical heat, to turn themselves to agriculture, the system of slavery would be then by degrees abolished, and that unhappy race would in time become the peasantry and day labourers of the country. The proprietors of the slaves would little by little be reimbursed, and these isles would wear a new aspect; perhaps the profits of the landholders at first would be diminished, but it is surely better to enjoy a certain security, than the whole with the continual risk of not only losing it, but also their lives.

There are, no doubt, numberless difficulties and objections to be made to this proposal, but before it be totally dismissed

the means of putting it into execution should be duly examined; and there is no doubt but that should this plan be commenced in a proper manner, and the negroes made to understand the intentions of government, a great part of those who first felt its good effects would become attached to the cause; hence a schism in the conspiracy. It would be improper at once to put them on the footing of the peasantry of England, but to take those of Germany first for our model, making such amendments in their situation as the nature of things required, would be a great point gained.

Let the proprietor of a West India estate reflect for a moment on the capital he has employed in negroes, their food, the drivers, and others whom he is obliged to employ on his plantation; that capital would then return into his chest, and might be applied to commerce, were every negroe thus emancipated to have a piece of land allotted to him, and to contract with the owner for so much rent in kind, or to divide the crop, as is usual in Italy and other countries; his capital might be employed in buying that part of the produce which the negroe must sell, and by advancing to him small sums from time to time. The latter would remain in his dependance, and he would always thus buy to great advantage; the laws of the country might watch over, and check oppression on the one side and bad faith on the other. This comparative state of freedom, would render the peasant happy; and perhaps in time those of St. Domingo, wearied as they will soon be with revolutionary violence, would flock to Jamaica in numbers to enjoy that peace and liberty which they had vainly hoped from the destruction of their masters.

The present government of St. Domingo has in the true revolutionary jargon published the articles of the constitution, which are in themselves vague and indefinite; in fact the government is despotic, and the supreme power elective; the different provinces must be governed by delegations to lieutenants, and these on every vacancy of the throne, will aspire

at the supreme power. In order to ensue success, they may call in to their assistance Europeans; if the latter chuse to interfere, they will obtain settlements, and thus by degrees the history of Bengal and Coromandel will here be acted over again on a new theatre. In the mean time the people of the island must exchange their produce for our goods, and thus the trade to Europe in sugar will be carried on with the same advantage as before. Slavery will be abolished, the European may finally be the masters, as it is very problematical whether the negroes will ever be able to establish any rational form of government among themselves.

Should all this happen, the loss of the West Indies will not be fraught with all the evils supposed: during this interval, the change above proposed in our islands, with such modifications as those who have a more perfect knowledge of the subject might deem requisite, should be effected. We may save the negroes from running the same career as their brethren, and hold out an asylum to the fugitives disgusted with their own anarchy in St. Domingo, until that island should settle into the form above mentioned.

TRACT XVIII.

At Sea, July 24, 1807.

In the former part of these tracts we have observed, that since the wars which have succeeeded to the death of Louis XVI. the whole power of Europe on the land is divided between France and Russia. We have observed that France is at present a continental empire, and that it is our evident interest to check her naval power. Let us examine under what aspect Russia ought to be viewed.

European Russia is by far the best peopled and the most improved part of the empire, but though the wisdom of those

princes who have governed from the accession of Peter the Great, has done much both in the amelioration of the laws, as well as of œconomical and military systems, the peasantry are still slaves, and the representatives of the executive power are tyrannical and oppressive. One of the great objects at present of Russian ambition is to have a foreign commerce, and at the same time to become a maritime power.

The Russians have formed a navy, they have taken into their service strangers from every part of Europe, and they have instructed many of their own subjects in the naval profession; but the interest of individuals leads them to the profits rather of an inland commerce, for which that empire by the navigation of its rivers is so well calculated, while most of their vessels employed in foreign trade are both the property of strangers settled in the country, and manned by foreigners.

The Russian empire is very inconveniently situated for marine commerce; the ports of Archangel and the Baltic are not accessible for more than four months in the year; the northern ocean near their coasts is not navigable; their possessions on the Black Sea labour under the greatest disadvantages; it is in itself a very dangerous navigation, while the necessity of passing the Bosphorus cramps still more its utility; the slavery of the peasantry is another great obstacle to the encrease of the numbers of seamen, as well as to the growth of a commercial spirit. These reflections are enough to shew that a navy at present in Russia is, as it were, an exotic, and not the natural growth of the soil; that constant attention is required to maintain it, and that it has a natural tendency rather to relapse than to advance.

Should however the natural course of human events produce the downfall of the Ottoman power in Europe, the coasts of Thrace and Macedon, as well as those of Asia on the Propontis and Hellespont, may become a part of the Russian empire. We have endeavoured to shew that this event is

perhaps not very far distant; and that the Greeks, from a similarity in religion, will be happy to join that power. All this shews us the more strongly that the possession of Crete and Cyprus will be then more necessary than ever. The British are better masters than the Russians, and the behaviour of the latter in the isles of Corfu, Zante, &c. contrasted with the manner we treat the Maltese, is a proof of this assertion; the Greeks in these islands are already disgusted with the Russians, from whom they daily suffer acts of violence, of oppression, and heavy taxation. This contrast would appear still greater should the two above mentioned Grecian isles fall under our dominion, and we shall ultimately feel the utility they will be of to us, in preventing Russia from acquiring the absolute dominion of Greece; and forming a maritime power, without at the same time providing for the proportionable increase of our own.

The spirit of the Russian government inclines to conquest and aggrandisement*, and this sentiment is kept alive by the principal characters of the state; by extending the limits of the empire they create new and more distant commands, which whenever the weakness of the head begins to develope itself, will become independent sovereignties, like the successors of Alexander the Great:—The Empress Catharine the Second, once threatened to march to India;† but if we consider the immense desarts they will have to pass from Orenburg to the country of Bokhara, a large army would with difficulty find provisions, and a small one would be overpowered; the heat of the climate in the province of Lahore would probably destroy those who had escaped the fatigues and dangers of so long a

* Φυσει γαρ πασαν μοναρχιαν το μεν ισον εχθαιρειν ζητειν δε παντας, ει δε μηγ', ως πλειστους, υπηκους ειναι σφισι και πειθαρχειν.

POLIB. EXCERPTA. leg. 25.

† The march of a French army to India will be the subject of a future tract.

march; but if the Russians by degrees establish military posts along the Oxus, and gain a great influence in independant Tartary, we might find them too strongly established, to be able to avert the evil when it comes so near. It would therefore be good policy in the East India Company to have a friendly communication with the Khans of that country, to have a resident with their chief, to shew him how much we are interested in his independence, and on the contrary the dangers which he might have to apprehend, should intestine discord ever induce the Tartars to admit the Russians among them.

Whenever the Russians shall be in possession of the principal fortresses in Bokhara, and shall have established depôts on the banks of the Lake Aral and the Oxus, they may, by sending small detachments at a time, very soon encrease their force in that country; and if they get the revenues into their hands, what can hinder them from recruiting there? The Tartars are always ready to join in a march to India; its advantages are known from tradition, and it is then that we might find a Russian minister at the Mahratta courts.*

There is yet time enough to provide against this storm, but the circumstance ought not to be disregarded: it is not enough that even the Russians do not look so far; perhaps their object at first will be only to open a trade to India by caravans; but when they get still nearer to this scene, to have their moderation alone to trust to will be but an insecure barrier; it would farther be right to acquire a clear knowledge of the state and politics of independent Tartary, before these reflections be condemned as vain and chimerical.

* The road from Bokhara to Balch is along the Oxus, which an army may follow up to the mountains, on the other side of which are the rivers which fall into the Indus.

TRACT XIX.

At Sea, off Algiers, July 28, 1807.

To those travellers who have visited the various regencies on the coast of Barbary, it is a mortifying reflection, that to the British, whose maritime superiority is acknowledged by all the world, less respect is perhaps shewn than to any other flag; the respect shewn to the French consuls, and the insults which the representatives of our government are obliged to suffer, certainly shew that our influence is null; how far this may give us credit for political sagacity, every one will judge. But if a French consul, without the support of an invincible maritime force, can almost dictate in their councils, while our flag is scarcely respected, what excuse can we make to ourselves, if conscience accuses us of not knowing how to profit by the advantages we have? Perhaps this is one of those circumstances which escape our view at home, enveloped as we are in the clouds of domestic dissention by selfish parties.

The depredations of the African cruizers are thought little of at home, because they are distant and out of sight. Our policy hitherto has been to cultivate peace and amity with them, as advantageous to our commerce; but the French, Spanish, Austrian, American, Danish, Swedish, and Russian flags are equally at peace with them, their attacks in the Mediterranean are confined to the coasts of Sicily. While all Italy is under French protection. Can our commercial jealousy be alarmed at the rivality of Sicily? But it is for this object alone that British vessels are constantly insulted by these pirates, who intercept the commerce of the only country in whose protection we are at present interested. Whether the policy which suggested peace with the Barbary powers, was

good at the time it was adopted, needs not now to be enquired. Things are now changed, and the good effects of this policy exist no more, yet we continue in this system of conduct without considering that the Barbaresques are now disposed to insult us under pretence of our being at war with the Turks; and that the cabals of the French at Algiers and Tunis have prepared the whole of that country in a future day to be ranked among the number of our enemies. If we look back to the Roman empire, when after the fall of Carthage, the whole Mediterranean became included in their provinces, the dominion of the sea was found indispensably necessary to the welfare of the state; the Cilician pirates were then extirpated. In the same manner the East-India Company has destroyed that nest on the coast of Malabar, known by the appellation of the Angria pirates.

If the British empire has now no other object to aim at for its own preservation, but the supreme dominion of the seas, here are two examples to guide her, and due punishment inflicted on these may at the same time strike a certain awe into those European states who still affect to keep up a navy. The fewer of these there are, the more difficult for the French to make combinations against us by sea, but enough has been hinted above on this head; and the only condition on which the corsairs of Barbary ought to be permitted to put to sea, should be that of attacking those only whom we shall point out to them as enemies.

TRACT XX.

Gibraltar, August, 4, 1807.

Recapitulation and Conclusion.

If the reader will consider the great tract of country we have travelled over together in a short space of time, he will not think the rider has spared his pegasus, nor rendered by that means the journey too tedious; he will certainly have a much greater right to complain that he has been hurried so fast from one country to another, that he has scarcely had time to examine thoroughly the objects which have presented themselves before him. This tract therefore will serve as a caravanserai, where he will put up, and take time to look over and arrange the curiosities he has brought with him from the various places he has visited. To travel through so many distant regions, without having previously gained some knowledge of each, by general information, would be imprudent. It is supposed that in making this excursion, he will call to mind his stock of information, and not require a tedious detail wherever he goes, which would render his jaunt more expensive to himself, and laborious to his conductor. Let us therefore sum up the knowledge which we flatter ourselves we have acquired.

At the beginning of the last century the balance of the different powers of Europe was arranged according to the weight and influence of each; at the time Alsace and Lorraine were ceded to France, the states of Italy were guaranteed, and its various interests established by that criterion. Gibraltar was given up to Great Britain, and many other points not necessary to be here mentioned were settled. These

arrangements at the time they were made, certainly resulted from the then relative state of affairs; but it could never be supposed that this would be perpetual: during this interval, a gradual change has been constantly working in the proportionate progress and decay of the various states which composed the great commonwealth of Europe. Habit has however so much influence over the human mind, that though this reasoning may be admitted as just on speculation, yet some will hesitate, and start back, when they find where it leads them. So long accustomed to go on in the beaten track, it will be difficult to lead them into a new one, and there will be an outcry raised against those who dare to deviate so widely from it. If no objection be made to what has been urged on the constant mutability of human affairs, and the reader will weigh with attention the changes which a century has produced, he will perhaps feel the truth of the reflection.

Let us briefly recapitulate the different changes in the last hundred years; the progress of Russia from the establishment of the capital of St. Petersburgh, the cession of Canada to Britain, the rise and fall of the Prussian monarchy, the loss of America to Great Britain, and her subsequent conquests, and acquisitions of the latter in India; the dissolution of the Germanic league; the decline of the Ottoman empire, now tottering to its fall; the revolutions which have happened in Persia, from the time of Shah Nadir, to the present,—we might compare this retrospect of the world to a game of chess: since the game began many moves have been made, and we find the order of the different pieces totally changed; surely no good player will recommend the same moves to be made which he would judiciously have proposed at a different period of the game!

Is it then unreasonable to recommend a new plan of operation on this assumption? There is a principle in the public mind of England, which though founded on the most noble

trait of the public sentiment often leads us into very false reasoning with respect to politics; it is often abruptly asked, "What right have we to interfere in the affairs of different princes and states? By what authority do we or any other people take upon us to cut and carve, without asking the permission of those who have so long held the supreme power, in parts of the world where our authority never was nor ever can be established?" This way of thinking does honor to the public character; but if we examine a little more deeply into the subject, it will be found to be only shutting our eyes against the progress of human events, and not endeavouring to arrest it, however obviously inevitable it be.

When a prince or state has once lost their political existence, however morally unjust may have been the conduct of that people which caused their ruin, it is evident that the state in question lost its independence from having ceased to be what it was in the meridian of its power, and has thus also involved others in its ruin:—The state who destroyed it may as well ask, "what right had such a government to deviate from its original institution, and by the corruption of its principles to lose that energy which gave rise to and maintained its vigour?" When the different orders of society, in any community, are so situated as to lose the love of their country, their warlike spirit, it is evident that the evil results from some internal defect. The first injustice therefore may be laid at the door of those who have thus become the cause of their own downfall. From a principle of justice to persevere in the determination of supporting and re-establishing such states, is like insisting that a dead man should stand on his legs, because he was able to do so while he was alive.

Let us examine, whether by endeavouring to put Europe on the precise footing it was before the war, we are able to attain any useful object; or whether, if we could execute that

project we should not have to reproach ourselves for all the oppression and bloodshed, which the attempt would occasion? The justice therefore, and the equity of our conduct, would in that case vanish before our eyes. Let us read the history of Italy from the elevation of the House of Medici, to the present day:—Let us examine the governments of Venice and Genoa, will any one consider these states in the same point of view at both epochs? In 1793, Sir Gilbert Elliot applied to every state in Italy, to animate them to a coalition against France; he pointed out to them the danger they were in, and foretold to them the misfortunes which would happen; his mission we know had not the desired effect. We have experienced the same disunion in Germany, which has brought it to its present state. The Genoese assisted the French army with provisions, and facilitated their descent into Italy; and the Duke of Braschi, nephew to Pope Pius the Sixth, enriched his private purse in the same manner. The ruin of his country followed. After having made these reflections, shall we (even in the event of being completely successful,) insist, as a point of justice, on the re-establishment of Italy on the old plan? And how can we propose any other, without setting aside the pretensions of those princes and states whose disunion and indifference to the common cause, have caused them to make the pitiful figure which they now exhibit to the world? The natives of the country are awake to these arguments; and, as we have above shewn, in all the principal cities and provinces the leading characters have upheld and disseminated this doctrine; and the people at large will be ready to take up arms whenever an opportunity offers, to support the general unión and integrity of the Italian state. What right have we then to oppose such a design?—Is a principle of justice to individuals to authorise us to cross the views of a nation at large? Especially where for those individuals who were so indifferent to the common cause, and ever

so willing to sacrifice us to their own interests? When, moreover, by so doing we refuse to consult our own advantage? Further, it cannot be worth while to go to a great expence to destroy the political fabrics which the French have erected, and then leave them full leisure to do the work over again!— What has been said on the subject of that moderation which some politicians have recommended to our councils, should here be recapitulated. As it seems obvious from all we have seen that a mere defensive system is chimerical, that power is relative; that to stand still is not only hurtful and destructive, but even impossible; and though it is not pretended that the British empire is eternal, yet as it is our duty to render it as durable as we possibly can, it is therefore urged that as this intention cannot be fulfilled by departing from the principle of aggrandisement by which we have arrived at our present power and grandeur, it becomes our duty not only to continue in the career which we have run for so many ages, but even to increase our pace, in proportion as we perceive our neighbours and rivals endeavouring to outstrip us. That it is by these means alone that we can hope to make peace on equal terms. That any peace founded on the power of France, and of our weakness, will be the prelude to the downfall of our independence; for the very terms of the peace would be part of the means which our enemies would use to promote our destruction. The treaty made by the Romans with Carthage after their second war will elucidate this doctrine.

Perhaps among the corollaries to be deduced from these little essays, one might be, the establishing a new criteron by which to judge of the real power and resources of different states. We may discover by closer examination, that the great distinctions of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, are often very false guides in forming just conclusions of what conduct a state would hold on any given occasion, as well as of the real spirit of its government. The distribution of landed property, the tenure by which it is held, the numbers

and influence of the monied interest, the state of distributive justice, the force of the commercial spirit, the population, the state of the peasantry, the character of the populace, the footing on which the military power rests, the state of literature, the numbers of men of learning, the extent of the liberty of the press, all have a share in stamping the character of the government. In effect, every state has its ostensible constitution; but if we wish to have a clear idea of its real one, we must examine not only those things which are here hinted, but also a thousand others which it is needless to enumerate.

To form distinct notions of all these circumstances, and hence to foresee events, would be a science of infinite utility to ministers, as it would prevent many of those errors resulting from a false estimate of the power and virtue of other nations, of which we have had so many striking examples in the course of the present contest. The investigation of these points is peculiarly the duty of ambassadors, envoys, and other agents abroad, and it is from these that a minister at home must gain his principal information. Yet how few are there, who after having past their whole lives in this profession, could give any just or satisfactory account of these things.

It may be allowed us here to make some reflections on the department of foreign affairs in England. It is probably one of the disadvantages resulting from the freedom of our constitution, that those who have this branch in their hands are necessarily so much implicated in parliamentary disputes, that they have not time to pay proper attention to the very objects of their ministry. We have seen in foreign countries the agents of the British government complain of this neglect at home;—"I am acting, like yourself, without instructions, as I have received no dispatches for these many months;" says a British minister at Vienna to his colleague at Constantinople! When this circumstance took place, and who were

the persons is of no consequence, if the fact be true.—"Eighteen months have elapsed," exclaims another in a distant part, "since I have received a line from the Secretary of States's office, while the French minister gets a packet every month."

This neglect from the fountain head cools the zeal of our agents abroad; and as they have of late been so weakly supported from home, they cannot but become discouraged from this continued mortification. The cabals at foreign courts, the principles of their policy, cannot be easily conceived but by those who have made them their study; and a young man who early enters into the diplomatic line, is often less acquainted with the country where he has served his first campaigns, than if he had previously travelled as a private character. The motions of these are narrowly watched; it is the peculiar care of the court to prevent such men from coming at the truth on many subjects; so that even the information he gives at home will be adulterated by these artificial errors, while the routine of official documents sanctions the most dangerous mistakes, and makes the most erroneous view of things the basis and standard of our conduct. This assertion can only be denied by shewing the happy results which we have drawn from our late negociations on the continent.

As peace and war are the two questions on which mankind in England are ever intent, and as success and victory are always on the road to the only peace we ought to make, it appears a paradox to confess, that the means of obtaining them are so much neglected. It is surely not among the means the least to be considered, for a minister to ensure the duration of his power by the veneration and popularity he must gain from his successes abroad; it would therefore be better for him to endeavour to send such agents abroad, as would make him the more respected, or at any

rate to give more support to these, if he approved of their conduct.

Since every prospect of exciting enemies to France on the continent of Europe is now nearly at an end, and since any idea of peace with a nation that will not lay aside her arms, even if she have no enemies, is a chimera, what have we then to look to but a continuation of hostilities until some favorable occurrence shall bring with it a prospect of happier days? At the present moment, whatever the advocates for peace may alledge, they will not assert that even on such an event, government would be able to disband one single regiment, or pay off one ship of war? But to what end shall we make the semblance of peace without its advantages? And can Buonaparte disband such a part of his army as to reduce it to a peace establishment? We do not wish to be surprised by an insidious foe, who would lull us into security to invade the country; we then have no other resource to look to but war. It is wise, therefore, to draw from a war now become inevitable those advantages which are within our reach.

As long as we maintain our maritime superiority, and prevent others from emulating us, by the weight of our power to keep them down, our independence is safe, and our greatness unimpaired. The whole power and riches of Rome was called forth to subdue the little republic of Rhodes; and the infant Venice braved the strength of Alaric, under whose sword all Europe trembled; she even owed the foundation of her greatness to that very circumstance, and if another Alaric, an Attilla or a Buonaparte over-run the continent again, the insular position of the British empire, as we have above traced it, and which she has now the means of rendering more than ever available, will enable her not only to weather the storm, but to carry her prosperity to a still greater pitch. And as we have no reason to apprehend that the condensation of all

Europe into one empire can be a permanent event, seeing the heterogenous quality of its parts, as well as the nature of the power that has brought it about; Britain may still look at the tempest, and since she cannot at present have peace she may make a virtue of necessity, and draw from the war the advantages which it offers.

It has been lately the favorite theme to descant on the miseries of war, and to magnify the blessings of peace; one of the greatest blessings of the latter proceeds from commerce, but commerce it is said produces luxury, and luxury corruption. Perhaps it does less harm in England than in other states; this may be perhaps owing to the climate, to our position in the midst of a boisterous ocean; perhaps also to our frequent wars, to the habits and exercises of the people, and also to the form of the government; all these tend to preserve us from the baneful influence of luxury; but commerce increases capital, and that capital sustains the spirit of enterprise and speculation, while the frequent wars, in which we are engaged, contribute their share to the general result. Too long a war may at length fatigue the people; too long a peace may weaken their sentiments, and degrade their principles. A people which never goes to war, loses its personal energy; it becomes selfish and timid; a warlike state every day produces examples which elevate the individual, and ennoble the sentiments of the heart.—Mankind, accustomed to the dangers of war, cease to make their personal safety and convenience the spring of their actions; hence that character of frankness which all warlike nations preserve. Peaceful nations cease to esteem themselves, and form the most unworthy prejudices against foreigners; they become shut out from the great theatre of politics, and fall a prey to their more enterprising neighbours. Let us trust that the prudence of our government will be able to strike a just medium, that we shall go to war often enough to prevent degeneracy, and admit such intervals of peace, as to

give us leisure to improve our finances and commerce, to repose from our fatigues, and enjoy the fruit of our struggles.

Thus we have taken a cursory glance at the most striking features of the political world. As the object of these essays is an attempt to seize the clearest and most precise points of view, and to combine the various results of observations thus made, so the imperfection of the execution must be felt, when compared to the importance of the subject, which in itself is difficult and various. Many conclusions may be falsely drawn, subsequent events may have given a new appearance to many parts of the subject, and some predictions, by unforeseen accidents, which are every moment liable to happen, and which totally change the aspect of affairs, may not have been verified. It is for this reason, that a certain indulgence is craved from the reader, and he must at least join the writer, in the last sentence of his work, when he expresses the hope, that the British empire will last as long as her ambition leads her to unite her own prosperity with the general tranquillity and happiness of the rest of mankind.

END OF PART I.

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AN

HISTORICAL SURVEY

OF THE

AFFAIRS OF GREAT BRITAIN,

&c. &c. &c.

PART II.

TRACT I.

At Sea, August, 1807.

IN the twelfth Tract of the First Part we have hazarded a supposition that the balance of power, which has been totally overthrown by the weight of the French arms, will in all probability be restored by the redivision of the continent into independent states, as soon as the extraordinary cause which brought about the violent union shall cease to operate: let us examine the grounds on which our supposition has been founded.

The third chapter of Machiavelli's Prince is a concise and clear piece of reasoning on this subject: he observes, that whenever a conqueror has made himself master of a country, the surest way to preserve his possession is either to keep a strong army within it, to be a check to the people, or to make it his residence and seat of government, as the Turk did, after the conquest of the Greek empire; or, after the example of the Romans, to found colonies. To a prince who is not devoid of a fixed home, as were the barbarians who established themselves on the ruins of the Roman empire, the fixing his residence in the conquered country is impracticable,

and, as we are treating of such countries as are annexed to a great empire, foreign to the present subject.

The only means which Bonaparte has taken to maintain his power has been that of keeping a strong military force in the conquered states. To quote Macchiavelli's own words, he proceeds thus: "The next, but better way, is to send colonies into one or two places which by their site may become the keys of the province, because it is necessary either to do this, or to send a vast body of troops. In colonies, the metropolis is not at a very great expense; and without employing large sums these are planted and established."—Again he continues thus: "But he who, instead of planting colonies, keeps up a military establishment, is necessarily at an immense charge, and must consume the whole revenue of the state in the defence of it; so that the acquisition may become a loss, and gives the greater offence, because it is injurious to the people. In every point of view, therefore, this precaution is useless; but as that is insecure, so the founding of colonies is useful."

The Romans, in the provinces which they took possession of, observed this rule, and sent colonies. They supported the weaker party, without adding to its power.

If we reflect on the nature of the dominion which our modern Timur has established in Europe, we shall perceive that its chief basis is the terror of his arms, and the weakness of those princes who have either been set up by himself, or who, having previously existed, have bent before the storm. The nature, therefore, of his dominion over the other states of Europe cannot but be highly odious and unpopular in all of them, and the strong hand alone which has imposed this order can support it.

In the ensuing chapter, Macchiavelli discusses the following question—"Why did the kingdom of Darius, when occupied by Alexander, not rebel against his successors after his death?" He assigns the following reason: that as this, like all other Asiatic states, was a pure military despotism, in which there was no hereditary nobility, nor any other powerful order of men, there was no rallying-point for the body of the people. Here he draws a parallel between the French and Turkish monarchies, as they stood in his time.

The whole Turkish empire is governed by one lord, all whose

subjects are slaves. Dividing his country into sengiakliks, he sends his administrators, and recalls and changes them according to his pleasure: but the king of France is placed among a multitude of hereditary lords, acknowledged by their vassals and beloved by them; these have their privileges, nor can the king take them away without danger to himself. He who considers, therefore, each of these states, will find the difficulty of getting possession of the Turkish territory: but having once conquered it, the keeping it will be easy. The contrary principle obtains in those countries which are governed like France, because nothing is so easy as to obtain a footing by gaining over some powerful member. There are malcontents every where, and such as desire innovation: These, he says, open the way to you, and facilitate your victory, which, however, to maintain, draws after it many inconveniencies, both from those who have assisted you, and from those whom you have oppressed; because those chiefs still remain who may become the leaders in fresh innovations; and neither being able to gratify these, nor extirpate them, you lose the country whenever an opportunity of defection presents itself.

France herself, in consequence of the revolution which overthrew the ancient monarchy, and reduced it to that state of disorder on which Bonaparte laid the foundation of his throne, presents a very striking contrast with those states which have been annexed to her dominion by the power of her arms, or the imbecility of her enemies. Landed property has been transferred into new hands, and these being creatures of the revolution, now give security to the usurper. But the same has not happened in Italy and Germany, nor have colonies of French been transplanted to these provinces, according to the practice of the Romans. While the allegiance of these is secured by the power of the sword alone, every thing will be quiet; but the first opportunity that offers, either by the death of Bonaparte, or any other cause that may disturb the operations of the sovereign power, there is every reason to expect that those princes who not only have been forced into a nominal league, but a real state of servitude, will endeavour to assert their own independence. Those princes also who have been created by him, if they are not driven out by their own subjects, will seek, in the same manner, to throw off their allegiance; for

there is no tie by which the states of Germany and Italy are held in obedience to France, but the power of the sword alone.

We have here noted either the mistakes which have been committed by Bonaparte, or the evils to which his system is subject. Whether they proceed from the dislike which the French have to expatriate, or from any other cause, is at present little to our purpose; but since we have here spoken of conquests, and of the means of preserving them, let us consider the nature of our Indian possessions.

We have acquired, by various means, a very extensive empire in India, but we have committed the greatest errors in the choice of means to preserve it. We have made no change in the nature or tenure of landed property, by which, as in present France, all people of wealth would be interested in the support of our power; so that the body of the nation has no motive to desire the permanence of our dominion, while we have deprived them of all power.

The British government having acquired her Indian empire while she lost her American colonies, has been deterred perhaps by that event from colonizing, or permitting Europeans to acquire landed property in India.

The British colonies in America were composed entirely of European adventurers, before whom the Aborigines fled into the interior, and the settlements were thus composed of strangers alone: these finding themselves the only inhabitants of the country, had no check to prevent their aspiring at independence.

India being inhabited by a people of husbandmen and manufacturers, exhibits a striking contrast with the forests of North America, before the founding of our settlements. The Romans secured the dominion of the countries they conquered by colonies established in the manner we have cited from Machiavelli: thus they secured their dependencies by the very means which modern politicians were apprehensive would cause the loss of ours! and the error originated in not adverting to the state of Asia and America, and not distinguishing those circumstances in which they are completely at variance.

British colonies in America, unmixed with natives, might naturally be supposed to become independent; but those founded

among a people whose religion and manners preclude the prospect of union, would always feel a dependency on the mother country for support; while these, at the same time, would become a most powerful check to any innovations which the natives might plan against us. Thus we are not supported in India by any institution interesting to the people, and tending to insure their fidelity, the policy of strengthening our hold by colonization having been disregarded. Our power in India is founded simply on military force; let us see how we have succeeded in this point.

Our European army in India is perhaps the only force on which we can securely depend, but it is far disproportioned to the extent of the empire. We have supplied the deficiency by raising native troops, commanded by our own officers; and this certainly is the least defective method. But notwithstanding this precaution, we have often experienced dreadful mutinies; nor can we be sure that the ill blood which remains after these events will not show itself again. Should these troops betray us on an invasion of India by any power which could excite the Mahrattas to make war against us, all would be adverse to us, and that adversity would have been provided by ourselves! We have not sought to create an order of men interested in our welfare, from whence to recruit our native troops; we have not planted colonies, to give stability to our empire; we have neglected to destroy the power of those who would embrace the first opportunity to join our enemies; so that we have not only omitted the means of our own preservation, but have also provided for the convenience of the first powerful enemy who should seek to drive us out, by leaving in the Mahrattas the instrument of our destruction!

TRACT II.

At Sea, August 1807.

The legislature of Great Britain, in the formation of the system of her interior polity, and in the regulation of her commerce and finances, has perhaps, without exception, displayed a greater degree of foresight and wisdom than has ever fallen to the share of any nation,

whose history claims the attention of mankind. Let it suffice to the reader, that we feel the greatest veneration for a constitution, which ensures more happiness and security to every order of society than any other yet known: but let it not be considered as political blasphemy to advance, that the principles on which both peace and war have been conducted, since the middle of the sixteenth century, can neither be reconciled to the examples of history, nor to the most acknowledged rules of sound policy; and that a perseverance in the same measures, even in the event of the most brilliant successes, tends to a destructive effect.

Every virtue carried to an excess, approaches its kindred vice. In the display of moderation which Britain has exhibited to the world, she has sacrificed her own welfare to an erroneous theory of public morals. She has notwithstanding been unable to exculpate herself from the imputation of injustice in many instances, where the nature of events has reduced her to fall into absurdity, in order to adhere to her system. This will be shewn in the sequel.

The great power and riches which have accrued to the British empire, had they been otherwise employed, might be expected by this time to have placed us beyond the reach of any combination of foreign powers against us; but since we feel that this has not been the case, and that all the exertions which we have hitherto made require to be renewed, if we would maintain our relative position, it may perhaps be allowed us to question the wisdom of those who have hitherto guided the helm of the state, and it will appear that we have never adopted a proper system in the employment of our force, nor adequately appreciated the nature of our own resources. What we brought into action was therefore improperly employed, and a great part of what remained, neglected, and left to increase the fortune of others.

As the resources of the state increased with the industry and commerce of the people, the funding system gave a great facility to the ministers to pursue such enterprizes as suggested themselves to their minds, in the various periods of the æra alluded to. Unhappily for us these men rather looked to the advantages ac-

cruing from the events of the day, than to a more extended prospect of human events. They thought of nothing more than of preserving, as nearly as they could, a balance among the powers of the continent, hence to reap the fruits of a well regulated plan of commerce, founded on that order of things. By these considerations the public conduct has been regulated, and our war ministers have too often been biassed by the advice of merchants; they have rather aimed at repressing the ambition of others, than giving way to the salutary operation of that frame of mind in ourselves. This is so true, that to prove it, we need only consider the origin of our foreign possessions, and it will be found, that with very few exceptions we are rather indebted to the spirit of enterprize in individuals, than to that of aggrandizement in the rulers of the state. Our colonies on the coast of North America owed their rise, in part to religious persecution, in part to commercial speculation. At first, these were neglected by the government at home, nor can the most candid allow them the merit of foreseeing that these colonies in a short space of time would become a great and prosperous nation. Scarcely had these begun to enjoy the fruits of their perseverance, and by their prosperity to be considered as valuable to the mother country, when the government, by the impolicy of their measures, and by not allowing them the right to grant supplies by their own representatives, but endeavouring to reduce them to a state inferior to that of their brethren at home, forced this people into a rebellion, which finally ended in their independence.

In like manner our Indian empire owed its origin to a combination of speculating individuals; and the basis of our power was already laid, before government had begun to interfere in the politics of Asia.

With the exception of Great Britain, who has abandoned the maxim for the last century and a half, it has been considered as an axiom among statesmen, that the object or motive of making war was to enrich ourselves and to empoverish the enemy; to encrease our own power, and to diminish that of our antagonist. We have violatated this rule; we have contracted debts to prevent the progress of our rival; we have sought rather to impoverish him, than to enrich ourselves; and our system of war has been to consent to

lose one of our eyes, that he might be deprived of both*. This statement may appear overstrained, but we must allow that it is strictly true, as will be shewn shortly. Yet it cannot be advanced that victory should be pursued, unless it be to strengthen ourselves while we weaken our enemy. Whenever it happens that a state is weakened by victory, it may fairly be concluded, either that the mark has been overshot, or that the end has not been obtained for which the war was undertaken. A government enriched by its successes in war, which humbles and depresses its enemy, and possesses itself of the spoils of conquest, or opens new sources of revenue, may be allowed to act on just principles of policy; but that state which obtains even the greatest advantage at a vast expense, and leaves her enemy the means of annoying her again, while neither spoils nor provinces fall to her share, but belong to her mercinary allies, may be considered indeed as unfortunate in defeat, but is still more unhappy in victory. In the former case she has to combat a successful enemy; in the latter the pretensions of her importunate friends; while her only resource is in fresh loans, to pay the interest of which, she must be oppressed with taxes. If her rulers have a true sense of patriotism, they never can feel much joy in victories which bear heavy on the people.

No state understood the political part of the art of war better than the Romans; their victories filled their treasury, and their wars were concluded by a remission of taxes, and by public games and festivals. Our policy has hitherto been to expend immense treasures, to load our own subjects with taxes, and after all, not to be safe from our enemy. All this arises evidently from the false principles on which we have made war.

When a league is formed against France on the continent, a principal part of the expense necessary to support the allied armies was paid by Great Britain. If any province could be torn from our enemy, it remained the prize of our allies; if, on the contrary, the

* Ει γαρ υμεις ουκ αυτοι πλεονεκτησαι και κατασχειν αρχην ευ πεφευκοτες, αλλ' ετερον λαβειν κωλυσαι, και εχοντ' αφελεσθαι δεινοι· και ολως ενοχλησαι τοις αρχην βουλομενοις, και παντας ανθρωπους εις ελευθεριαν αφελεσθαι ετοιμοι.—DEMOST. CHERSON.

fortune of war drove them from the field, those places which British valour had gained were exchanged for such provinces as had been lost by the weakness and ill fortune of our allies. Thus our victories only served to counterpoise their losses, and for a few years the balance of power was, or seemed to be, re-established, while a constant burden remained on ourselves; so that we submit to a perpetual evil to inflict a transitory check on the ambition of our rival; and every war with France is but a repetition of the same events. Let us ask ourselves, where are the sums which have been expended in continental wars! The interest of the money is paid by the people, while those countries which were the object of the contest are now reduced into provinces of the enemy; and will any one still assert that there was either wisdom or foresight, or knowledge of history, or any one quality to form a statesman, in those ministers, whose measures have led to so vexatious a result?

But those ministers who have pursued this policy are now no more, and it is useless to repine at what cannot be undone n;or ought we to blame the intention of men who saw events in no clearer light; an error of judgment ought not to be considered as proceeding from an evil intention. Let the memory of such dead men remain unreviled, but let it be permitted at least to profit by their errors, and let us make the best of the circumstances in which we are already placed. We are now at last convinced that the prosperity of an empire must depend on its own absolute power and strength, and cannot be estimated by the temporary or relative debility which we may have produced in others, at the expense of our own vitals. Had we not interfered in the affairs of the continent, it is not certain that our favorite ballance of power might not still have subsisted. Had there not existed an island in the Atlantic Ocean called Britain, either the powers of Europe would have been able to counterpoise one another, or the whole would have been swallowed up by one, as is the case at present; and that one would have been opposed by the magnitude of Russia.

The power of Britain is the dominion of the ocean, and the legitimate object of her conquests is the islands. Whenever Britain sends an army to the continent, a detached portion of her power has to contend with the concentrated force of France. Wherever she

attacks islands, her whole power is opposed to a small part of that of that of her enemy. By the conquest of these, she open new fields of commerce, colonization and riches to her own subjects. Let this policy, which she should originally have pursued, at last be adopted by her long-deluded sons!

In the sixth century, from the building of Rome, the dominion of that Republic extended from the Po to the southern extremity of Italy; Sicily and Sardinia, were her only provinces; her population could not have exceeded fifteen millions of souls. At that period she kept up a constant war with the Gauls; she had three armies in Spain; she subdued the power of Philip in Greece and Macedon, and wrested the fairest province of Asia Minor from Antiochus the Great; but her measures were so well taken, that every war produced wealth to the state, whilst it provided for its own expense. None of her resources were neglected; and though she had daily calls for men to fill her legion, she sent colonies to every part, not only to Italy, but to Spain, to Gaul, and to Greece.

The colonizing system of the Romans was under the controul of government; a number of willing families were enrolled, triumvirs were elected, and there at once planted the colony, and distributed lands to the settlers. By this means the Romans cultivated and improved their resources, while the superfluous increase of their colonies was prevented; they were kept within bounds, and the surplus of the population still contributed to the strength of the state. But the British government is at a loss for numbers to enroll in her armies; and while she either neglects or opposes the founding of colonies, the surplus of her population, which must from the nature of things find new regions, leaves the mother country, and settles in America; while it is not even supposed that this torrent of emigration might be turned into a channel, in future, useful to the interests of the empire.—Thus, while we disclaim the principle of conquest, we expend our active force in favor of others, and we negligently allow a great part of our population to seek such seats as must for ever render them useless, if not hurtful, to their countrymen at home?

If we only look back to the wars in which we have been engaged from the beginning of queen Anne's reign to the present time, we

may trace the rapid progress of our national debt; and of the vast sums which have been expended in war, we may observe what proportion has been applied to the object above mentioned. During this period we have either been engaged in increasing the dominions of one prince, or in diminishing those of another; and in these laudable exertions we may account for the expenditure of the greatest part of them.

If we look back also to the several expeditions which have been sent from England, and compare the number of those which have failed with those which have succeeded, we shall regret that with such ample means of substantial achievement we had so ill-concerted our measures.

Let us pass over the attempts in former wars, the expedition to Carthagena—that to Bellisle; and if we are told of the Havannah, let us ask for what consideration it was given up.—Let us only enumerate the different attempts we have made in the present war. The expedition to Toulon failed, because its success depended on that of the Austrians, whose energy we had estimated too high. In that of Quiberon, if we were not deceived by the French insurgents, why did we send an army inadequate to the conquest of France? Because, from ignorance, we had falsely estimated their strength. But had the Bourbons been re-established, would they not have been our enemies in a few years? View our conduct in Holland, after the taking of the Helder; this expedition also failed, because there was no confidence on the part of the people, nor intelligence on ours.

What advantages have resulted from the possession of Corsica and Minorca? Neither of these isles were considered by the Romans as objects of consequence; the one a barren rock, the other a mass of precipitous mountains, with narrow, unwholesome vales covered by impervious woods. Elba, the only military post which could give us an influence in Italy, had we ever seriously attempted its deliverance, we gave up to France in the disgraceful treaty of Amiens.

Thus we have attempted to show that the true spirit of aggrandisement, in such parts of the world as could be advantageous to the empire, has never been the genius of our government; and that her principal acquisitions have been owing to individuals rather than

to herself; and we conceive the reader is by this time persuaded, that to elevate ourselves to an equipoise with the enemy is now our only resource; of course, that it is high time for our government to begin to act on this principle; and that if they do not, it will prove to all mankind that its counsellors are pigmies who aspire to contend with giants.

TRACT III.

London, Oct. 1807.

LET us dwell with pleasure on the success of the British army in Denmark, while we deplore the deluded spirit that already deliberates on evacuating it; but while we pay the just tribute of applause to the mind which concerted the measure, let us not throw away the advantages which fortune and the courage and discipline of our fleet and army have thrown into our hands.

In the year 1660 the bishop of Zealand, in union with Nausen, burgomaster of Copenhagen, obtained the votes of the clergy and burghers of Denmark to offer to the king a resignation of their rights. The nobility having refused to contribute, according to their landed property, to the public burthens, were by these means obliged to yield. Thus the crown became absolute, and a new code of laws, called the Royal Law of Denmark, was promulgated.

Since that time the monarch has abused the absolute power entrusted to him, and the nobility are so reduced by exorbitant taxes, that they can hardly subsist; nor can they liberate themselves from the burthen by converting their estates, which no one will buy, into cash; besides that one third of the purchase-money would go to the crown. Some landholders in the isle of Zealand actually offered to make a surrender of large tracts of very fertile land in lieu of the taxes which the king had laid on them. The reason is, that by the law of Denmark, if any estate is burthened beyond what it can bear, the owner is compellable to make up the deficiency out of his other estates or property, if he has any. Hence these offers are refused by the crown, and a great mark of favour

has been shown to some individuals in his majesty's gracious acceptance of their estates. The nobility are therefore obliged to oppress those under them, and hence a scene of injustice pervades the whole realm. Whoever gains money by commerce or public offices employs it in foreign banks, to the detriment of his own country,

This view of the state of Denmark, from the year 1660, shows the unhappy condition of the country, and the improbability that the nobility, burghers, or peasantry could have been well affected to the government. Thus when the French revolution offered so many specious advantages, it is no wonder that the greatest part of the nation was well disposed towards that nation and its interests; and hence, by a very natural transition, that they had conceived a party enmity against the British. The political conduct of Britain, which has hitherto supported all the corrupt and tottering governments of Europe, with the cry that was raised against its policy, were not circumstances calculated to efface these impressions.—Thus as no hope of a better fate could be expected from Britain, it was not to be imagined that a cold respect for our national character should keep alive any warm sentiments of affection towards us. The events which have lately taken place open a fair prospect for the removal of these unfavourable impressions; and there is no doubt, if we consult the natural feelings of man, that by offering to the people a government devoid of those evils which press most on them, these might become firmly and sincerely united with our empire, on the principles established in the former part of these Tracts.

When Antiochus king of Syria was about to make war on the Roman people, his ambassadors were sent to the diet of Achaja; and after having endeavoured to urge that state to join him against his enemies, they concluded with begging them at least to remain neuter. It is not necessary to quote the speeches of both parties on this subject; let it suffice to say, that the Roman deputy Flaminius finished his oration with these remarkable words: "Nam quod optimum esse dicant, non interponendi vos bello; nihil immo tam alienum rebus vestris est: quippe sine gratia, sine dignitate præmium victoris critis *."—This passage is the more curious, as it has

* Livy, Book XXXV. Chap. 49.

been verified in every example in the present war. Tuscany, Venice, Genoa, Denmark, Prussia, and other states, have not been able to preserve themselves by their neutrality; hence we have every reason to conclude that their downfall is connected with the natural progress of events!

This short digression was necessary, to show how inevitable the seizure of Denmark has been; and if that step was unavoidable, what prospect can we have either of re-establishing the king of Denmark, or of obtaining an equivalent for his territory on concluding peace with a government which has declared it will not cede one grain of dust of its empire on any consideration *?

If an union with Great Britain were proposed to the nobility and the deputies of the commons assembled at Copenhagen, either by a civil commissioner appointed for that purpose, or by the commander in chief, the following might be the substance of the proposal which the present state of Europe ought to suggest to us, and which would probably be received by them with universal approbation.

"The intention of calling together the present assembly is to raise the spirits of the people of these islands, and to endeavour to show them the difference there is between the destiny of those nations which the fortune of war has placed at the disposal of the British sceptre, and the unfortunate people who have fallen under the rod of the French. These have invaded both friends and foes, and nothing will satisfy their ambition but the universal dominion of Europe. At first they seduced the minds of men by promises of liberty, and the lure of a government which could not be realised. As soon as they obtained a greater degree of power, they openly attacked every country in succession. They still boldly declare themselves obliged to take these steps by the restless enmity of Britain: this is the pretext they assign for having destroyed the Prussian monarchy, which has for so many years been in amity with them. Where there are none to answer their false reasonings, they flatter themselves with having gained the day, and given full currency to the false doctrines which they are so expert in propagating. Had the British forces not invaded these realms, a very short time would have elapsed before a French army would

* See Papers of Lord Lauderdale's embassy.

have arrived, and, added to the weight of taxes which were imposed by pernicious counsels during the reign of your king, fresh contributions would have been extorted from this unhappy people! The necessity of the present times has caused us to take this step, in anticipation of their views, and you cannot assert that it was becoming the dignity of the British empire, which commands the seas, supinely to suffer our enemy to invade these isles, after having reduced all Europe to slavery. Hence you will perceive that self-preservation was our motive; that we owed it to ourselves not to be foiled with weapons already in our hands; and that we were impelled by that insatiate ambition which burns in the breast of Bonaparte.

"Let me beg of you to reflect one moment, and compare in your own minds the wide difference which there would have been in your affairs, had we abstained from bringing our arms hither. All that the French could hold out would be a participation of that abject despotism under which they themselves groan—forced loans, conscriptions of troops, to be made the instruments of future wars and conquests! Thus the nobility and burghers would feel a reduplication of the ill they had to struggle with heretofore, while the merchants, falling under the dominion of our enemies, would be excluded from the commerce of the ocean! Thus you would have had slavery at home, and war abroad with the power which alone commands the seas.

"The Danes are a brave and wise nation, they are sensible of the origin whence their own ills have sprung, and they will not fail to acknowledge the truth of these reflexions—they will perceive the advantages which I am directed to offer you.

"His majesty the king of Great Britain having deeply considered the present predicament of these islands, having shown the power of his arms, does not wish to treat this people as a conquered enemy; but he feels the necessity of protecting both their interests and those of his empire.

"He therefore proposes to you to unite yourselves to his kingdom, and to partake of the inestimable advantage which all his subjects enjoy!

"As a part of the empire, the present nobles will have their seats in the assembly of that order, while the representatives of the

people will enjoy, in common with their colleagues in the United Kingdom, the privileges annexed to their important and honourable function. Your former grievances shall be duly considered, an equitable system of territorial imposts shall be established, and the commercial interests of the Danes shall be properly attended to. This will give to landed property its just value, while justice * shall be equitably administered, and those evils which, since 1660, have caused your decline, shall be effaced. If you will consider this proposal in its true light, it will show both the wisdom and goodness of his Britannic majesty. The Danes and Britons were formerly kindred nations, and many of us are descended from the boldest and most illustrious of your ancestors! In those days the ties which held us together were very strong: these may now be renewed, and the moulding the two nations again into one will be no more than the renovation of an order of things which has already existed! Let those who will reason impartially compare this offer with such as the French can make, and let them reflect that it is the most honourable testimony of esteem which his majesty can show to this people, while it unequivocally promotes their real interest.

"Reflect, I beseech you, on the real advantages which must result to you, at once, from becoming a part of a rich and powerful empire! I need not mention that those fisheries which the Hollanders have lost by their attachment to the French, will fall into your hands, while the British flag will protect your ships. Your views of the future will be enlarged, and the theatre of your action expanded; the military and naval employments will be open to your ambition, and the honour attached to them the reward of individual merit; while your commerce and general prosperity will be identified with ours.

"Let each of you weigh well these proposals; and if any objections are to be made, the inconveniencies you would point out may be done away, when the subject comes to be more closely investigated."

This proposal would in all probability meet with a welcome reception from the people at large; its popularity in Denmark would

* The absence of this equitable administration of justice is one of the great grievances of Denmark.

damp the ardour of our enemies as well in France as in the North of Europe, while it would add to our revenue, but still more to our resources in soldiers and sailors. The superior goodness of our government to that of the neighbouring countries would gradually re-establish, on the basis of experience, that general good opinion which of late years we have deservedly forfeited. It would be far more effectual to that purpose, at least, than perseverance in errors, because we have once adopted them; or in order to maintain an appearance of consistency and good faith, the effects of which, however laudable the motive, are often hurtful even to those who would otherwise be inclined, from interest as well as reflexion, to favour our cause. Let us, on the other hand, suppose a different line of conduct to be adopted; we must either hold the country as a conquest, and it will then require a large force to maintain it; or we must still acknowledge the king of Denmark; and the same inconveniencies will in that case result, which have been fully pointed out in the article relating to Sicily; or he will become our enemy by his total dependence on France. We shall not cease to be the enemies to the interests of the people, even after our victories over them; and we shall furnish the French with arguments to preserve in the breast of the Danes an eternal hatred against ourselves; and thus, by half measures, neither attain the object we aimed at, in the occupation of the country, nor prevent our enemies from occupying it. To exchange Zealand for Hanover, is to give that which we can hold in spite of our enemies, for that which it will be in their power to wrest from us whenever they please.

The uncertain prospect which the people of every country we have hitherto occupied have had of their destiny, has deprived them of all confidence in us, and they consider our dominion as merely temporary. Hence they neither respect us, nor think it worth while to conciliate us; and their doubts naturally subside into a fixed opinion of our levity and weakness—a sentiment, of all others, most evidently detrimental to that influence which we are entitled to command. Let us conclude that the boldest step is also the wisest; and no measures less decisive than those above recommended can render the success of our arms of any permanent advantage.

TRACT IV.

THE name of Macchiavelli is so stigmatized in the present age, that any policy which is faithless, cruel, dark, and designing is emphatically stiled Macchiavellian. But it is equally to be observed, those persons who are most prodigal of this epithet have never scarcely seen his works, or are at all acquainted with his principles. It is not the the design at present to enter into the absolute merits of this author, nor even to defend him against what may be advanced respecting the general tendency of his works, as a fair reading of them will furnish their apology.

Let those, however, who have an aversion to Macchiavelli, at least assent to the truth, although it should be advanced by him; and if his books contain such maxims as will be found to be demonstrable truths, if these, when applied to our own politics and public conduct, should be found distinctly to show their consequences, those who cannot admire the author in general, will yet not object to receive his admonitions, and to coincide with him when he is right. Every production of genius must in itself be imperfect; but it were unreasonable not to acknowledge the wisdom which we cannot reach, and the veracity which we are unable to controvert, because they may be mingled with some false or pernicious reasonings, from which none can be in any danger but those whose servile temper and feeble talents render them implicit adherents of the last author whom they read. To obtain instruction, we must read and judge, and not merely read to admire.

The twenty-third chapter of the second book of his Discourses on Livy has this remarkable title, viz. "How much the Romans, in judging their subjects on account of any particular accident which caused the necessity of such a judgment, avoided half measures!"

To explain this theory the more, he adduces the following example. The Privernates having revolted from the Romans, the senate was assembled, to deliberate on what line of conduct should be pursued by them: many deputies from that state had been sent to Rome, and these being introduced into the senate, one of the fathers asked, "What punishment their republic deserved for their

rebellion?" The chief of the deputies answered, "That which those men deserve who dare to think themselves worthy to be free." The Roman consul then said "What, if we should remit your punishment, what peace or reconciliation can we expect from you?" To which the other replied, "If you give us good and just conditions, a faithful and perpetual one; if bad, of no very long duration." Then the great majority of the senate exclaimed, "We have heard the sentiments of freedom and manliness, nor do we believe it possible that such a nation, or such citizens, would rest longer in a state that was irksome than what necessity obliged. That peace can alone be stable which is voluntary; nor can it be hoped that where slavery is established, fidelity can be sought for."—— It was immediately decreed, "that Privernates should be considered as Roman citizens." Lucius Furius Camillus, in a former deliberation on what conduct was to be held with respect to the cities of Latium, had before expressed himself in the following words: "Itaque pacem vobis, quod ad Latinos attinet parare in perpetuum, vel sæviendo, vel ignoscendo potestis. Vultis crudeliter consulere in deditos victosque, licet delere omne Latium? vultis exemplo majorum augere rem Romanam, victos in civitatem accipiendo? Materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppeditati, certe id firmissimum imperium est, quo obedientes gaudent. Illorum igitur animos, dum expectatione stupent, seu pœnâ, seu beneficio præoccupari oportet."

When the American rebellion broke out, the people of that country took up arms because they had not succeeded in obtaining the repeal of the duties on tea and that of the stamp act. They alledged, that though they had emigrated from the mother country, they had not lost their privilege of British subjects, which consists in being taxed by their own representatives. Government did not listen to their remonstrances, but sent an army to quel the insurrection. The rebels were defeated on all sides, but their demands were not granted, nor did the British general make a cruel example of them for their rebellion. It was vainly hoped that they would return to their duty, and remain tranquil under the yoke which galled them.

The consequence was that the Americans gathered fresh courage, and appeared again in arms; the French came to their assistance; and after our weakness had been shown by the capture of Burgoyne and

Cornwallis, the duties were repealed. But the moment was past; and that which would have been attributed to our generosity and public justice, if seasonably granted, was imputed to our own weakness, and want of confidence in the power to compel. The means of reconciling us to the people, too long witheld, served only to encrease their hatred and indignation; and the Americans extorted their independence from us, and humbled us in the eyes of the world.——How much better to have agreed with this principle, because it was just, than to have lost America, because it was that of Macchiavelli!

TRACT V.

Letter to Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, K. B. Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean, &c. &c.

My dear Sir, *Gibraltar, August* 1807.

The possibility of undertaking the invasion of India, by marching an European force across the continent of Asia, is a question which involves in itself so many subordinate ones, and so many contradictory arguments are aduced on both sides, that it seems almost impossible to decide on it. But which way soever the question be determined it can scarcely be brought within the compass of a sitting, or be adapted to simple and verbal discussion. I have therefore endeavoured in the compass of this letter to sum up all the information I have been able to gather on the subject; and since the Russians have threatened to undertake this enterprize, and of late the French have pledged themselves to perform it, the subject cannot fail, from its importance, to merit your attention, who are in the service of a power whose interests must be so intimately affected by the event.

As our present object is to examine into the nature of an expedition entirely by land, it would be foreign to the purpose to touch on the route by Egypt and the Red Sea, as it is evident that a few frigates stationed in the Babelmandel Streights would defeat the object. In the same manner the embarkation at Bussora, for any part

of the coast of India, would be impracticable, as the Streights of Ormus are equally in our power, should the enemy even find means to pass through Mesopotamia, and the country west of Euphrates, both the theatres of those many and great disasters which befel the Roman armies in the latter ages of the empire.

These immense plains, which were irrigated by the artificial canals drawn from the Tigris and the Euphrates, are now reduced to an arid desert, and afford a scanty subsistence to a few scattered villages and wandering tribes; a numerous and regular army would therefore have the greatest difficulties to contend with in passing them.

An army destined by France to attack India must pass through Austria and Hungary, and following the course of the Danube to Wallachia, will thus arrive in the vicinity of Constantinople, and crossing the Bosphorus, land in Asia Minor; or, they will be wafted from Europe to Trebisonde, by the assistance they will most probably obtain from the Russians. Passing from thence in a S E. course, their route must be over the mountains of Curdistan, which you will be better acquainted with by turning to Xenophon's march with the ten thousand. This is precisely the route they must take, and that country is at present perhaps as ill calculated to supply a large army as it was in Xenophon's days. Arriving at Mousoul, or thereabouts, they must pursue the route of Hamadan, the ancient Ecbatana. Having thus conducted our modern Alexander to the summer residence of the great king, let us next consider the remainder of his march to India; and here I must quote a very remarkable passage from Arrian.

Την δε Περσιδα γην τριχα νενεμησθαι των ωρεων λογος κατεχει· το μεν αυτης προς τη Ερυθρη* θαλασσῃ, αμμωδες τε ειναι και ακαρπον απο καυματος· το δε επιτελεως προς αρκτον τε και βορεην ανεμον ιοντων, καλως κεκρασθαι των ωρεων, και την χωρην ποιωδεα τε ειναι και λειμωνες υδρηλες και αμπελον πολλην φερειν, και οσοι αλλοι καρποι, πλην ελαιης· Παραδεισοις δε παντοιοισι τεθηλεναι και ποταμοισι καθαροισι διαρρεεσθαι, και λιμνεσιν και ορνισιν οκοσοισιν αμφι ποταμους τε και λιμνας

* Here is meant the Persian Gulf, as the present Red Sea was called the Arabian Gulf.

εστι τα ηθεα· ιπποισιν τε αγαθην ειναι και τοισιν αλλοισιν υποζυγιοισιν νεμεσθαι. και υλωδεα τε πολλαχη και πολυθηρον· την δε προσω ετι εφ' αρκτον ιοντων χειμεριην τε και νιφετωδεα *.

This middle region here mentioned lies in the track from Hamadan along the southern shore of the Caspian sea, to the banks of the Oxus, which falls into the lake Aral, and is therefore the only practicable route for the march of a great army. This was the track followed by Alexander the Great; by all the Persian monarchs, from the earliest ages to the time of Nadir Shah, who was the last of them who marched to India. It is therefore necessary to hold Khandahar, Balch, Bokhara and Ghizni, as well as Samarcand. This precaution, we see, was taken by Alexander, (who found these provinces reduced to be satrapies of the Persian monarchs,) before he attempted to subdue any part of India. The same policy was pursued by Nadir Shah, Khorasan being governed by his lieutenant Abdallah; and what seems to corroborate the truth of this assertion is, that we have no account of any attempt being made on India from the western bank of the Indus †.

This is, in a few words, the task which a French army must execute before it arrives at the passes which lead into India. Let us omit the march through Hungary and Transilvania, which will be

* "From the accounts we have of the country of Persia, it appears that it is divided by mountains into three parts, that which borders on the Red Sea being sandy and sterile, from its great heat; but that part which is exposed to those winds which blow from the north and north east are finely tempered by the mountains: the land is grassy, and contains watered meadows, and produces the vine in abundance, and every other sort of fruit except the olive: it contains all sorts of fine gardens, and it is intersected by the clearest rivers, as well as lakes, inhabited by all such wild birds whose nature leads them to resort to streams and pools: it is famous for its breed of horses and every other domestic animal: it abounds in woods stocked with every kind of game. Proceeding still farther north leads to a region of snow and winter."—

† Consult the Sixth Book of Arrian's Expedition of Alexander, and his Return to Persia through the Desart of Gedrosia. Semiramis and Cyrus lost their whole armies in this march.

accomplished at the expense of the court of Vienna, and suppose them safely landed at Trebisonde. As far as the Porte exercises any influence, that is from Mosoul to the borders of Persia, the whole of the country will with difficulty find provisions for so large an army. The Curds who inhabit the mountainous track will with difficulty be induced to keep their cattle on the road side, for the benefit of the French; and unless every thing is paid for in good coin, which in so long a march will be found expensive, there is every probability that the wandering inhabitants of these regions will drive their flocks and herds out of the reach of our heroes.

When Alexander the Great undertook his expedition into Persia, he subdued a rich and luxurous empire, the seat of refinement, of arts, and of depotism. Agriculture was part of the religion of the people, and the laws of the country wisely seconded the doctrines of the Magi: hence the prosperity and abundance of Persia. But from the downfall of the Khalifat of Bagdad to the time of Nadir Shah, Persia has been constantly on the decline; the trancient prosperity that was experienced under the family of Shah Abbas was finally obscured by the cruel tyranny of Nadir, whose death was the opening of an epoc of discord and total ruin of that kingdom. Since that event Persia has been dismembered on all sides, usurpers have started up in every province, the laws of the country have been trampled under foot, agriculture has been neglected, while the constant inroads of the wandering Turcomans have destroyed the security of the peasant.

The chief who leads an army through a rich cultivated country, where the arts of peace have produced abundance of all the necessaries of life, may support his followers by levying contributions on the inhabitants; but where he has to travel a region desolated alternately by tyranny and anarchy, and by an endless series of civil wars, many and new are the obstacles which he will meet with on his way.

The rich country mentioned in my quotation from Arrian, so interspersed with watered meadows, fine gardens, and shady groves, is now reduced to marshes, uncultivated swamps, and impassable forests. All those features in nature which give fertility to the land are, when it is abandoned by the industry of man, the harbingers of diseases and death. The testimony of Jonas Hanway, as well as

the campaigns of the Russians in this country, of late years, will clear up any doubts you may have on this subject.

The French general who attempts this extraordinary expedition will reflect beforehand that he must, let his army be ever so powerful, put his confidence in a nation, which may, without too much harshness, be deemed a race of fickle barbarians. To preserve the friendship of these, he must not be a burden to them; for it will be in vain to impose the law of terror on the Persian, who will string his bow, and mounting his horse, will fly to the desert for refuge, with his family and his herds; and if we consider the treasures he must bring with him to defray his expenses, fresh difficulties will appear—the drain of cash, and the danger of exciting the avidity of his barbarous allies, who might be so dazzled by the immense sums he must daily spend, as to be induced to sacrifice him for the treasures they would hope to gain.

To a nation situated as the Persians are at present, the French must be very burdensome allies; and even passing on to Khandahar, the same difficulties and dangers equally occur. But we have not yet reflected that the French army has not secured a retreat; and should any misfortune happen, as famine, dysentery, a defeat, or other effects of the desultory attack of barbarians, would such an army dare to return by the route they came? Would they have reason to trust those, in their adversity, whom they found it so necessary to be guarded against in the hour of success?

The necessity that there would also be to keep up a communication with the army from Europe, and the re-inforcements necessary for so great an enterprize, would exhaust the treasury of Bonaparte, and the patience of his Persian allies; while one defeat would discourage his army, tarnish his own laurels, and totally ruin his future prospects.

I have thus briefly laid before you the difficulties of this undertaking; but it ought not to to be inferred that this enterprize is so desperate as to justify the British cabinet in remaining wrapt in supine security, and taking no steps to counteract the evil. A minister *ought to be sent from India to Persia, well versed in the language and manners of that people. Whatever address the French negociators may

* Sir Harford Jones has been since sent to Persia.

have, the evident truths contained in the foregoing part of this letter, added to the many other weighty arguments which would suggest themselves to the minds of the Company's servants, would probably cool the ardour of the Persian leaders, and open to their view at once the burthen, the imprudence, and the danger of admitting the French into their country. Zeman Shah and the Tartar khans might be inspired with the same motives for alarm ; and their cavalry, assisted by our Indian army, would throw many difficulties in the way of the enemy. You will see the necessity of sending ministers to these princes, as well as that of still further weakening the Mahratta power, who would certainly create a diversion in favor of our enemies.

Let me, my dear Sir, here put you in mind of the calumny and detraction with which Lord Wellesley's policy in India has been assailed. He wisely saw that our power could never be secure until every state which could lend assissance to a foreign enemy were either totally destroyed, or reduced to a state of dependency on the British. His policy, stigmatized with the epithets of ambitious and unjust, is no more than what has been followed in Europe with success by Bonaparte. His dominion in the West is at present undisputed, while we have left open in India the door for every rival to come in and threaten our power with destruction, by sparing those whose interest it is to drive us out of the country.

I have, in a paper which you have seen, endeavoured to propose some alteration in the tenure of landed property in our Indian provinces ; you will have perceived that my object was to introduce such a system, in order to give the people a lively interest in the support of our government. It is not necessary for me to repeat the reflections I there made on the subject, and by turning to the 26th chapter of the first book of Machiavelli's Discourses on Livy, you will see this doctrine fully elucidated on a general principle. Indeed the perusal of that work will show that many of the reverses and disappointments which we have experienced during the late wars have proceeded from our deviating from some of his most established precepts.

One of the great deficiencies of our military system in India has been the difficulty of procuring cavalry sufficient to act against the enemy. Possessing such immense and fruitful territories, we are

surprised to find that no attempt has been yet made by the presidencies to establish a breed of horses. The finest stallions may be procured from Arabia; the breed of the Cutch horses is excellent, and the province of Guzurat, which has been ceded to the Company, is a breeding country. I conceive that in Bengal, the country about Rajamahil would be an excellent situation, and the neighbouring hills would afford a proper change of pasture from hill to plain, according to the variety of the seasons. This speculation might be repeated in different parts of our provinces, and there is no doubt, but that skilful Europeans might be found to undertake it. The providing of forage for those seasons when pasture is scarce cannot be difficult, if we consider the nature of the country.

To you, as commander of our forces in the Mediterranean, it might be supposed that these reflexions on the French attempts in Asia would be of no concern, at least while you hold that station; I shall, however, since I have gone so far, endeavour to submit to your judgment the thoughts which occurred to me on this important subject; and I deeply regret that our national interests, in the part of the world where you now are, should not be left entirely to your prudence and discretion. I cannot help feeling great apprehensions, that in sending Sir Arthur Paget to negociate a treaty of peace with a falling state, we shall again be thrown out of the chace; and that the Greek people, which we have totally overlooked, will in a short time be the ostensible nation; and having speedily formed an alliance with France, will of course be our enemy. I have therefore submitted to you my reflexions on Crete and Cyprus; and the more I revolve the subject in my mind, the more I see the necessity of occupying those islands. By wise management that people might be attached to our cause; their predilection for the sea is a strong inducement for them to decide in our favour, unless by our supineness we let slip so fair an opportunity. The forces we have in Egypt are evidently misemployed; but were they safely landed in Crete, they would become the rallying-point of all the insular Greeks; and with the Sicilians and your own troops, a short time would give you from forty to fifty thousand men.

The erecting the Greeks into a free state, under the British protection, is now a necessary step; and if it be neglected, a short time will ripen the mischievous effects of our apathy into the most

alarming ills! Since the French are so powerful in Europe, your capacious mind will see that nothing but this step of forming a secondary maritime and military power between the two continents will be able to interrupt the continuity of French influence from Europe into Asia!

The existence of such a state would disturb their machinations in Asia Minor, and prevent them from laying the foundation of a power, which, by extending gradually to Persia, may fully obviate all the difficulties which I have pointed out in their intended march to India. If this enterprise be longer neglected, nothing will interpose, from the Danube to the Indus, to prevent the encroachment of the French. You cannot fail to reflect, that if that power succeed in establishing itself in Greece and its islands, our tenure in Egypt will be but slender; and that they will have every advantage in their negociations in Asia Minor, which they will new model according to their own views. Their authority will be greater in that country than that of the Romans in former times, because these were balanced by the energy and vigour of the Persian empire, in its meridian splendor. Persia is now a weak and barbarous state; hence the necessity of creating that of Greece, to guarantee the fortunes of the British empire.

If we neglect this counsel, we shall have to reproach ourselves with having seconded the designs of the French; and when these have laid their measures, and brought them to maturity, the junction of a French and Russian army in Bactria will be the prelude to the expulsion of the British in Hindostan. Britain must then bid adieu to the empire of the seas, to opulence, and even to independence. Adieu, my dear Sir—I can no longer dwell on this subject without the greatest pain. I am, &c. &c.

TRACT VI.

Ο Πεισανδρος παρελθων προς πολλην αντιλογιαν και σχετλιασμον, ερωτα ενα εκαστον παραγων των αντιλεγοντων, ην τινα ελπιδα εχη σωτηριας τη πολει;---οποτε δε μη φαιησειν ερωτωμενοι, ενταυθα δε σαφως ελεγετο αυτοις, οτι τοινυν ουκ εστιν υμιν γενεσθαι, ει μη πολιτευομεν τε σωφρονεστερον.

THUCYD. Lib. 8.

"Peisander, after much altercation, addressing himself to his opponents one by one, asked them if they had any hope of salvation to the state; and these answering in the negative—'Then it is clear,' said he, 'that in the present case it is not to be expected, unless we conduct our affairs with greater wisdom."—

THE difficulties which occur in every government to alter the principles of its public conduct, with respect to its foreign affairs, and the invariable manner in which an established line of politics is often pursued, after the circumstances which first produced it had long since ceased to exist, will be found, by those who deeply reflect on historical events, to be one of the principal causes of the decline and fall of empires; and though it often happens that those to whom the helm of affairs is entrusted have been fully apprised of the shoals to which they were steering, yet the effects of habit, and the domestic arrangements of the state, make almost every effort to adopt a conduct analogous to the pressing emergency of the times abortive, and almost impossible: we have nevertheless some examples of an opposite system being followed, and have often seen, that where the principle was well founded, the result has been successful.

Among other methods which the French have pursued, to paralise the vigour of this empire, one of the most successful, though the least known, has been by means of their agents insidiously to disseminate opinions best calculated to promote the objects they have in view, by making it believed, that to oppose them would never answer the real interests of this country.

Amidst the doctrines which may be traced to this impure source,

and of which the members of the opposition have lately laid hold; in a manner equally disgraceful to their public character and to their judgment, we find the following—"The pursuit of the war in the Mediterranean is expensive, without procuring adequate advantages; that it is a drain of men, of ships, and of money; and that our wisest policy would be, to evacuate completely the whole of that inland sea, keeping only a fleet to guard the passage of Gibraltar."

We are all well persuaded that Bonapárte has nothing so much at heart as to form a navy able to cope with ours; and, if possible, to wrest from us the dominion of the sea. If we are convinced of this, it is evidently his first object to make the moderate and good people of this country believe that we ought not to pass Gibraltar, because it will furnish him with an ample theatre whereon to form the marine which his ambition * so ardently sighs for: but who will be found so credulous as to believe that his moderation will induce him to be contented with the dominion of the sea remaining tranquilly in our hands? Bonaparte has compelled all our allies to abandon us, and to unite themselves to his views, his politics, and his fortunes; and with such an immense empire as he has at his command, he seeks the means of creating a navy, in which, if our

* ὃ δὴ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν εἰ στρατευόμενος καὶ πόνων ἐκεῖνος αὐτος, καὶ παρὼν ἐφ' ἅπασι, καὶ μηδένα καιρὸν, μηδὲ ὥραν παραλιπὼν, ἡμῶν μελλόντων, καὶ ψηφισομένων, καὶ πυνθανομένων περιγίγνεται· οὐδὲ θαυμάζω τοῦτο ἐγω· τοὐναντίον γὰρ ἦν θαυμαστὸν, εἰ μηδὲν ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ὧν τοῖς πολεμοῖς προσῆκει, τοῦ πάντα ποιοῦντος ἃ δεῖ, περιημεν.---DEMOSTH. OLYNTH. 2.

"Nor is it wonderful that he, (Philip of Macedon,) by active war, by being constantly employed himself, by being present to every thing, by neglecting neither time nor opportunity, should gain the advantage of us, who are always delaying, debating, and asking for news. This indeed is no wonder! for the contrary might create surprise, if we (who do nothing that is proper in the conduct of war, while he is doing every thing that is to his purpose) should gain any advantages."—

policy continues to be as passive * as it has hitherto been, he will succeed.

Let the reader cast his eye attentively on the map of Turkey, and consider the site of Constantinople †: he will find there a port able to contain all the fleets in Europe, and the water of such a convenient depth, that a first-rate may lie so close to the shore as to have a plank placed for the purposes of communication. The Black Sea above, as well as the Propontis below, each extends itself into an immense lake calculated for all evolutions necessary to exercise a navy, without the danger of being surprised; as the Helespont, by the rapidity of the current setting always into the Mediterranean, and guarded by forts on each side, renders the whole in-

* Ισε γαρ δηπε τεθ', οτι μελλοντων υμων, ετερες τινας ελπιζοντων πραξειν, αιτιουμενων αλληλοις, κρινοντων, παλιν ελπιζοντων, σχεδον ταυτα ειπερ και νυνι, ποιεντων, ο χρονος απας διεληλυθεν.---Demosth. Olynt. 2.

"Are you not aware, that while you are delaying, hoping that others will act, accusing one another, debating, again hoping, and still going on in the same manner, your whole time is wasted?"—

† Βυζαντιοι, κατα θαλλατταν, ευκαιροτατον οικουσι τοπον, και προς ασφαλειαν, και προς ευδαιμονιαν, παντων των εν τη καθ' ημας οικουμενη--κατα μεν γαρ θαλλατταν βτως επικειται τω σωματι τε Ποντε κυριως, ως ε μητε εισπλευσαι, μητε εκπλευσαι δυνατον ειναι των εμπορων τινα, χωρις της εκεινων βουλησεως. Εχοντος δε τε Ποντε πολλα των προς τον βιον ευχρηστον τοις αλλοις ανθρωποις, παντων εισι κυριοι τουτων βυζαντιοι, &c.—Polyb. lib. 4. chap, 38.

"The Byzantines, toward the sea, have an excellent situation, both for strength as well as prosperity, to be equalled by none in the world; for by sea they are placed in so commanding a position at the mouth of the Black Sea, that no trader can either come in or go out without their consent; and as the country of Pontus produces many articles of great utility to other nations, the Byzantines are the masters of them all."—

This situation must evidently be stronger since the discovery of artillery.

accessible to an attack by sea. The shores of the Black, or Euxine Sea, are on every side furnished with immense forests of pine and oak, with mines producing iron; hemp in great abundance, pitch, tar, tallow; while the country of Calcedon, and the Isles of the Princes, are filled with mines of copper.

At a time when we see so rich a prize on the eve of falling into the hands of France, will not posterity be astonished that the British government, so far from struggling to the utmost to avert such an event, was so passive as never to take a single step, either to prevent an evil, or, at least, to divide the spoil with the enemy; especially when they shall be acquainted with the ample means which were in its power *; but, on the contrary, that the senate of the country listened quietly to such of its members as proposed the abandonment of the Mediterranean; as if the only means of defending ourselves were, by endeavouring to deprecate the wrath of an enemy, whose whole system has been directed to destroy our power and independence? When we reflect on this prospect, when we know that the Greeks are a people of mariners, and that at

* Ειδε προησομεθα; ω ανδρες αθηναιοι; ειτε τουτους τους ανθρωπους, ειτε Ολυνθον εκεινος καταστρεφεται, φρασατω τις εμοι, τι το κωλυον επι αυτον βαδιζειν οπου βουλεται; Αρα γε λογιζει τις υμων, ω ανδρες Αθηναιοι, και θεωρει τον τροπον, δι' ου μεγας εγεγονεν; το πρωτον αμφιπολιν λαβων, μετα ταυτα Πυδναν, Παλιν, Ποτιδαιαν, Μεθωνην αυθις, ειτα Θετταλιας απεβη· μετα ταυτα Φερας; Παγασας, Μαγνησιαν, παντ' ον εβουλετο; ευτρεπισας τροπον, ωχετ' εις Θρακην, ειτ' εκει τους μεν εκβαλων, τους δε καταστησας των βασιλεων.

DEMOSTH. OLYNTH. 2.

"But if we overlook these men, or if Philip should subdue Olynthus, will any tell me what is to hinder him from going where he pleases? But do any of you, Athenians, reason on and consider the means by which he has become powerful? Having first taken Amphipolis, then Pydna, next Potidea, afterwards Methona, he next invaded Thessaly: subsequent to this he seized on Phoræ, Pagasæ, Magnesia, and whatever he pleased; and taking his opportunity, he proceeded to Thrace, and there he dethroned some, and crowned others;"—

present they can furnish above 50,000 of the most able and active seamen, who are yet within our reach, how can we explain by what spirit, or on what plan, our affairs are conducted, when we have hitherto never considered the importance of these isles? Thus we overlook those advantages which Archidamus pointed out to the Spartans, among the difficulties necessary to be obviated in restraining a maritime enemy *.

As a proof of the indecision of our present rulers at this moment, every preparation on the side of France to overthrow the Ottoman empire is mature, and the execution of the project is commenced; while the British are not yet awakened to these circumstances, and have no efficient agent, either public or secret, to counteract these views! Two months † have already elapsed since the Turks applied to us for a minister, and the matter is delayed from day to day, from week to week ‡!

* Τοις δε αλλη εστι πολλη γη ης αρχουσι, και εκ θαλαττης, ων δεονται αποξονται, ει δε αυ τους συμμαχους αφισαναι πειρασομεθα, δησει και τουτοις ναυσι βοηθειν, το πλεον ουσι νησιωταις, τις ουν εσται υμων ο πολεμος; ει μη γαρ η ναυσι κρατησομεν, η τας προσοδους αφαιρησομεν, αφ' ων το ναυτικον τρεφουσι βλαψομεθα τα πλεω.---THUCYD. lib. 1. chap. 81.

"The Athenians possess other territories, and they will procure what they stand in need of, by sea; and if we would endeavour to detach their allies, it will be necessary to assist them with a fleet, as they are, for the most part, islanders. What sort of war, therefore, shall we wage? for if we have not the command of the sea, or that we deprive them of their foreign resources, by means of which their navy is supplied, we must be the sufferers."—

† April 1808.

‡ Τι αν αν τις ειποι, ταυτα λεγεις ημιν νυν; ινα γνωτε, ω ανδρες Αθηναιοι, και αισθησθε αμφοτερα, και το προιεσθαι καθ' εκαστον, αιει των πραγματων ως αλυσιτελες, και την φιλοπραγμοσυνην, η προς απαντας χρηται και συζη Φιλιππος, υφ' ης ουκ εστιν οπως, αγαπησας τοις πεπραγμενοις, η συχιαν σχησει. Ει δε ὁ μεν, ως αιει τι μειζον των υπαρχοντων δει πραττειν εγνωκως εσται, υμεις δε, ως ουδενος αντιληπτεον

The bishop of Montenegro, who is powerful by his situation, and by the bigotry of his followers, has two French commissioners in his confidence; he is master of the passes which lead from Dalmatia into Greece and Macedon, and the activity of our enemies is sharpened by our apathy and indifference *?

When France shall be mistress of Constantinople, she has ample means to build one hundred sail of the line, and we shall permit her to occupy all Greece to man them! Surely, if Bonaparte retained some members of the House of Commons in his pay, he could not be better served than by those who endeavour to inculcate the evacuation of the Mediterranean.

It has been the custom, among political reasoners to compare the present contest with the Punic wars, and, where circumstances have

ερρωμενως των πραγματων· σκοπειτε εις τι ποτ' ελπις τελευτησαι. προς θεων, τις ουτως ευηθης εστιν υμων, οστις αγνοει, τον εκειθεν πολεμον δευρο ηξοντα αν αμελησωμεν.---DEMOST. OL. 1.

"What if any one were to ask, to what purpose do you tell us this now? In order that you may know, Athenians, and that you may be sensible of two things; first, of your individual neglect of each object of your interests, as useless; and then, of that great activity which Philip displays, and which is so congenial to him, that it is impossible he should sit down contented with what he has already achieved. But if he be persuaded that it is proper for him to go on increasing his power and influence, while you have no constant or serious regard of your own affairs, consider what will be the termination of your hopes. In the name of the gods, who is there so simple as not to know that the war will at last be transferred to our own country, if we continue thus negligent?"—

* Νυνι δε το μεν παρον αιει προιεμενοι, τα δε μελλοντα αυτοματα, σχησειν καλως, ηυξησαμεν, ω ανδρες Αθηναιοι, Φιλιππον ημεις, και κατεσησαμεν τηλικουτον, ηλικος ουδεις πω βασιλευς γεγονε Μακεδονιας.---Ibid. 1.

"Because we ever neglect the present, flattering ourselves that future events will turn in our favour. It is we, O Athenians, who have aggrandised Philip, and it is we who have made him what no king of Macedon ever was before."—

not exactly corresponded, they have been tortured into a resemblance which they could not well bear; but where the events have no mutual resemblance, the whole history of past times is open to us, and we may be allowed to seek other objects of comparison.

As soon as the Lacedemonians had assured to themselves the resources of Asia, which they did by their friendship with Tissaphernes, they became superior at sea to the Athenians; if we allow the same resources passively to be usurped by our enemy, with the port and territory of Byzantium, as has been above described, does not the battle of Ægos Potamos stare us in the face? and may not another Lysander sail into the Peiræus *?

The history of Athens will exhibit pictures of the enemy, and sometimes furnish examples for ourselves.

At the opening of the Peloponnesian war, the restless spirit of the Athenians is well described in the speech of the Corinthian ambassador †. In the speeches of Demosthenes, their apathy, their want of foresight, and, above all, their fatal security, is but too comparable to the unsteadiness of our present councils.

It ‡ is evident that, unless we adopt a more decided conduct,

* Ετι τοινυν, ω ανδρες Αθηναιοι, μηδε τυθ' υμιν λανθανετω, οτι νυν αιρησις εστιν υμιν, ποτερον υμας εκει χρη πολεμειν, η παρ' υμιν εκεινον· εαν μεν γαρ αντεχη τα των Ολυνθιων, υμεις εκει πολεμησετε, και την εκεινυ καλως ποιησετε, την υπαρχουσαν και την οικειαν, ταυτην αδεως καρπουμενοι· αν δ' εκεινα Φιλιππος λαβοι, τις αυτον ετι κωλυσει δευρο βαδιζειν;

DEM. OLYNTH. 1.

"Besides, let not this escape your attention, O Athenians, that you have now the option either of making that the seat of war, or permitting him to make war on you; for if the Olynthians remain prosperous, you will carry the war there, and lay waste his territory, while you enjoy with satisfaction your prosperity at home: but if Philip possesses himself of Olynthus, what shall prevent him from advancing hither?"—

† THUCYD. lib. 1. the parallel drawn between the Spartans and Athenians is applicable to the British and French.

‡ Υμεις δε, ω ανδρες Αθηναιοι πλειστην δυναμιν εχοντες απαντων, τριηρεις, οπλιτας, ιππεας, χρηματων προσοδον, τυτων

it will be impossible to resit the enterprising spirit of the enemy. We have already discussed the defects arising from the heterogeneous composition of our empire; we have endeavoured to shew the necessity of altering this system, with that discretion which is evidently necessary; yet, while we confess our want of resolution to make these changes, we are bold enough to insist on perpetuating all the abuses wheresoever we go.

If those who are at the head of affairs fear the Opposition

μεχρι της τημερον ημερας εδενι πωποτε εν δεοντι κεχρησθε, εδενος δε απολειπεσθε· ωσπερ δε οι Βαρβαροι πυκτευουσιν, ουτω πολεμειτε Φιλιππω· και γαρ εκεινων ο πληγεις αιει της πληγης εχεται· κ'αν ετερωσε παταξη τις, εκεισε εισιν αι χειρες· προβαλεσθαι δ' η βλεπειν εναντιον, ουτ' οιδεν, ουτ' εθελει· και υμεις `εαν εν Χερρονησω πυθεσθε Φιλιππον, εκειθε βοηθειν ψηφιζεσθε· εαν εν Πυλαις, εκεισε· εαν αλλοθι πω, συμπαραθειτε ανω· και κατω· και στρατηγεισθε μεν υπ' εκεινου, βεβουλευσθε δε εδεν συμφερον αυτοι περι του πολεμου. εδε προ των πραγματων προορατε εδεν, πριν αν η γεγεννημενον· η γιγνομενον τι πυθησθε. ταυτα δε ισως προτερον μεν ενην ποιειν· νυν δε επ αυτην ηκει την ακμην, ωστε εκετ' εγχωρει.

DEMOST. PHILIP. 1.

"But you, Athenians, though your forces are superior to all others, in ships of war, infantry, cavalry, revenue, yet to this day you have never made the proper use of these resources, though you have spared none of them. But in the same manner as the Barbarians are accustomed to box, so do you combat Philip; for among them, he who is struck lays his hands where the blow took place; and as soon as he receives a second blow, immediately transfers them there; but neither exhibits concern nor skill to ward them off, or to watch his adversary. In like manner, you, when you hear that Philip is in the Chersonesus, decree to send forces thither; if at Pylæ, thither; if elsewhere, you follow him up and down, and are over-reached by him, but resolve on nothing that can promote your interests in the war; not foreseeing any thing that happens till you learn that it is doing or actually accomplished. At an earlier period it might have been possible to effect your purposes; but now you are in the crisis of your affairs, and it is no longer to be hoped that he will recede."—

enough to abstain from that which their own judgment tells them is right if they are convinced that it is not zeal for the public good which induces them to declaim against, and disapprove, the conduct of those in power, have they not the same reason to apprehend that these very men will equally blame them for the omission of those very measures which, had they pursued them, would have been the subject of complaint? and, if the Opposition, in the event of their not being pursued, have not sagacity to find these accusations, which posterity will not fail to bring to their charge, what can they have to fear from men, whose motives and abilities they must internally despise?

In the construction of the British Parliament, which, in its original institution, was calculated to repress the overweening power of the crown, it was supposed that virtuous men would employ their faculties for the public advantage: but when once those privileges are prostituted to the purposes of faction, when no object is pursued but that of embarrassing the wheels of government, to render it weak and inefficient, merely for the purpose of seizing the power; and where, to carry their point, the Opposition is obliged to second the views of the enemy, against whom all parties should be united; it must be confessed, that the very perfection and superiority of our polity leads to its own destruction; and the only question which will occupy the nation will be, whether it be better to entrust our liberties, for a time, to the crown of England, or to cede them to that of France for ever?

According to the present style of parliamentary proceedings, the executive ministers are so completely occupied with answering the accusations brought against them for their conduct in the preceding year, that they have no time to attend to any plan for the ensuing one *: it results from this, that the British government is constantly six months behindhand † with the events of the day,

* Thus the discussion of past measures, instead of furnishing salutary lessons for the grievances of the future, serves only to "perplex and dash" the maturer counsels, from which alone can be derived any rational hope for the time to come!

† Δυσκολε δ' οντος φυσι, και χαλεπε του βουλευεσθαι, ετι χαλεπωτερον υμεις αυτο πεποιηκατε, ω ανδρες Αθηναιοι· ει

and to this is not only owing the success of the enemy *, but the failure of our own prospects, while it destroys the confidence of our allies, and excites the sarcasms of our enemies †.

It is, then, necessary to secure the independence of this empire by every means in our power; and the first step is, to cease to

μεν γαρ αλλοι παντες ανθρωποι προ των πραγματων ειωθασι χρηςθαι τω βουλευεσθαι, υμεις δε μετα τα πραγματα.

DEMOSTH. de Pace.

"To deliberate is by nature a hard and difficult task; but you, Athenians, have made this still more difficult: for all other men are accustomed to deliberate before events—you dispute about them when they are past!"—

* Ειθ' ουτως αγνωμονως εχετε, ω ανδρες Αθηναιοι, ωςε δι ων εκ χρηςων, φαυλα τα πραγματα γεγονε της πολεως, δια των αυτων, ελπιζετε πραξεων, αυτα χρηςα γενησεσθαι.

DEMOSTH. OLYNT. 2.

"Are you so blinded, Athenians, as to suppose that the affairs of the state, which, from prosperous, have become so bad, will, by your pursuing the same conduct, become flourishing again?"—

† Τον γαρ του πραττειν χρονον εις το παρασκευαζεσθαι αναλισκομεν. οιδε των πραγματων καιροι ου μενουσι την ημετεραν βραδυτητα και ραθυμιαν.

"We employ the time which should be given to action in preparation; but the opportunities of things do not wait for our slowness and apathy."—

—αισχρον εςιν, ω ανδρες Αθηναιοι, φενακιζειν εαυτους και απαντ' αναβαλλομενους οσα αν η δυσχερη παντως υςεριζεσθαι των εργων, και μηδε τουτο δυνασθαι μαθειν, οτι δει τους ορθως πολεμω χρωμενες, ουκ αν ακολεθειν τοις πραγμασιν, αλλ' αυτους εμπροσθεν, ειναι των πραγματων.

DEMOSTH. PHILIP. 1.

"It is disgraceful, Athenians, to flatter ourselves, and to put every thing off; so it is a disadvantage to be behindhand with events, and even to learn, that those who know what it is to make war ought not to follow occurrences, but to be always beforehand with them."—

listen to factious moralizers *, who seem willing to betray their country, under the cloak of religion and morality, to their own affectation of immaculate patriotism, while, in fact, they prepare us for the servitude of a stranger! The principle of public justice may be misapplied, and virtue in the extreme degenerates into vice. If we cannot resist the encroachments of our enemies without foreign conquest, will those who decry national injustice pretend that we ourselves must submit to the greatest ignominy? If those very nations, whom we abstain from annexing to our empire, will inevitably fall under the yoke of France, to become, in their turn, instruments of our destruction, (inasmuch as that yoke will be far more galling than any we could impose), we permit a greater evil to be produced by others, because we have not courage or virtue to do, perhaps, a positive good, lest a minor and contingent evil should accompany it. If the safety of our empire depends on such measures, is it the duty of ministers to consult its interets, or to act upon the theory of abstract justice and morality? Was it ever known, in the history of mankind, that a people should be so lost in the mazes of contradiction and absurdity as that it should be necessary to put them in mind of these truths?

If those who hold such doctrines in horror as we have here inculcated, are asked what arguments they have to offer against them, they tell you that Bonaparte will die, that he will not be able long to wield such an engine, that his successors will be less skilful than himself, and several other reasons, in which the question is always begged. When they are reminded of the fallacy of this reasoning, they recur to our own limited resources, and assert that we have not means to execute such gigantic schemes; particularly dwelling on our want of sufficient population. This is offered as a good reason to allow that of our adversary to increase by the addition of every conquered country, while they do not allow it to be possible for us to turn at least a part of those means against him. They also

* "Un dont l'imagination est frappé de la Jerusalem celeste dedaigne les fanges de la terre; les soins des affaires sont pris pour des momens perdues les axiomes de la politique pour des cas de conscience; les regles de l'evangile pour son code militaire, et les intrigues des pretres influes dans les deliberations de l'etat."——Roi de Prusse. Hist. de mon Temps, chap. I.

alledge that the constitution of our parliament will never allow such bold measures to be taken. This proposition is either true or false; if it be false, no attention need be paid to it; because the good sense of the majority will overthrow it: if true, it is asserting, in other words, the British parliament is the only obstacle to the salvation of the state; and that through its means we are incapacitated from escaping the evils which are approaching, though we already see them clearly. This amounts to confessing, that what is intended for a defence to our liberties is the very means by which our chains will be forged.

The parliament, to exculpate itself from this heavy blame, has no choice but to support the state by approving of the spirited measures that are taken, or to betray it by an opposite conduct. It is to be hoped that the weakness of such adversaries will give fresh courage to those who hold the helm of affairs at this tempestuous season; and that the bulk of the people may again, by proper management, be brought to feel that sentiment of unanimity with which they were inspired in 1797, by Mr. Pitt; that we shall be able to go farther, and that they will finally feel, that without offence there can be no efficient defence.

As the first example of renovated vigour in our councils and consequent measures, if we operate a moderate reform in the Sicilian government, we shall feel an increased security and confidence in our position in the Mediterranean. The revenues of that island will then probably pay the expense of its maintainance and defence, while the population may be useful to serve either by sea or land; the measure will increase the number of our partisans in Italy, while the Greek islanders will wait in anxious expectation for us as deliverers. This may prevent French influence in Asia Minor; and the opposite sides of the Hellespont and Bosphorus being divided between the contending parties, will deprive Byzantium of part of its importance, which in the other case will give to the French the foundation of a maritime power, promising hereafter to be formidable to us here. If our apathy to the affairs of Turkey allows events to take their course without our interference, Asia Minor will open the way to Persia, and by an influence consolidated by degrees, those objects which cannot be attained at present, will then become easy, and we shall have to contend by land in Asia and by sea in Europe.

TRACT VII.

THE unexpected revolution which has broken out in Spain has suddenly altered all the views of ministry. A determined and open resistance to the power of France, as we are told, carries with it such a dazzling appearance, that the whole attention of all orders of men has been called to this object. As usual, one party has magnified it into the most auspicious event, which indicates the liberation, not only of Spain, but of all Europe, from the oppressive yoke of France; while the other has treated the whole as a wild chimera, fraught with future reverses and misfortunes to this country. With a proper deference to the opinion of others, let it be permitted to offer some reflections on this head.

It must be remembered that hitherto we have made war to assist legitimate and established governments; and that in this instance, without any blame to be attached to ourselves, we become the allies of a revolutionary state. What conduct we shall hold in these transactions, and how far we shall accommodate ourselves to events, without abandoning the principles to which we have been hitherto wedded, or failing in every part of our plan, is the present object of discussion.

We must either confine ourselves solely to supplying the Spaniards with arms and ammunition, or go farther, and send a body of troops to their assistance.

If the former, we must become the aiders and abettors of whatever form the kingdom of Spain will take in the event of success; for it is evident that if the Spaniards are able to repulse the enemy, the provinces of Spain may either become a republic, should they call an assembly of their states, or the supreme power may remain in the hands of the victorious chief under whose banners they will have conquered.

At present the supreme power of Spain is vacant, and before that people can act with energy, it is necessary that it should be filled by some means or other.

It is not enough, therefore, to send them powder, and ball, and

muskets, if we consider this event as any thing beyond a mere diversion of the enemy's force, while we pursue our own objects elsewhere; but it ought to be our anxious wish that Spain should be moulded into an homogeneous form, lest its want of unity should blast our hopes. If we do not interfere in the politics of the country; are we sure that this end will be attained? that the consolidation of Spain will be ensured? If we do interfere, are we sure that we shall be able to wield so complicated a machine, without its flying out of our hands, and our becoming an object of distrust to those who direct its operations? To give arms to the Spaniards, and to leave them a prey to the ills which may arise from their own undefined state, and their internal disunion, is both a cruel and useless policy; to take a more decided part would be dangerous to the administration here, as it would make them responsible for all the consequences of bad success.—These are not all the objections to the policy of this interference. Spain is on the continent, and we are again drawn into a continental war, against which we have urged what we conceive the most rational objections; besides, that in this case, we have, in addition, to encounter all the evils attending anarchy.

Will ministry go so far as to take on them to lead events in that country? If they do not, it appears that they will never be able to ensure the unity or independence of that kingdom; if they do, they should be aware of the shoals on which they may strike in shaping this perilous course. Should they determine simply to supply the people with arms and ammunition, they will be left either to sink under the weight of the enemy, if worsted; or, if successful, to struggle with all the discord which may arise from the ambition of individuals, and other causes, resulting from the vacancy of the throne. Should they send an army to co-operate with the Spaniards, with whom will the general combine measures for the common advantage, as it must appear natural to seek to communicate with those in whose hands the supreme power is concentrated? Will he regard, in that light, the Spanish commander in chief, if there be one acknowledged by all the provinces, or will he consider the supreme power as having virtually reverted to the nation? If the former, can he be sure that this general will not become an usurper? and will the ministry of Great Britain openly espouse his cause? If, aware of these difficulties, he applies to the Spanish na-

tion, what official channel can be opened to enable him to act in unity with them? It results, therefore, that there can be no defined and efficient means to obtain this end, unless he is allowed to be the centre and soul of their movements; for he must tread in the steps of Timoleon, dangerous as they may be, or be sure of ill success and disgrace. If an army is sent to co-operate with the Spaniards, it is evident that no good can be done unless our general also assume political power; an assembly of the states of Spain must be called, and a form of government pitched upon, to give a legal sanction to the proceedings of the combined forces. Whoever may be qualified to convene this assembly, it will be necessary that some deference should be paid to the British general, else he will be no more in Spain than a captain of a band of Swiss in the wars of Italy in the fifteenth century; and unless he has address sufficient to conduct himself in this delicate office, it is evident that he will be subject to the jealousy of the Spanish chiefs, who will insinuate to the nation that he is endeavouring to render Spain dependent on Britain; yet, what other umpire can be found to decide those disputes which must necessarily arise between the nation and the army? The former have lost their confidence in the house of Bourbon, whose timidity has reduced them to their precarious state. Here is a brief view of the difficulties which will attend us in Spain. The reader will, if he admits the truth of these reflections, be able to calculate the chances of success, if he can at all guess what is to be obtained by what we shall undertake.

When we consider the irresolution and want of foresight, the half measures, which are a part of the character of a British ministry, added to the eternal disputes which their opponents always prepare for them in parliament, we may safely foretell that the result of these magnificent preparations will throw a new light on the practice of those who totally exclude all theory from politics, even though it be founded on the knowledge of actually existing circumstances, and the testimony of history.

But another great difficulty occurs, which has not been considered: a great army, collected from the mass of the nation, requires immense funds for its support. Will the British government pay the whole expense, or will the revenues of a country, convulsed from one end to the other, be considered as able to supply the demand?

It is natural to suppose that in the present crisis the revenues will not be collected with the regularity they were formerly, and that many individuals will make away with large sums. This may first produce the plunder of the church, and next of the nobility; and the crimes connected with this hard alternative must be approved of by the British! No more need be added on this subject; the moment is at hand, and every unbiassed individual will perceive the difficulties which these events must plunge us into! But even in the event of establishing a proper understanding with the Spaniards, what conduct are we to hold respecting the form of government they will adopt? If we support the recall of their princes, who are now in the power of France, we shall evidently pursue a plan which the enemy may turn to his own advantage against ourselves. If we offer them the Spanish prince, who fled to Brazil with the Portuguese, we must support an usurper against the rightful heir of the monarchy. If the Spaniards are found averse to the whole family, we must support a republic, or admit the claim of some chief who may put himself at the head: if a republic be agreed on, the difficulties which must await the nation in the maintenance of their freedom, after having been so long under an absolute government, may be seen from Machiavelli's Discourses on Livy, book I. chap. 16. To wait events, without having any fixed plan of conduct, will be, most probably, the alternative our ministers will adopt; and as this will exclude them totally from any influence in events, they must confine themselves to the usual half measures, while the Spaniards will deprecate the cruel love of justice, and forget even the real benefits which Britain may have conferred, in the prospect of calamities which her supineness alone will have prevented her from averting.

Let us suppose that the spirit of the Spaniards, the wisdom of their regulations, with the help of fortune, should succeed in freeing the country from the yoke of France, and that the powers of Germany should make another effort; the result will bring us back to another continental coalition. The degenerate monarchies of Germany and Russia will employ the same corrupt ministers, and they will be equally open to the wounds which may again be inflicted on them by the French.

But the insular empire would raise this kingdom above these co-

tinental considerations, which have hitherto been so expensive and unavailing.

The Spanish insurrection, if alone attended to, will lead us back to a repetition of the same errors, and the failure of four experiments should now have convinced us of them; while the general state of Europe will be just as unsusceptible of any arrangement, on which a general peace could be founded, as it was before.

An insular federative state, universally established round the coasts of Europe, as we have already described, can only treat of peace on equal terms with a continental empire, like present France and its dependencies; but to sacrifice these considerations to the events of Spain will produce nothing more than an undecidable contest, which will lead to no definitive object; which, after all the obvious reasons for the above-mentioned policy, will still remain inherent in the very nature of things.

But should even every state in Europe, in the event, recover its independence, we have to expect a new succession of continental wars, from the unsettled state and jarring interests of the different powers, and the necessity for our interfering in them will be the same: but, were we the masters of the islands, we should naturally be less interested in those events, and leave the continent to find its own level. But it may be considered a strange reasoning, that the mischiefs occasioned by the explosion of a volcano in France should be remedied by another in Spain!

France, in the infancy of the republic, was able to repel the pressure of all Europe combined against her; she has nothing now to fear on the Rhine. If she invades Spain with a fresh force, she will certainly not do it on precarious grounds; she will first be assured of partizans, or profit by the division and anarchy of that kingdom. If she has not that intention, she has little to fear from an invasion of France on the side of the Pyrenees; and if she be not able to secure her conquest, she will be at full liberty to leave Spain to the state of paralysis in which she has thrown her. But it is more probable that Spain will be a fresh acquisition to France, or, at least, not long stop the progress of her conquests elsewhere.

It is necessary to apprise the reader of some circumstances attending the affairs of Spain which have escaped notice. But first, to explain the meaning of those assemblies called juntas: they are

no more than the councils of the municipalities; there can be no supreme junta, because every province is independent of the other. It is for this reason we have no minister at any, lest we should excite the jealousy and discontent of all the rest. An assembly, representing the whole nation, would be called the *Cortes*, which have not yet been formed. However violent may have been the proceedings of the Spaniards against the French, the chiefs have still left open the means of reconciliation; the letter of the French admiral at Cadiz, to Morla the Spanish leader, is a proof of this: he tells him, that he leaves the French squadron *deposited* with the Spaniards, as he is convinced, notwithstanding the present differences, that the permanent interests of France and Spain will always make both nations consider the English as their natural enemies; and therefore, that in taking the present step, he does not consider the ships as lost. If we connect this circumstance with the refusal of the Spaniards to avail themselves of our assistance in the affairs of Cadiz, we have no great reason to think our influence with them is very great.

Bonaparte has not yet sent troops to Spain, nor will he, till the first effervescence is over; but he is not idle: the different juntas of Spain have already demonstrated a jealousy of each other, and it will be his business to foment these dissentions: he has taken care to persuade the people in the southern parts of France, that the churches are full of gold and diamonds. To those who know the levity of the French, it will not appear strange, that so far from finding any difficulty in raising conscripts, every one is crowding to be enrolled.

France has demanded a passage for troops into Turkey through Austria; we are told she has been refused. If this be true, what hope will the Emperor entertain of defending himself against so powerful an enemy; and by what means can he avert his own downfall? If he grants the French a passage through the heart of his dominions, what assurance can he sufficiently rely on, not to apprehend that he may be dethroned in the same manner with the king of Spain, or by some similar means.

The Austrian state is the only one remaining in Europe (Russia excepted) who has the means of giving France any trouble; and the same policy which urges Bonaparte to create new sovereigns,

will show him the necessity of putting one on the throne of Vienna, in order to deprive Great Britain, for the future, of the slightest hope of a continental alliance. As he has acted towards the Spaniards, he will tell them their monarchy requires renovation, and that he will render his name immortal by the benefits he will confer on them.

We have flattered ourselves with the hopes that the affairs of Spain will arrest the progress of our enemy; but when we consider the immense armies for which he must find employment, what rational hope can we have that either Spain or Austria will do the work for us?

The French government foresees and prevents evils by well-timed manœuvres. They guide events, we only follow them as they arise; and as we have no concern in producing them, we are seldom able to appreciate the causes whence they originate. Hence it happens that the greater part of our conduct is grounded on the most erroneous views of them.

If these reflections are admissible, the doctrine just recommended, and our depending solely on our own virtue and strength, redoubles its force. Yet we find that the present events have diverted our attention; and while we are pursuing a shadow, we neglect the substance; and this will every day become more manifest. The French have already made new arrangements with the Porte, by which the Turks are again lulled into a fatal security; and a fresh declaration of enmity to us will be the consequence. The result of Mr. Adair's intended mission will prove the correctness of this prediction.

The following letters, written previous to the late changes in Spain, will throw some light on the subject.

TRACT VIII.

To P. S. Esq.

SIR, *May* 1808.

The task which you did me the honour to set me yesterday is the most pleasing which you could have fixed upon. From my earliest days I have seen with pain and regret the celebrated region of Greece, the cradle of arts and sciences, groaning under the yoke of ignorant barbarians; but at the time when these impressions were made, the state of Europe precluded every hope of a change in its hapless lot. Events the most extraordinary have extended the views of Great Britain, and have shown her that her own fate and her dearest interests are connected with those of the islands of Europe, and a ray of hope at last begins to dawn on the vivid fancies of my youth.

Every expedition to the Grecian islands must, to ensure success in the first instance, and advantages for the future, be grounded on the principle of permanency. The Greeks, weary of the Ottoman yoke, have twice made an effort to obtain rational freedom under the milder influence of an European government; and they have as often been abandoned, when the contest was over in which they had taken a part. The treachery of the Russians is too well known to you to make it necessary to dwell on this subject; but it has alienated their minds from that people, and nothing prevents their joining us heartily but the fear that we shall not carry them through in the undertaking.

In order to occupy the Grecian islands, with a view to give them up at the pacification of Europe, should the French government be disposed to admit of independent states, and to the re-establishment of a balance of power, which is highly improbable, we must determine previously to require of the Greeks to join us, without assuring them of any prospect but what must depend on the arrangements which Great Britain, at a future period, may be disposed to make. This will paralise their activity in your cause, and render them indifferent, and, perhaps, inimical to it. To promise them independence, laws, and a regular government, without being

determined to support them, we must perjure ourselves to deceive them, and to destroy, at the same time, our credit; and any attempt not able to bear this scrutiny must have results similar to those of Egypt and Buenos Ayres. It is therefore obvious that we ought either to abandon the idea altogether, or to reduce all insular Greece to the state of a dependent confederacy, under the specious title of independent allies; or even perhaps for the Greeks to receive the British sovereign as their liege lord, under certain stipulations of rights and privileges. This would give a sanction and legality to the measures which would silence the clamour of Opposition at home, while it would pre-suppose, on the part of the Greeks, the obligation of contributing to the general support of the insular empire by the furnishing such numbers of men, and such supplies in money, as might be raised without oppression, were a proper system of revenue laws established. It is by this material alteration in the management of our colonial dependencies alone that we can rationally hope to draw such advantages as to prevent the increase of our empire from drawing after it so great a train of expenses as has hitherto rendered even our most brilliant successes oppressive and injurious to ourselves.

The Greek people have been considered, in all ages, as fickle and treacherous; but if we consider the various forms of government, and the political circumstances in which they have been placed, this unsteadiness is not to be wondered at. When the great body of a people feels their own advantage inseparable from the government which protects them and secures their property, few will ever wish to change, from mere love of variety; but when we can also offer them the means of gratifying their favourite pursuit, it requires great perversion of excellent abilities in those employed by that government to alienate the minds of a people in such a predicament; and in that case the Greeks would have full right to retort the reproach of bad faith on those who had deceived them. The darling propensity of the Greeks is commerce and navigation, which they pursue with admirable courage and enterprise; hence, it is to be presumed that they would receive propositions from us without reserve.

It is obvious that the creation of a maritime power must be an object of anxious desire to the French; and that the Greeks, thrown

into their scale, would promote and assist their views; hence the necessity of seriously and speedily occupying ourselves with the destiny of Greece.

The opportunity which at present offers itself is perhaps the most favourable that could possibly be expected—the moment of the decay and fall of the Ottoman power—which, influenced by its fears, will show great readiness to accede to any proposals we may make to it.

I conceive, that whatever person were sent, at the present moment, into the Levant, the following should be the powers and instructions with which he ought to be armed, and the tenor of conduct he ought to pursue:—The Turks, last year, offered to make a secret treaty with Great Britain, to be made public when circumstances should permit, or even to conclude an armistice: this probably not being contained in the instructions of their minister, the affair was broken off; but if the assistance which we could give to the Porte were not so efficient as to make secrecy superfluous, in the refusal on our part we were certainly wrong; and the event has shown it. But whatever treaty we make with the Porte, whether it be public or secret, can be but of little consequence, provided we gain our point. Our object being, if possible, to save Asia Minor, in order to prevent the ills which would thence ensue, it does not seem that our own interest should be sacrificed to so trifling a consideration. Should government have it in contemplation to send another minister to the Porte, the Capitan Pasha Seid Ali, who is a friend to the British interest, will most probably be again sent to treat with him.

The Turks will implore our protection, which we must not be averse to give them; but it must be represented to them, that if they expect it of us, they must not thwart us in the only means by which our assistance can possibly be useful. It should be represented, that in the present circumstances the Archipelago and the whole of the isles are totally out of their power to defend; and also that the inhabitants, being Christians, must of course be their

* This was written before the affairs of Spain had induced Bonaparte to accommodate matters with the Porte.

enemies. If they remain as they are, they will evidently incline to the French, and we shall become odious by seeking to prolong the period of their servitude; that the only rational method to make them useful to the Porte would be by the medium of their being annexed to our power; that the government they would receive from Great Britain being more congenial to their interests, they would become more alienated from the insidious overtures of the French; and hence they would see that the Turks in Asia would become their natural allies. Their fighting for them in this state of affairs would alter the nature of the case; and a small British army becoming, as it were, the nucleus on which a Greek force might be constituted, would render our situation respectable, for reasons which will shortly be mentioned.

If the Turks accede to this proposal, a secret treaty might be signed, and by agreement the British forces would attack the island of Crete, while the minister, who should also have another set of powers to treat with the islanders, would invite them to unite their interests with those of this empire.

This, if it be not made the *sine qua non* of any farther connexion with the Porte, would render any attempt to draw advantage from our interference in the politics of that country perfectly abortive; and if we insist on these conditions, the Turks evidently must accept them, as they will have too much occupation on the continent to make any resistance in that quarter. Even in the event of our success in spite of their refusal, they would, in the end, feel that the increase of our strength in their neighbourhood would oblige them to extend their arms to us for protection.

Had this plan been originally pursued, instead of the ill-concerted descent at Alexandria, the British empire would at this day have been increased by thirty-six islands of various sizes, inhabited by a warlike and maritime people. These would have formed a disposeable force of nearly twenty thousand men. In such circumstances the French would not have been so ready to march through Asia Minor into Persia. But the opportunity, though retarded, is not lost; and though we shall work under greater disadvantages, we must seek to do the best we can, and lose as little time as possible.

The Turks might be further induced to cede this point to us, if we promised to send an army to Bussora *, which cannot safely be done unless the Sheik of the Montefik Arabs were made Pasha of Bagdad. This prince has ever been the faithful ally of Britain. He is able to bring forty thousand cavalry into the field.

Were these two objects gained, the Turks in Asia would acquire more courage; and it is hardly credible but that the French expedition to Persia might thus be intercepted.

In my next I shall unfold my sentiments with respect to the Grecian island, and finally touch on the probable effects which the acquisition would produce in the affairs of European Turkey. I am, &c. &c.

To the same.

Sir,

The Greeks of the Islands are ignorant, illiterate, and superstitious. Most of the isles are the apanage of the sultanas, or sisters of the Sultan. The people are oppressed with heavy tributes, which may be enumerated as follows.

They pay ten per cent. on the produce of the land; all the male inhabitants pay a capitation tax, from the age of fourteen years, upwards. Each island is obliged yearly to furnish a certain number of sailors for the Turkish fleet, (and the number is fixed according to the population of each island,) or pay a certain sum of money to the Capitan Pasha for finding substitutes.

The internal government of the island is a further burthen; each village or town has four municipal magistrates, (Coja Bashi or Αρχοντες πρεσβευτεροι;) these are appointed by the Capitan Pasha, and the natives have no share in their election; they manage the finances of the township, and levy a certain sum of money, at pleasure, on each housekeeper or landed proprietor, for the exigencies of the interior. They meet at different times of the year to share the spoils of their unfortunate countrymen, who have no right to demand any account of these oppressive contributions; but

* On this subject in a future Tract.

nearly the whole is embezzled by the above officers, who become, comparitively, so rich, (notwithstanding that out of their peculative profits they must fee the officers of the admiralty, and the agents of the sultanas,) that they can often produce as much as a thousand pounds sterling, at a moment's warning, as a present or douceur, when their heads are at stake; and all this is without any inconvenience to their fortunes!

We have now to take a view of their ecclesiastical burthens.—Each island makes a part of some continental diocese. When a new bishop is appointed, a very large sum is wanted to fee the patriarch and his head clergy, the vizier, and all the ministers; the new bishop borrows the sum from the money-lenders, at the exorbitant interest of twelve and even eighteen per cent.; and as they have no means of paying the capital, the debt becomes funded on the diocese, and the interest is paid yearly by the inhabitants. It is collected in the same manner as the other municipal burthens. Thus this debt increases with every new bishop. There is, beside, the yearly contribution of each Greek, male and female, together with their children, from which arises the income of the bishop and other casual expenses. After all this, they are again assessed for the maintenance of the priests, and that of the different churches; so that, upon a moderate calculation, three quarters of the annual income of each individual is taken from him. Notwithstanding these impediments to national prosperity, they find means of purchasing all kinds of woollen manufactures, hard and glass ware, crockery, all kinds of stuffs, muslins, kitchen furniture, carpeting, and even the luxuries of the East and West Indies; the only manufactory they have being a coarse kind of linen: but the soil is very fertile, and, added to the great industry of the people, they are enabled to pay all the burthens imposed on them by the sale of their produce, and by their great activity and enterprise in commerce.

Excuse me, Sir, if I here interrupt the course of my narrative by a short reflexion. One third of these taxes, well imposed, would, by alleviating the oppressions of this interesting people, give so great a spring to their industry, that it is not improbable that the public revenue which might be thus drawn would in a short time exceed the amount of the whole of what is at present levied.

This, well administered, would supply the domestic expenses and pay the militia of each island.

Could such a new dominion, if thus arranged, be burthensome to Great Britain, when we consider the population, and consequent disposable numbers of soldiers and mariners? Nothing can overthrow these prospects but the abuses which we may introduce into the system from home, by multiplying and overpaying numberless offices, created to increase patronage.

Should the Turks not accede to our proposals, the method most adviseable to be pursued would be, first, for the British agent, with a small detachment, to present himself at some of the islands, such as Naxos, Paros, or Mycone; make a proposal to them to shake off the Turkish yoke; explain the nature and advantages of a regular system of government, with a solemn guarantee of the continuation of British protection; the inhabitants would, to a man, swear allegiance to the British sovereign. But this must be effected by men who understand the national logic, as well as the character of the people. This experiment having succeeded in the first instance, the same proposals being communicated to the rest, would bring over deputations from all.

In order to effect this point with the greatest certainty, a proper attention must be paid to the clergy, and the rhetoric of the pulpit will be the best means of insuring persuasion to the mass of the people.

Power must be given to, and wisdom must be found in, the breast of the British minister, appointed to this novel and complicated mission, to draw up a civil and criminal code. The Greeks having no laws or tribunals, recur necessarily to arbitration, with an appeal to the Capitan Pasha, which ends in bribery and violence; and the crimes of murder and felony can only be punished by the Capitan Pasha, on his annual visit. This jurisdiction being abolished, it will of course be necessary to pay attention to this subject.

Local circumstances will suggest to the British minister the most proper and least oppressive means of raising a revenue for the internal government of each island, the formation of a public treasury, and to oblige the collectors of the revenue to produce a regular account, with the cash, to the treasury; and these accounts

should be subject to the inspection of six principal inhabitants, chosen from among the most respectable and intelligent: they must be annually printed by public authority, to prevent embezzlement in the officers, and mistrust in the people. This to be under the control of the British minister. By these means the Greeks will enjoy two-fourths more of he fruits of their industry, and under the mild influence of British power they will be a happy, and perhaps a good people.

In the event of these plans being put in execution, we should either, with the consent of the Turks, be able at once to take possession of Crete, or, in the opposite case, having begun with the smaller islands, we should not only prepare the minds of the christian Cretans to join us, but also collect a force from the Archipelago able to co-operate in the taking the fortresses of Suda and Candia. The former would be forced to capitulate as soon as Canea was in our hands; while Candia has no water, except by an aqueduct which a Sphachiot informed me might be cut off.

I need not repeat here what I have already urged in the course of my former Tract on Sphachia, and the state of the country. If we are once in possession of the island, it will soon be seen if the Mahomedans will submit to our government. If they will not, it would be very easy to banish them the island, and their possessions would become farther pledges for the fidelity of those who succeeded to them. Suffice it to say, that the Cretans are under the same disadvantages in point of their municipal government and oppressive contributions.

Let me beg of you, Sir, at this moment to reflect on the consequences which this enterprise, happily executed, would produce in European Turkey; for we have already seen its probable effects in Asia.

The French armies have met with success, as the editor of the French paper says, by intimidating the rich, and deceiving the mass of the people by the promises of peace and tranquillity. The inhabitants of Thrace and Macedon are more difficult to deceive, because they do not sigh for peace as the Germans, and others who are farther advanced in civilization, while their chiefs are more warlike and independent. Should the French, by sophistry, get

a footing in these countries, the people in a short time will be found less willing, as well as less able, than others, to bear spoliations such as are committed on other nations.

The British policy established in the islands, contrasted, in all its aspects, with the French system, would sooner convince mankind, than all the volumes which could be written on the subject, of the superior goodness of our government; and while the discontent of the French on the continent increased, the resolution of the people would be strengthened by the asylum offered in the isles.

The followers of Czerñi George and Ali Pasha, &c, would cease to consider the French power as the only one in Europe, when they saw the effects of our's in the neighbourhood. It may be easy to defeat these in a pitched battle, but the French will find it very difficult to maintain their dominion over a country where every one, from the age of twelve years, carries a musket; and to confirm the conquest by arts of peace, in which they are far from being conciliatory.

Here then are means given to us to stop the progress of the French on the side of Asia, while the difficult task assigned them in Europe would still farther impede their ambitious projects. We have already enumerated the advantages arising from the population of Greece; we have touched on the influence it would give us in the neighbouring continents; and as this paper is too limited for us to expatiate on the commercial advantages, let us only consider the utility of the produce of these islands, their wines, silks, and particularly their oils. The deficiency in the article of tallow, since the rupture with Russia, would be supplied by the Cretan oil, for the soap manufactories. There is abundance of hemp, pitch, and spars for yards. The commerce which the growing prosperity of these islands would occasion with this country, their trade with one another, and with the coasts of Syria and Egypt, should also be put into the scale. But above all, let us reflect on the consequences of the establishment of our power, with the accession of such numbers, and such territories, the beauty and convenience of the harbours, &c.; the spirits of the people of England would be raised, and their prospects would brighten; the dark clouds which lowered on our distant Asiatic dominions would clear away, a spirit of en-

terprise would animate the people, strengthen the ministry, and silence the opposition.

I cannot help regretting that, ere this, some arrangements with respect to Sicily have not been made, by which the jealousy of the court might have been calmed, and the country put on such a footing as to have enabled us to draw some auxiliary force for this undertaking in the Levant: but on this subject enough has been said in those Tracts which have already been laid before you.

In this and my last letter I have briefly brought together the principal points which struck me on the subject of Greece; had I expatiated more, I might have been tedious. If I have been deficient or obscure in any part, I hope, Sir, you will do me the honour to put queries to me on such parts of the subject as I may have overlooked, and I shall endeavour to satisfy your inquiries; in the mean time believe me ever ready to obey your commands, and to subscribe myself, &c. &c.

To the same.

Sir,

The plan you mentioned to me to have been suggested by another person, on the subject of Peloponnesus, contrasting it with that of beginning with the islands, has been agreeable to the opinions of many with whom, when abroad, I have conversed on this subject. If the short-sighted delicacy which the former ministry so imprudently exercised toward the Russians had not prevented us from looking to our own interests, perhaps we might have been beforehand with our rivals on this secluded theatre of the continent. But it must, I conceive, occur to you, that should we at this period persevere in this project, the enemy being so near, and having already found their parties and connexions, we should begin our career with too many disadvantages, and be forced into an active war before we are properly prepared for it. Let us console ourselves, however, with this reflexion, that in the continental part of Greece, including Macedon and Thessaly, it will require great

wisdom, energy, and power, on the part of the French, to consolidate their dominion; and any favourable change which may probably be effected in the politics of the cabinet of St. Petersburg would oblige the French to recall their troops from that quarter. All, then, will depend on the abilities and address of your agent in the isles, to prepare these countries to follow their example; for the Helleno-Britannic force formed in the isles, with the printed papers which might be distributed on the continent, would prepare the minds of all to seek our confederation and alliance: but at any rate it is evident that the quantity of uncultivated tracts existing in Crete, Rhodes, Cyprus, and the rest of the islands, might be granted to such Greeks of the continent as would choose to settle under our protection, particularly in Cyprus, which is almost desolate; and this would render them more populous and flourishing, while it would leave the Peloponnesus, Attica, and Bœotia desert, and of course defenceless. Particular attention ought to be paid to this part, while the faculty of making grants of land should be entrusted to the minister, and his grants confirmed by government here. In this manner the nation of Greeks would be concentrated in our hands, and identified with ourselves, and the despotism and violence of France would, in these parts, distant from the centre of their power, cede to the superior wisdom and foresight of the British councils. In this state of things, a favourable impression would be made in our favour; the whole eastern coast of continental Greece would be open to receive us; and our agents with Czerni George and others would either induce them to join us, or undermine their power in the public opinion.

Your minister should be furnished with a set of Greek and European types, and a compositor; the rest must depend on his own abilities, and he must be guided in the substance of his proclamations and public papers by the circumstances of the day, the difficulties which may arise, and considerations of the moment, which it is impossible to anticipate at this distance. To enter fully into a detail of measures necessary to be observed for the continent of Greece would be premature at this moment, while there is no doubt but that the possibility of the enterprise would be greatly increased by having accomplished the insular plan; and it will then be full time to enlarge on the subject. Many events will then have

have taken place which at present cannot be foreseen: these, together with the general state of politics, must in a great measure influence the motives of ministers in the prosecution of the war. If I may be permitted, for a moment, to diverge from the limits of my subject, I will beg you to prepare for a change of politics in Russia, and to consider that your power thus acquired in Greece would be the principal means of inducing Austria * once more to shake off the yoke; and what surer means can be devised to encourage those nations, prostrate at the feet of your enemy, than to show them that Great Britain is always occupied rather in extending than circumscribing the limits of her empire, in spite of all the sophisms on her approaching destruction; that she is occupied with her own greatness and glory, rather than in confining her views to a cold and trembling defence.

I close this letter, Sir, fearing that I must have tired you on the subject; but I beg leave to inclose you a copy of a letter written by Mr. ——— to Sir A. Paget. The coincidence of sentiments between us on this subject may tend in some measure to confirm your confidence in the reflexions which I have, at your desire, submitted to your consideration. I am, &c. &c.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. —— to Sir Arthur Paget.

SIR, *Feb.* 1808.

I shall in the first place consider the Turkish empire, in its probable downfall, with respect to its possessions in Europe, and the benefits which Great Britain ought to reap from that event.—The line of conduct I shall suggest may in some shape vary from the generally-established rules, but it will be more or less adapted to the present politics of the continent.

The civil disturbances which exist in the European provinces of the Ottoman empire are dreadful; the executive power is now in the hands of illiterate persons in the military department, who

* Bonaparte, who sees this, will overthrow the Austrian monarchy as soon as he conveniently can.

control the power of the ministers at the Porte. One quarter of these states is in the hands of rebels, namely, Czerni George, Ali Pacha, and some others, who occupy all the tract of territory from Belgrade down to the Morea, and the opposite coast to the shores of the Mediterranean. Most of that country forms a chain of inaccessible mountains, where no regular army can make an impression. Add to this, the civil warfare, the restless ambition of Bonaparte, and the jealous views of Russia and Germany. All these considerations will leave little hopes of the salvation of Turkey in Europe. However, I am far from supposing that the allied powers of the continent will make an easy conquest of these countries, for their resources are really great, the fanaticism of their religion is inconceivable, and the number of men they can muster in the field immense: they will of course make a desperate resistance. But notwithstanding their efforts, the fatal blow will ultimately fall; Bonaparte will use bribery; and the French emissaries are, no doubt, already scattered over the rebellious provinces, endeavouring to form alliances, and promising the rebels support and protection, while their ambassador at the capital is probably endeavouring to form a party to assist their future views in the partition which Bonaparte has sketched out of European Turkey. He of course has appropriated to himself the whole of the Archipelago; and being already in possession of the Adriatic, will naturally exclude the English from the trade of the Levant seas. France wants a navy, and she will find plenty of materials to create one, and able sailors in these islands to navigate their ships. In this eventful time, will Great Britain be an inactive spectator? It is true that with a British fleet stationed in the Levant seas, at a very heavy expense, his plans of commerce and navigation may be greatly annoyed; but will any benefit arise to this country? None, except a few paltry prizes of little or no value. The plan which my limited ideas have suggested is as follows:— The Ottoman government, in the late overtures made by the Reis Effendi to you, Sir, looks upon your mission to the Dardanelles as continuing in full force, and your actual departure was of course not announced to the Ottoman ministry by the grand admiral till very lately; notwithstanding all which, they have appointed the

same admiral, Seid Ali Pasha, as plenipotentiary, and the Reis Effendi solicits you to facilitate the completion of the treaty.

The inference that may be drawn from this conduct is, that they wish to obtain the friendship of this country, and avail themselves of its assistance, should the event require it: but they are desirous to gain as much time as possible previous to concluding a treaty, and by that means avoid giving offence to the neighbouring powers who threaten her destruction.

It would in all probability be derogatory to his majesty's dignity to send a second embassy with full powers to treat with the Turkish plenipotentiary, for this new attempt would prove as fruitless as the former, the same reason which existed at that time not having subsided.

The line of conduct I would recommend to be adopted is to follow the idea of the Reis Effendi's letter to you, Sir, and that a proper person be delegated, under the authority of your full powers, and accredited by government, to treat with the Ottoman plenipotentiary. The object of the Ottoman cabinet would be to conclude a secret treaty, as formerly offered, and, in my opinion, they ought to be indulged: but in lieu of a definitive treaty of peace, only preliminary articles should be concluded and signed, with the cession, on the part of the Porte, of the island of Crete, as a guarantee for the execution of the definitive treaty; and that island to be held by his majesty, and the forts to be garrisoned by British troops, until the period of a general peace; and in order to favour and follow up the idea of secrecy, the Ottoman Porte may send private orders to the commander of the island to suffer an English force to land, and take possession of the forts. It will thus appear as if Great Britain had taken possession of the island by a coup de main.

Having such a strong footing in the Archipelago, the rest of the islands will be an easy conquest, in the event that Turkey in Europe should fall a prey to the ambition of France. England, in the mean time, will secure the trade of Egypt, all the coast of Syria, and the Archipelago, which may be formed into an insular state, under the dependence and protection of Great Britain. The beys of Egypt will then be tributary to and under the protection of

Great Britain, which they have long looked for and solicited, and a flourishing trade would be established in the Mediterranean, the Levant seas, and on the coast of Syria. But in the event that our conjecture on the downfall of the Turkish empire in Europe is unfounded, or that some unforeseen event should effect a change in the politics of the continent, and that the Turkish empire should exist in the same state as before the Russian war, the British trade will, notwithstanding, be in a flourishing condition, its manufactures will be looked for in preference to others, and the British will always have an ascendancy over those people in preference to any other nation, although things may be again established on the ancient footing.

I solicit your indulgence if I have too long intruded on your patience, and I have the honour to be, with truth and respect, Sir, &c. &c.

TRACT IX.

Supposed Address to the Cabinet, on the Invasion of India.

The invasion with which the French menace our dominions in India presents many difficulties and subjects of apprehension. In effect, if they can accomplish their project, they will certainly inflict a deeper wound than any we have ever received in any preceding war. When I consider the weight of these impending events, I do not think we ought entirely to despair, nor therefore to neglect to turn our attention to them; for it is the part of a politician and of a vigorous mind to be firm in the midst of the greatest dangers, and from the greatest evils with which we are threatened to draw the greatest hopes of advantage. I shall endeavour to say a few words on this subject, and show what reflexions should suggest themselves, and what seems adviseable to be done to avert the consequences which may be apprehended. First, we must remember, that by being masters of the sea, we possess the best means to hinder and retard the designs of our enemies.

But from Europe as well as northern Asia the most warlike na-

tions of the earth are moving, and threaten to pass the immense desarts and mountains which intervene betwixt them and the British settlements, which they design to subvert. The French and Russians united muster their forces on the shores of the Caspian sea; and the latter having lately made a treaty with the Persians, have been joined by them in the confederacy against us.

It therefore becomes necessary, instead of waiting on the defensive, to carry the war out of our own territories; and the truth of this reflexion is established from the days of Hannibal; for who could be content to see his own state devastated by an enemy, while he is able to carry the war abroad?

Persia lies between us and those who are concerting designs against us, and that country ought to be the theatre of the war. Taking the subject up in this point of view, let us consider its site and topography. It lies in the middle of Asia, and is accessible from three points: on the east, by the province of Candahar, whose inhabitants (the Afghans) have a rooted enmity to the Persians. These being induced to make an inroad with cavalry into Persia, would render the greatest service to our cause. In the Persian Gulf, below Bussora, are the mouths of the Tigris and Euphrates, and these offer a convenient harbour for the purposes of invasion on our part, in that quarter, which should be executed with vigour. By the rapidity of our enterprises we must anticipate the projects of the enemy; and before they can arrive, enter, if possible, into Persia *, and dethrone the present usurper of that kingdom, establishing another chief, who would thus become our ally.

On the western side of Persia lie the provinces of Mesopotamia and Asiatic Turkey; and should the French, in union with the Russians, invade that empire, it is evident that the Ottomans will be driven out of Europe, and that they will be found to emigrate in masse into Asia. It is from this consideration that the necessity of acquiring the islands naturally occurs; for having once established our power in them, we shall increase it on the ruin of that of the Turks. Islands are both useful and necessary to a great

* It is on this account that the policy of promoting the Montefik chief to the government of Bagdad has been recommended.

maritime power, and it is incumbent on such a power, in such changes of states and empires, equally to provide against their belonging to its enemies, or becoming a nest of pirates.

In the present condition of the whole world two distinct features are to be observed; the northern and western parts of the old continent are evidently under the influence of the enemy, while the southern and all islands may be considered as under that of Britain; for if there be no law but force on one side, it is fit the same right should be established on the other. Our field of contention is therefore in the islands of Greece, in Persia, and on the frontiers of India; but our conduct should be energetic: in Greece, by inviting the people to a freedom analogous to the spirit of our own institutions; in Persia, by changing the dynasty which reigns there; and in Caboul and Candahar, by inciting the Afghans to invade the eastern provinces of Persia.

It is well known to all that India is bounded on the north by the chain of Imaus, and beyond this is the kingdom of Independent Tartary. This tract lies between India and the Russian territories. The Oxus and Ochus (Gihon and Sihon) take their rise in the above chain of mountains, opposite to those of the Indus on the south. After joining their streams, which become navigable, they empty their united waters into the lake Aral. This lake is situated within the Russian dominions, and it is to be apprehended that the Russians will from thence follow upward the course of this river; it is therefore necessary to open the eyes of the princes of Independent Tartary to the fatal consequences of permitting the enemy to enter their territories, and, to encourage them to defend their empire, which has never yet been conquered from their ancestors. The alliance of this people is valuable, as their country is for the most part plain, and their cavalry numerous and hardy.

Let me conjure you neither to neglect or undervalue the Grecian islands *, for they are inhabited by a hardy and brave race of men;

* The writer is informed from good authority that a secret article of the peace of Tilsit, in the partition of Turkey, was, that Crete should be erected into a duchy dependent on France. Time alone will show if Bonaparte can draw so great an advantage from our want of foresight.

and in the event of the downfall of Turkey, and our neglect of this counsel, their strength will be employed against us ; and in that exigency how shall we prevent the enemy from becoming master of Syria and Egypt, and even of the coast of Africa?

The Greeks are addicted to commerce and navigation, and they are the more inimical to the French on account of religion, and their hatred to the Roman catholic persuasion ; they also are at variance with the Russians, on the score of the supremacy of the Greek church, which the patriarch of Moscow is ambitious of arrogating to himself: but we, by leaving them a perfect toleration in the concerns of religion, shall have the means of securing their attachment. Thus having obtained the dominion of insular Greece, the enemy will have the greater difficulty in invading Asia Minor, because they will leave a force in their rear in the west, while the Afghans, making an inroad from the east, will tend greatly to counteract their views.

A British army embarked at the same time at Bombay and the Cape of Good Hope, and rendezvousing at Bussora, may be able to turn Persia over to our alliance.

Let us by no means neglect these reflexions, but chiefly let us not await the war in India ; for who can tell what disturbances may arise, and what dangers to ourselves, when the enemy shall have once got a footing in our territories? Consider the consequences of our succeeding in this enterprise—in how favourable an aspect it would place our affairs—the respectable elevation on which we should stand, were it accomplished. Secure for the present, we should thus be prepared for those events which, after the death of Bonaparte, may open to us new prospects. A total failure ought not to be surmised ; it would argue the employment of inadequate means ; and the objects are too important not to justify all our efforts for their attainment.

TRACT X.

June, 1803.

THE town of Alexandria was occupied by the British forces in the beginning of last year; and some reflections on the subject, written shortly after the event took place, have been hazarded in a former essay. That place has been since evacuated, and no end answered by the transaction. It will not be foreign to our purpose to pursue the subject a little farther, and trace the tissue of errors which pervaded all our measures, and led us to do away every advantage that, notwithstanding the impolicy of the outset, after all we might have realised, and the detail will furnish some information hitherto not publicly known.

As soon as the army had got possession of Alexandria, the Beys, who had not been advised of this enterprise, immediately dispatched one of their number to head-quarters. He told the general, that the whole body were willing to co-operate with him in driving the Turks from Egypt: he advised him to remain tranquil until the the Beys could collect their forces from the upper country, and as they consisted chiefly of cavalry, that their assistance would ensure success to whatever future enterprise they should undertake. This advice was not taken, and the disasters that followed were the consequences of an ill-judged ambition, which ruined the army before the means of success were ready. In this state of things, a minister was sent to the Porte to treat with the Turks. Every disposition was shown on their part to come to a proper accommodation; they requested the evacuation of Egypt, and offered to make a treaty, to be kept secret for four months. Our minister would admit of no secret treaty, (though the publication would evidently have caused the invasion of the Turkish provinces,) and no advantage was taken of the friendly disposition of the Turks. About the end of the negociation, the Capitan Pasha, in consequence of the repeated refusal of the minister to evacuate Alexandria, told him that it was not a request he should repeat, as he would hear, by the first intelligence, that the measure was already taken.

Two days after this event arrived a Bey from Egypt, with full powers to treat with the British minister. The Beys offered to govern Egypt under the British protection; they asked for a certain body of infantry, and offered to provide cavalry themselves. They expressed their readiness to make any arrangements with respect to external commerce and internal government which the British should wish, and, in fact, tendered Egypt to us, on a footing similar to that of our Indian possessions. This, in the state of affairs at that period, was having a hold on Egypt, which we might have profited by in future; and, at any rate, the conditions of receiving the country under our protection were better than we could have promised ourselves when we occupied it.

This proposal, and every other offer of the Beys, was rejected. Thus the object of the mission seems to have been, to exclude ourselves from any advantages, whether present or future. If this conduct was dictated from home, it seems as if the new ministry had purposely contrived that no good should be derived from the occupation of that country, lest the merit should be claimed by their predecessors; as if the greatest proof of their talents would not have been to have made an ill-concerted enterprise turn out well! These failures have deprived us totally of any influence in Turkey; and it may be fairly asked, what benefit can arise from Mr. Adair's new mission to a state that is not able to defend itself against the common enemy, and whose destruction we cannot prevent? The result must be, that we can make no treaty at all, or make one which we cannot fulfill, unless we secure first, by an armament, the Grecian islands. This point is what the French must naturally wish to prevent, and it is not quite absurd to suspect that if any treaty is concluded with the Porte without this condition, it will be made with the privity of the French, who will amuse us till it is too late. Should it in future be discovered that we were thus duped, and which is but too probable, from the dependance of the Turks on the northern powers, it will be a fresh proof of the sagacity of our cabinet: but time will shew!

The plan to occupy the Greek islands has been rejected by our ministers; and we must proceed to show, that the neglect of it will ensure to the French the most complete accomplishment of their views in Asia.

As soon as the affairs of Spain shall have been arranged, which our half measures will not prevent, while they keep us completely employed, Bonaparte will dethrone the emperor of Germany, and erect a sovereign of his own, who of course will be his trusty vassal. It is then that every obstacle will be removed to his attempts on Turkey. The Turks will be driven from Europe, and they will enter into a treaty with the French, in which the free passage of an army to Persia will be stipulated. This will put Asia Minor completely under the power of France, and the following will be the use they will make of it.

From the shores of the Mediterranean to the frontiers of Persia, the Turkish empire is not, like Spain, inhabited by one people, but by various nations and tribes, differing in religion, manners, and even language. The Turks, it is true, are the predominant race; but while the others all join in a general hatred against them, yet these have no political or moral tye which can hold them together. On the contrary, a mutual hatred pervades all; the Greek, Armenian, Jew, Lesgi, Arab, Turcoman, &c. have all their separate interests in view; a French general, in the heart of this country, will become the arbitrator over all; and the means he has of improving the political condition of each, and of course the benefits he may confer on them, will be of no small assistance to his power. The allotment of lands on the tenure of fee simple, an usage unknown in Asia, is fraught with such evident advantages, that it would ensure to the French a decided influence in every part of the continent; and while by this means the asperity of religious prejudices will be softened, the whole of Turkey and Persia will become his vassals, under the specious appellation of allies.

This new political arrangement, which will probably take place in Asia, will have a relative effect on our Indian empire; and as we have taken the greatest pains to preserve those who may trouble our repose, the appearance of things will then be much changed; and while we must ever expect an enemy on the frontier, we have every reason to apprehend disturbances in the interior, from the native powers. This, added to what has been above said on the subject, shows how well we are prepared to meet these reverses, aided, as we may expect to be, by our jealous missionaries and their numerous Brahmin proselytes.

It seems to be a principle with the rulers of this empire, to leave events to their natural course, and to be totally indifferent to every danger till it be too late to apply the remedy. But they will tell us, that Sir Harford Jones is gone on an embassy to Persia. What effect will his gold and his eloquence have in opposing the intrigues of France, backed by the expectation of an army? Unless our minister can command the same means, the figure he will make at the Persian court will be very small!

It has been proposed, in the last Tract, to government, to occupy Bussora, and to promote the sheik of the Montefik Arabs to the government of Bagdad: this project is treated as a chimera, but it is what the French are now employed in accomplishing; they will by these means raise up to us an enemy, where we might have made an efficient friend.

When the neglect of these measures shall be brought forward in parliament, the public will be amused with very fine speeches *; but will the flow of eloquence hinder the progress of human events, and remedy the evil consequences which must ensue? or is the management of the House of Commons the only duty of ministers? It is certainly indispensible to the maintenance of their places; but the nation must ever consider the prosperity and grandeur of the empire at large as a more weighty consideration.

It may be contended, that the loss of India will be no detriment to Great Britain; that we shall have the same trade as before: this, however, must depend on the power which the French may establish there; but even if this should turn out as some have alledged, are Britons grown so callous to the wounds of their national honour as to be prepared for every humiliation? Do they look forward to be shut up in their own island, with the hope of perpetually being the merchants and carriers of the universe? Ambition may be a vice, but it is the parent of several virtues—its absence generates incurable imbecility.—Far be it from us to degrade our countrymen by supposing that this important spring of the human mind has, with them, lost all its elasticity!

* The contests of the Veneti and Prassini, in the Circus, alternately amused and found serious occupation for the people; but—they did not prolong the duration of the empire.

A party of considerable weight and respectability exists in Great Britain, known under the appellation of *Whigs;* the basis of their political theory is founded on the most virtuous motives. It teaches moderation with respect to foreign affairs; and in those of the interior, excites a salutary jealousy of any increase in the power of the crown. The argument used by these men against conquest is, that by daily increasing the empire by foreign dependencies, so much patronage is given to the throne as totally to overwhelm that influence which the representatives of the people ought to possess, to defend the rights of their constituents. As long as the powers of Europe balanced each other, this doctrine was justly considered as the security of the subject, and as pointing out the most efficacious means of preserving the purity of the constitution *: but when the possibility of continuing longer an independent people, on the same terms as before, is done away, and the necessity of increasing our relative power, in order to preserve our political existence, has become more manifest, without changing the system of our conduct, ought our jealousy of the power of the sovereign to supersede the apprehension of those external dangers which menace our independence? and if we have two evils to contend with, is it not natural that our first object should be to oppose the greatest? But let us suppose, for a moment, that in endeavouring to balance the power of France, by adding to our own intrinsic weight, through the means which are pointed out in these essays, we increase the patronage of the crown, still, as long as the British army is composed of men whose personal interests are connected with the liberties of the people, and with the fundamental laws on which they repose, have we any just

* See sixth book of Polybius, ch. 48, &c. He says that the government of Sparta was calculated for self preservation, but not for conquest or aggrandisement; that when they aimed at the dominion of Greece, they were in danger of losing their own territories. The relative situation of Sparta obliged her to seek to increase her power, lest she should be overwhelmed by her neighbour. As her polity was defective in this particular, she fell.—If we can bring this reflexion home to ourselves, at the same time that we must feel the necessity of enlarging our sway, there is no defect in our constitution which ought reasonably to oppose our views. Let the whigs be induced to temper the severity of their doctrines by reflecting on this obvious truth.

grounds to fear that such an army will ever become an engine in the hands of the crown to oppress the public freedom, and to reduce this kingdom to an absolute monarchy? Corrupted as the manners of the times may be, it is degrading the character of the nation too far; and, if they deserve this censure, it may with justice be doubted, whether a people so degenerate will long be able, with all the constitutional barriers in which we are taught to confide, to preserve those rights from invasion, to maintain which inviolate, a superior portion of the manly virtue is required?

TRACT XI.

July 1808.

It has been objected by some to whose consideration these opinions have been submitted, that such a system of policy could never be adopted by a British cabinet, and that they were suited only to those councils which possessed full powers, without apprehending the animadversions of an opposite party. If this reflexion be admitted as just, it results that the power given to ministers is inadequate to the emergency of the times; and that while the danger is so great, those powers should be enlarged. If this objection be not admitted as valid, (and we ought not to receive it lightly, when we consider the great power which Mr. Pitt enjoyed, though he misemployed it,) this will only show that the supposed weakness of this cabinet must arise from some interior defect of their own, and this defect can be no other than a want of union among themselves. If this be admitted, this state of discord must condemn them, throughout their career, to a series of half measures, not only inglorious, but ruinous. They must be sensible of this fact themselves; but if they reflect on the consequences of persevering in such a system, they can only be united in one principle, which is that of neglecting every advantage, from the fear of shortening the period of their continuance in office. In this deplorable state of things the nation must witness every advantage on the side of the enemy, and her approaching downfall as a great empire *.

* Roi de Prusse Histoire de mon Temps, chap. 8, says of Louis XV. after the death of Fleuri—"La France fu gouvernée par

Let it be permitted to an obscure individual to ask his countrymen what hopes they can entertain from the present rulers of the state; and should these give way again to those who exclusively arrogate to themselves the talents of the country, will they expect from them a conduct better adapted to the necessities of the times? Our only hope of salvation rests in the formation of a third party of men of virtue and genius, who will adopt new measures. The history of all ages has shown us that energetic measures were not exclusively followed by absolute monarchies, but that wars have been carried on with vigour by all states, under every denomination of government; for a decided action results from a concentration of the public will in one or more hands. Now if this faculty, according to the British constitution, be deposited nowhere, it follows that there is no government at all, and that the state can neither have nor express a will, on great occasions. Thus the spirit of the government is calumniated, to find excuses for those who enjoy authority without the firmness necessary to their situation.

To those who have reflected on the comprehensive system of politics pursued by Bonaparte it is natural to put the question, why similar projects, in point of greatness and extent, should not be entertained by the British government—why those who recommend them should be called *chimerical theorists*. If we do not admit that great measures are incompatible with this government; if we consider such a proposition as an undeserved reproach to the constitution, it must occur, that the only obstacles must be in the ministers themselves;—and if they can only see objects in miniature, and confine their action to a narrow plan, under the deluded idea of going on *snugly*, their ambition to govern an empire, to whose annals they will not add much glory, is of the most humble species.

Let the people of this country reflect maturely on this statement; let them carry their imaginations on to the termination of the next ten years; but if they are so infected by the factions which tear

quatre roi subalterns, independens les uns des autres. Ce gouvernemens mixte produisit des details de departmens; mais les vues generales qui reunissent et embrassent en grande le bien de l'etat et son interet, manquerent dans les conseils."

this empire as not to see the necessity of pursuing a more energetic and decided conduct, let them prepare themselves for the chains which the weakness of our rulers is now employed in forging.

While the affairs of Spain have totally diverted the attention of government from substantial plans for the grandeur and security of the empire, a considerable part of their forces has been sent, under Sir John Moore *, to Sweden: on their arrival there, the general was forced to quarter his troops, there being no plan of measures fixed on for the campaign, no arrangement with the court of Stockholm, and no definitive orders for his conduct. This, like all our other enterprises, appears to have been followed by half measures, of which the impotence would insure the ridicule, if the consequences were not deplorable.

It is now that the imprudence of giving up the island of Zealand, though the necessity of retaining it was obvious, begins to be felt. To have stipulated its evacuation was a step of the highest absurdity; but to keep an engagement made to a state which shortly after might justly be deemed to have ceased to exist as an independent kingdom, and to fulfill those very conditions in favour of our enemies, who succeeded virtually to the supreme power, is a conduct which Grotius himself would be puzzled to defend. It was giving Zealand to France, for the purpose of being employed as an instrument against ourselves. But it is said the cession of Zealand became necessary, in consequence of the hard frosts which prevail there, when it is impossible to prevent an army from marching across the ice; and that at any rate a fleet cannot keep those seas in

* When General Moore arrived in Sweden, as no orders had been given to him what measures were to be pursued, and he had found none from Stockholm, he sent home for directions: he was desired to put himself under the command of the king. As soon as his Swedish majesty was acquainted with the measure, he summoned the general to the capital, where he found the king was neither willing to allow him to act in Norway, nor to remain for the defence of the kingdom. The British army was intended, therefore, to act in Finland; but as this was quite out of the original plan of operations, the general refused to obey the order, left Stockholm suddenly, and arrived at Gottenburg, whence he embarked with his whole army. Thus ended the enterprise in Sweden, founded on crude and indigested ideas.

the winter. This remark serves only to show, that it never occurred to our military and naval commanders that there still was a means of defending the island; and it is so simple, that one is almost ashamed to bring it forward.

If a British army, placed in Zealand for its defence, should apprehend an invasion, in consequence of a hard frost, the obvious remedy in this case is to construct a fort of such strength and magnitude, that it would detain the besiegers for a longer time than they could possibly spare; for it is evident that they must raise the siege before the thaw, or expect, in their turn, to be overpowered by the re-enforcements we should send in the spring. But as the frost is seldom so violent as to admit the passage of troops, an opportunity of this kind might not occur once in ten years. Beside that, a fort constructed so as to be capable of being defended by ten thousand men would require a much greater force to oblige them to retire to their entrenchments; and so large an army would be reduced by famine to lay down their arms, should they outstay the frost *.

From what has been said, in the course of these Tracts, on the island of Sicily, the late treaty with the court of Palermo will be seen in its true colours. The stipulation of the third article, by which the British are to have provisions duty free, is, in the first instance, a gross fallacy; and if it were not so, it is no more than what all foreign armaments have from time immemorial enjoyed in the ports of that kingdom: but the subsidy of 300,000l. which is paid in consequence of these weighty considerations, is the most absurd of all; for either the money will be applied to an armament raised from a people discontented with the government, and then it is levying an army against ourselves; or the money will be made away with by the agents of the Sicilian government. In that case our salvation must depend on our being the dupes of the negociation.—With these miserable means we oppose the profound wisdom and artful subtlety of the French cabinet!

* The Swedish expedition, with all the magnificent panegyrics on the king, are now silenced, and the Baltic will probably be shut against us. If our pursuits in Spain prove chimerical, we shall see the consequences, but perhaps be too late for our best but last resource—maritime and insular dominion.

The reader will conclude that we breathe nothing but war, and that we are enemies to peace. Let us understand each other before we part.

Peace is obtained in two ways: we make a peace, and we receive a peace. To sue for peace, because we cannot defend ourselves, is to prepare to receive the most humiliating terms: but before we seek peace, to place our affairs in a safe and proud position is a surer way to obtain a durable one, than to seek it in the hour of adversity. Let the example of Rome, when Hannibal was within sight of her walls, bear witness to the strength of this argument. We are not yet reduced to this extremity, and shall we listen to the voice of fear?

To seek peace, because war was undertaken from unjust motives—should that assertion of some writers even be true, it is very amiable morality, but miserable policy. If it can be proved that the French revolution, whose basis was the very insecurity of person and property, was a noble struggle for liberty against despotism, (which those who still remember those days will hardly admit,) it is certainly not a just conclusion, that we should make peace with a state, whose policy, like that of Rome, consists in the destruction of all independent governments; and to express fine sentiments to so cool and designing a politician as Bonaparte, is like the geese reasoning on morality and justice to the fox.

The measures proposed in these papers are not intended to inculcate the necessity of perpetual war, but to form the empire on such a plan as that it shall be invulnerable from without, and wear a menacing appearance to its enemies. A state in this predicament will always insure better terms of peace than that which falls prostrate, and calls for mercy. The first object of peace is safety from insult. Commerce is a brilliant appendage, but not the sole consideration which should guide us in seeking it; if it were, there is no humiliation which we ought not to submit to, in order to obtain it; and having thus gained it, we should be scorned by the French as a nation of pedlars.

Peace with France will be possible, when we can be persuaded that Bonaparte will abandon all his schemes of ambition, to give us the liberty of going with our wares to all the markets in Eu-

rope: but his generals look for fiefs and duchies—they sigh for the plunder of nations.

We may make a peace with France, but at present it would be like those made by Venice or Tuscany; for what treaty can merit a better comparison, unless we can bind the French to guarantee Turkey and Austria, withdraw their troops from Spain, and give us the same footing on the continent as we had before the war? But this is impossible at present, and in our political position we can neither expect nor demand it. It is on this ground that the plan of an insular empire, and the means of securing a predominant influence in Asia, has been recommended.

No party motive can be attributed to the publication of these Tracts, and the administration itself can find no objection to the execution of the measures but the want of sufficient powers: if, therefore, their contents be found to coincide with the sentiments of the public, whatever arguments they may contain against the system of our foreign affairs, the effect must evidently tend to strengthen the hands of government, by disposing the nation to acquiesce in its exertions.

From what has been seen in the course of these Tracts, it must appear clear, that not only Great Britain, but every state which has its own interest at heart, should seek to adopt the following maxim:—"That every state which, instead of reposing on its own strength, trusts to its allies, deceives itself*."—It is not permitted, however, to every government to follow this rule; the jarring interests of the different powers make it necessary to negociate, to temporise, and often to make sacrifices, in order to gain a desired point; for it would be superfluous to court the assistance of a neighbour in accomplishing that which the state could with impunity execute by itself; and the reason of this is evident, because it has never been known that alliances between nations were so sincere, that either should act from disinterested motives; and jealousy is ever at hand to sow the seeds of discord. In the coalitions which have at various times been formed in Europe we have often seen, that every power, in its turn, has been displeased at any great success of its allies, from the fear that as one state was humbled,

* Roi de Prusse Guerre de Sept Ans, ch. 2.

so another was elevated. The king of Prussia's writings are full of examples of this kind *. It would therefore be natural to conclude, that as no alliance can be thoroughly sincere, so it ought never to be recurred to but when it is indispensible.

Few states, however, are able to profit by this reflexion, because their local position prevents their being at liberty to act from themselves; and this is a disadvantage which, until the immense increase of the French empire, particularly belonged to continental powers, whose chief strength consisted in their armies. Britain herself was shackled by the same considerations, because, though she was very powerful at sea, yet other nations were not totally without a maritime force: thus she was often obliged to act from the impulse which was given to her by the position of her allies.

At present the military preponderance of France has excluded us almost entirely from negociating on the continent; but while Britain is in a manner rendered null with respect to this point, her naval power has exceeded all that has ever been known in past times, and that of every other state has been totally annihilated.—In spite, however, of this fact, which is undeniable, we find it often asked, how far we ought to attempt any particular enterprise, by objecting the jealousy of other powers. This results from habit, without reflexion; and though the very nature of our situation, added to the uncontrolable force we have at sea, points out to us that islands are the only basis of our power, yet we make our maritime superiority only a means of pursuing our manœuvres in Europe. It seems inconceivable that, with so obvious a track for us to pursue, we should never be able to strike into this path, but continue in the old one, where we have ever met, and shall encounter, so many obstacles and difficulties; though we know,

* "Depuis qu'en Europe l'art de la guerre s'est perfectionne, depuis que la politic a seu établir une certain balance de pouvoir entre les souverains, le sort commune des plus grands enterprises, ne produit que rarement les effets auxquels on devroit s'attendre; les forces egales des deux cotes et l'alternative des portes et des succes font qu'a la fin de la guerre la plus achernée les ennemies se trouvent chacun a peu près dans le meme etat ou ils etoient avant de l'entreprendre."—Hist de mon Temps, near the end of chap. 14.

from experiments repeated over and over again, that in all wars where we have had to co-operate with allies, every object has been defeated by their want of zeal as well as the clashing of interests which have commonly prevented the attainment of the end desired; so that, instead of the fulfilment of our own wishes, or those of our coadjutors, a third result has arisen foreseen by none.

History is open before us, and the example of Themistocles claims our attention. He saw the effect which is produced by the command of the sea; and, as he felt the defect under which Athens laboured by her situation, he remedied the evil by building the long walls by which the city was joined to the Peiræus, and, as it were, divided it from the rest of Attica. He felt that, had Athens been situated on a considerable island, her situation would have been perfect, and the power she would have acquired over the rest would have enabled her to dispense with the interference she was forced to take in the affairs of the continent, and in the consequently exorbitant power of Sparta; but the genius of Themistocles could not remedy a natural defect, nor could it foresee the mistakes which were afterwards committed, in the war which broke out after his death, and which was mismanaged after that of Pericles.

Britain, at this moment, has the opportunity of putting in practice the theory of Themistocles, at the same time, without the defects of Athens, and the counterpoise of the navies of other states: yet we find that nothing is so far from the intention of our rulers as to profit by an example which speaks so clearly to our present case. It would be unfair to accuse them of want of judgement, and of a defect of reason; the cause, therefore, of this radical fault, which may be deemed the springs of their conduct, must be sought for elsewhere. To those who are acquainted with the king of Prussia's History of his own Times, it is unnecessary to say, that he has not, in general, been accused of disguising the truth of events, nor of falsifying the causes from which they arose. He says, that among the motives which induced king George the Second to enter into the war in support of Maria Teresa and the pragmatic sanction, "that besides it tended to increase his treasures in Hanover, which England was to pay him for the services of the Hanoverian troops. (chap. 8.) In another part of the same history, (chap. 11,) in speaking of the motives which induced him to discharge the lord Car-

teret, he says, that "a general discontent obliged his majesty to turn off a minister who had entered into all his views, and who glossed over, with the appearance of the public interest, all those steps which were taken on account of his electorate. This delicate point has never been given up to any ministry; and to this day, whoever has desired to come into power has been obliged to swear a faithful obedience to the elector of Hanover. Even Mr. Fox *; when a little before his death he came into office, declared himself attached to all that related to his majesty's rights in Hanover.

When lord Lauderdale was at Paris, no difficulty was made to the restitution of Hanover, and the sacrifice will be made whenever the price is paid; but as the tenure would be insecure, while the equivalent would be lost for ever, the matter could come to no conclusion.

It is evident, that the pursuing the plan of an insular empire could never restore Hanover to the royal family, and this is a sufficient reason for our projects being chimerical: but what is more lamentable, it ensures our being constantly embroiled with continental politics.

But would it not be possible to find an indemnity for the private interest of the crown, sufficient to repay it for the loss, among those islands which might be the fruit of maritime war? This indemnity might surely be found; and, indeed, it would be better that such an arrangement were made, than the interests of a great empire should be eternally sacrificed to those of a principality, of so little consequence in the general scale.

As a proof that this is not a groundless assertion, every one who pleases may observe the peculiar deference and respect paid to the Hanoverian minister, now resident at this court, whenever he presents himself at the public office, or at the private houses of any of our cabinet ministers.

* In the Preface to Mr. Fox's work, page 7, he expatiates on the pleasures of literary pursuits, from which nothing but the establishment of a whig party would ever tempt him to deviate. How excellent are the principles of a whig, who, when in place, will render the politics of the state subservient to those of the electorate! But these hard conditions are unavoidable.

When the house of Brunswick was called to the throne of England, the country had been the seat of turbulence and discontent; it was natural, therefore, that strangers should consider their native country as their home, and a refuge here, in case of disturbances: but when that family had become naturalized to the soil, one would be led to suppose that habit had reconciled them to the difficulties attending their brilliant situation; and since the total subversion of the continent, a corner of it, in these days, should not be considered as a retreat, when there shall be no safety here. The contrary is a proof that men reason from habit; for when the empire of the ocean can afford no farther security, to seek a refuge in Hanover is acting like the fascinated bird, which flies into the jaws of the serpent. Enough has been said on this subject. It is to be hoped that Hanover will not, in future, prove a bait to ensnare the independent policy of Britain, nor cause us to deviate from the road to national prosperity: but the public conduct of every state will always have an unaccountable appearance, while the sovereign has interests incompatible with those of his people.

THE END.

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ERRATA.

Page	line	
5	—	2. *for* overweaming *read* overweening
47	—	note, line 4. *for* prædæ *read* prædæ
		5. *for* deinda *read* deinde
62	—	20. *for* at valoren *read* ad valorem
81	—	14. *for* for *read* from
109	—	31. *read* 1763
138	—	10. *for* motion *read* motions

PART II.

30	—	second note, line 1. *for* θαλλατταν *read* θαλατταν
31	—	note, line 2. *for* ανθροπους *read* ανθρωπους
21	—	note, line 2. *for* θαλλασση *read* θαλασση